The state elites and secularism with special reference to the military : the case of the 1980 military intervention by Yılmaz, Mehmet
  
 
 
THE STATE ELITES AND SECULARISM WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO 
THE MILITARY: THE CASE OF THE 1980 MILITARY INTERVENTION 
 
 
 
The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences 
of Bilkent University 
 
 
by 
 
 
MEHMET YILMAZ 
 
 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment Of The Requirements For The Degree Of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION 
 
in 
 
 
THE DEPARTMENT OF 
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
BILKENT UNIVERSITY 
ANKARA 
 
 
February, 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii
I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope 
and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political 
Science and Public Administration. 
 
 
 
_________________________________ 
 
Prof. Dr. Ergun Özbudun 
Supervisor 
 
 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope 
and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political 
Science and Public Administration. 
 
 
 
_________________________________ 
 
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ümit Cizre 
Examining Committee Member 
 
 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope 
and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political 
Science and Public Administration. 
 
 
 
_________________________________ 
 
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Yusuf Ziya Özcan 
Examining Committee Member 
 
 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope 
and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political 
Science and Public Administration. 
 
 
 
_________________________________ 
 
Assist. Prof. Dr. Nur Bilge Criss 
Examining Committee Member 
 iii
I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope 
and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political 
Science and Public Administration. 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
 
Assist. Prof. Dr. Ömer Faruk Gençkaya 
Examining Committee Member 
 
 
 
Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
 
Prof. Dr. Kürşat Aydoğan 
Director 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
THE STATE ELITES AND SECULARISM WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO 
THE MILITARY: THE CASE OF THE 1980 MILITARY INTERVENTION  
 
 
Mehmet Yılmaz 
 
Department of Political Science and Public Administration 
 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ergun Özbudun 
 
 
February 2002 
 
 
 
The study aims to analyze the policies and attitudes of the military leaders of the 
1980 Intervention towards religion. The state elites in the Ottoman-Turkish history 
have been the principal agents behind the secularization reforms and the 
maintenance of the established secularity tradition since the adoption of the 
modernization reforms in the nineteenth century, which initiated a process of social 
and political changes that culminated in the establishment of the Turkish Republic. 
Yet, the affirmative approach of the military leaders of the 1980 Intervention 
denotes a notable break from the previous tradition. The military leaders of the 1980 
accentuated that religion was one of the indispensable components of national 
culture, and promoted it in cultural area through various policies and practices. This 
study tries to comprehend the implications of this change for the established 
secularity tradition in Turkey.  
 
 
Keywords: The Turkish Military, Civil-Military Relations, Politics, Secularism, 
Islam, The 1980 Military Intervention in Turkey, The Policies of 12 September.   
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ORDU ÖZELİNDE DEVLET SEÇKİNLERİ VE SEKÜLARİZM: 1980 ASKERİ 
MÜDAHELESİ ÖRNEK OLAYI 
 
 
Mehmet Yılmaz 
 
Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü 
 
 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ergun Özbudun 
 
 
 
Şubat 2002 
 
 
Bu çalışma 1980 Askeri Müdahelesini  gerçekleştiren askeri liderlerin din ve 
laikliğe ilişkin takındıkları tutumu ve uyguladıkları politikaları incelemektedir. 
Türkiye’de devlet seçkinleri ilk modernleşme hareketlerinin başladığı dönem olan 
on sekizinci yüzyılın sonlarından itibaren hem modernleştirici reformların hem de 
laikliğin arkasında duran en önemli güç olagelmiştir. Oysa 1980 Askeri 
müdahalesini gerçekleştiren askeri liderlerin uygulamalarına baktığımızda önceki 
gelenekten bariz bir şekilde ayrıldıkları görülür. Bu liderler dinin milli kültürümüzü 
oluşturan vazgeçilmez unsurlardan biri olduğunu vurgulayarak onu değişik 
yollardan kültürel olarak güçlendirmeye çalıştılar. Bu çalışma, bu değişikliğin 
mevcut sekülerlik geleneği açısından ne anlama geldiğini ortaya koymaya 
çalışmaktadır.  
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk Ordusu, Ordu-Siyaset İlişkileri, Sekülerleşme, Siyaset, 
Islam, 1980 Askeri Müdahelesi, 12 Eylül Politikaları.   
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CHAPTER I  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 The Military and Secularism in Turkey 
This dissertation aims at understanding the attitudes of the military leaders of the 
1980 military intervention towards secularism and religion with the precise 
implications of their policies for the established secularity tradition and the state-
religion relationship in Turkey. One of the distinguishing characteristics of Turkish 
secularism has been the complete exclusion of religion from politics and the public 
realm. The elites, in the early republican era, took hard measures against the 
religious “establishment” in order to create a modern society in a Western form, 
from the one whose social fabric had been tinted with extremely religious colors. 
The state elites’ prime concern in religion led them basically not to the separation of 
state and religion, leaving religion intact, but to a kind of state-church model in 
which religion was subordinated to the state.1 The Western model of state-church 
                                                 
1 Richard Tapper, “Introduction,” in Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, 
Politics and Literature in a Secular State, ed. Richard Tapper (London, New York: 
 
2 
separation was extended to the religion-politics separation in Turkey which made it 
impossible for religion to articulate its interests politically. No religiously inspired 
political demand has been approved by the state elites. Despite the fact that the state 
declared itself as secular, and that a new official discourse was created with a novel 
and extremely secular vocabulary, in reality, it has not remained immune because it 
has officially organized religious institutions to provide people with religious 
services and reserved the right to interfere in the religious affairs, actions hardly 
compatible with the notion of a secular state. The state’s chief concern with religion 
has been to control it by incorporating religious organizations into the state 
bureaucracy, which is an uncommon model of state-religion relationship in modern 
societies.2  
Secularism in Turkey was developed as a response to modernity. When the 
Ottoman statesmen recognized that they had fallen behind the Western states in 
terms of the military strength, they adopted a secular modernization program through 
Westernization in the early nineteenth century. This initiated a process of 
                                                                                                                                          
I.B. Tauris, 1991), 5; For a classification of the models of state-religion relationship 
and a critical evaluation of different experiences in the Ottoman-Turkish history, see, 
Ali Fuat Başgil, Din ve Laiklik [Religion and Laicism] (Istanbul: Yağmur Yayınları, 
1991). Especially, pp. 191-226; For the proponent views of the interventionist 
secularism, see, Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Atatürkçü Laiklik Politikası [Atatürkist Policy 
of Laicism] (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1970); Bülent Daver, Türkiye 
Cumhuriyet’inde Layiklik [Laicism in Turkish Republic] (Ankara: Son Havadis, 
1955); Doğu Ergil, Laiklik [Laicism] (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1990). 
 
2 Binnaz Toprak, “Islam and the Secular State in Turkey,” in Turkey: 
Political, Social and Economic Challenges in the 1990s, ed. Çiğdem Balım, et. al. 
(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), 91; On the basis of the state’s concern in controlling 
religion, Sami Selçuk calls Turkish secularism as laicist [laikçi] which implies an 
enforcing application. Sami Selçuk, “Laikliği Tanımlama Denemesi ve Tanım 
Işığında Türkiye’nin Konumu” [An Attempt to the Definition of Laicism and the 
Position of Turkey Based on this Definition], Yeni Türkiye [New Turkey] 22-23 
(1998): 2536-2541.  
 
3 
secularizing reforms which culminated in the establishment of the republic in 1923. 
Since religion was considered responsible for the backwardness and as a core of the 
value system of the ancien regimé whose transcendence became the primary mission 
of the reformist elites, they preferred a kind of secular nationalism as a new 
ideology, which did not incorporate religion into the definition of new political 
community neither as a part of cultural identity nor as an attribute of the new 
members of the nation. Secular nationalism, constructed on rationalistic-scientific 
grounds, was offered as a new integrative social bond and a new moral source for the 
nation. However, it could achieve partial success for the new ideology lacked the 
symbolic power in comparison to Islam and an appropriate source of morality.3 That 
is why the liberalization of the politics in the early republican period resulted in 
participation crises, and as a result, the experiments in multi-party politics collapsed. 
Accordingly, the republican elites made deliberate efforts to break the hold of 
religion on society through various reforms which were vital in consolidation of the 
new political system. It was because of the unique nature of Turkish secularism that 
although the state’s hold on politics was lifted after the consolidation of the new 
state and the liberalization of politics dominated the following decades, not 
unexpectedly, no similar developments took place in the state-Islam relationship. 
One could expect that after a gradual process of secularization, which was quite 
successful, the state’s hold on religion would be abolished and religion would be 
allowed to participate in politics. Nevertheless, the historical dissension which 
developed between the state and Islam, coupled with both the religious reactions to 
                                                 
 
3 Şerif Mardin, “Religion in Modern Turkey,” International Social Science 
Journal 29 (1997): 279.  
 
4 
the reforms at initial periods of the republic and the ambivalent attitudes of religious 
groups toward democracy, intensified the prejudices of the state elites; thus, religion 
remained within one of the state’s reserved domains. Any liberalizing move in the 
state-Islam relationship was equated with a return to the ancien regimé.  
 The claim that the permission for religious participation in politics would 
lead to the collapse of democracy seems to reflect the state elites’ firm belief in the 
fragility of Turkish democracy and the whole political system. This claim, however, 
has not been confirmed historically. Turkish democracy has managed to achieve a 
notable institutional autonomization and the emergence of religious parties by the 
end of the 1960s did not lead to the collapse of democracy. Moreover, to what extent 
the position of religious currents in Turkey have been “fundamentalist,” in the sense 
that this thesis has been used to describe the currents in the Middle East and Africa, 
is also open to question. The Islamists’ strong commitment to the state and their firm 
belief in its unity and integrity, which inclined them to play the game within the 
legitimate boundaries, show not only the fact that there is a weak historical ground 
for the emergence of fundamentalism but also the fact that the existence of relatively 
open channels of participation in general politics has been functional in moderating 
radical demands.  
 It was no accident that the conception of Islam as a symptom of the ancien 
régime and a marker of an inferior culture4 inclined the republican elites to design a 
kind of public sphere in which no appearance of religiosity was allowed. Rather a 
monolithic conception of the public sphere was preferred which was open to 
                                                 
 
4 Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, “Rethinking the Connections Between Turkey’s 
“Western” Identity versus Islam,” Critique (Spring, 1998), 9 
 
5 
Western, “universal” and cosmopolitan visions and representations, but closed to 
those of the indigenous, traditional and the “particular.” Designing such a public 
sphere has turned out to be one of the ideological missions of the state, which was 
only a part of the general secularizing one. Expressions of particularism in this sense 
were regarded as expressions of a desire to retreat to the past and a challenge to the 
Western vision of the state, society and the individual. The same was true for the 
political sphere as well. Relying on the republican tradition which places the sole 
emphasis on the “common good” or the “public interest,” the republican elites opted 
a kind of nationalism which conceptualized society within the terms of unity and 
uniformity.5 Consequently, the state elites, particularly the military-bureaucratic 
elites in Turkey, opted for a sort of democracy which gave priority to the “ends of 
the state” rather than to the articulation of particular interests.6 Although the 
republican elites put great accent on modernity, they have failed to recognize two 
crucial aspects of modernization, i.e. social mobilization and increased demands of 
participation by different social groups.7 Their denial of societal divisions and stress 
on the unity and uniformity clashed with the rhetoric of modernity which also 
involved “the discourse of democracy and the rights of equality of citizens.”8 It was 
this paradox between the state’s expressed mission of modernization as 
Westernization which included democracy, on the one hand, and the state elites’ 
                                                 
 
5 Ibid., 13. 
 
6 Ibid., 14; Metin Heper, “Introduction,” in Political Parties and Democracy 
in Turkey, ed. Metin Heper and Jacob Landau (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991), 2. 
 
7 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1968), 33-34. 
 
 
6 
denial of the plurality of politics, on the other, which has produced immense tensions 
between state and society. But the political space was not widened to include these 
particularities. Thus, the project of modernity in Turkey has not proved well in 
absorbing the ethnic and religious particularities and in incorporating them into the 
general body politic. Not unexpectedly, Turkey faced serious crises during the 
1970s. 
 The chief structural determinant behind the formation of such state of affairs 
between the state and society in general and state and religion in particular has been 
the elitist political culture, which has been the most enduring trait of the Ottoman-
Turkish polity. The military and the bureaucratic elites have been the constitutive 
agents of this political culture; thus, neither the character of Turkish secularism nor 
the changes in the state-Islam relationship can be understood without looking at the 
role and the changes in the attitude of the civil and military elites. As will be 
explained below, the Turkish civil and the military elites identified themselves with 
the state and have acted as the guardians of the state, along with the central norms 
delineating the state’s ideological set up, among which secularism occupied a central 
position. Needless to say, in historical terms, the military has occupied central 
position and it gradually became more independent from other factions of the elites. 
They intervened in politics three times. The military’s conviction that the civilians 
had deviated from secularism played a prominent role in these interventions.9   
                                                                                                                                          
8 Sakallıoğlu, “Rethinking the Connections,” 13. 
 
9 For the elitist political culture and the state tradition in the Ottoman Turkish 
history see, Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey (Walkington, England: The 
Eothen Press, 1985).  
 
7 
 Yet, the policies and the way the military leaders of the 1980 military 
intervention approached to Islam manifest important changes in the military’s 
understanding of secularism and their attitudes towards Islam. The claim by the 
military leaders that the politicians deviated from the principles of Atatürkism and 
their enormous efforts to reinstall Atatürkist ideology seem somewhat paradoxical if 
they are taken into account together with their policies encouraging Islam in society.  
 
1.2 The Problem 
As has already been pointed out, after the 1980 military intervention, the policies and 
attitudes of the military leaders regarding Islam changed radically. The military 
government initiated compulsory education in primary and secondary schools and 
promoted Islam as an indispensable element of national culture and social morality. 
As it was observed, the “official discourse articulated and tolerated Islamic elements 
in the public political realm that had until that point been under the monopoly of 
secular standards and criteria.”10 The ultimate implication of the changes in the 
attitudes of the military leaders of the 1980 Intervention towards religion and their 
policies for the previous conception of secularism is the main question that this study 
addresses to itself. Stating differently, this study primarily aims to answer the 
question of what were the principal implications of the affirmative attitudes of the 
military leaders of the 1980 intervention for the established secularity tradition in 
Turkey?  
                                                 
 
10 Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, “Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State 
Interaction in Republican Turkey,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 28 
(1996): 244. 
 
 
8 
 As has already been noted, secularism in Turkey was developed as a response 
to modernity whose forerunners were the military and bureaucratic elites. The 
Ottoman state elites introduced a modernization program in the last decades of the 
eighteenth century in order to save the state from decline, which resulted in a series 
of secular Westernization reforms aiming at the strengthening of the central Ottoman 
state. Religion, as a prevailing element of the traditional culture, was considered as 
an impediment in attaining modernity, a conception that paved the way to an 
intellectual tradition which saw an incompatibility between Islam and modernity.11 
Thus, it became one of the chief targets of the reformers to decrease the role of 
religion in the state, society and the life of the individuals. The republican elites 
maintained this general outlook in conducting the reforms, which completely 
secularized the state and society. Religion was replaced by secular nationalism and it 
was offered as a new ideology and a source of morality.  
In general, it can be argued that the religious policies and the affirmative 
approach to religion on the part of the military leaders of the 1980 intervention was a 
new answer to the fundamental problem that the republican elites had faced in the 
very early periods. As observed by Şerif Mardin,12 the main problem that the 
republican elites had to overcome was not the popular sovereignty. It was easily 
captured. The problem was the ethical foundation of society. The Atatürkist elites 
had no answer such questions: what would be the ethical principles which would 
                                                 
11 Metin Heper, “The State, Religion and Pluralism: The Turkish Case in 
Comparative Perspective,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 18 (1991): 46. 
 
12 Şerif Mardin, “Kollektif Bellek ve Meşruiyetlerin Çatışması” [The 
Collective Memory and the Conflict of Legitimacies], in Avrupa’da Etik Din ve 
Laiklik [Ethics, Religion, and Secularism in Europe], ed. Oliver Abel, Mohammed 
 
9 
regulate the social and individual relations? What would be transcendental principles 
from which legitimacy could be derived?  
 The above problem was closely related to the another one to which the 
modernizing elites sought to find an answer: what would be the role of the 
indigenous norms and values in the new set up of social morality? Within the circles 
committed to the reformist ideals of Atatürk there were two main groups with 
different answers. The radical republicans, who constituted the majority among those 
who were close to Atatürk, thought that none of the indigenous ingredients would 
have a place in the cultural and ideological bases of the republic. The advocates of 
the other group, which can be called as the traditional conservatives, were also the 
supporters of the Atatürk’s republican ideals and reforms, but they were against the 
total rejection of the indigenous elements. Their aim was to reconcile the reformist 
ideals of Atatürkism and the tradition.13 According to the conservatives, the 
authenticity of the political regimes and national identity was a product of 
geography, religion, tradition and history. The history tells us that behind the 
revolutions there are no dead civilizations, but the bridges which bind the past to the 
                                                                                                                                          
Arkoun and Şerif Mardin, trns., Sosi Dolanoğlu and Serra Yılmaz (İstanbul: Metis 
Yayınları, 1995), 10-11.  
 
13 C. Nazim İrem, “Kemalist Modernizm ve Türk Gelenekçi-
Muhafazakarlığın Kökenleri” [Kemalist Modernism and the Roots of Turkish 
Traditionalist Conservatism], Toplum ve Bilim [Society and Science] 74 (1997): 85. 
In fact no studies have been carried out on the conservative front of Atatürkism, 
which was shaped in the early republican period. The advocates of the conservative 
group included some members of the Republican People’s Party  (RPP), such as 
Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver and Fuad Köprülü, and some leading intellectuals of the 
time, like Peyami Safa, Hilmi Ziya Ülken and Şekip Tunç. They were also the 
defenders of Atatürk’s reformist ideals but they had a conservative outlook. For an 
exceptional work, see C. Nazım İrem, “Kemalist Modernism and the Genesis of 
Modern Turkish Conservatism,” Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis (Ankara: Bilkent 
University, 1996).  
 
10 
present.14 They criticized the radical interpretations of the reformist ideals of Atatürk 
in such a way that these bridges would not be devastated.  
 They were the radicals who consolidated the power after the death of Atatürk 
and radicalized the reformist deals of Atatürk through transforming Atatürkism into 
an official ideology. Their answer for the problem was a kind of secular morality 
rested on reason and science, and secular nationalism underpinned by scientific and 
rationalistic tenets.15  The advocates of this view were the heirs of the Westernists 
emerged in the Ottoman Empire in the last decades of the nineteenth century, who 
claimed that the Western civilization was a totality and should be taken totally in all 
fields of life.16 Consequently, society was divorced from its cultural tradition, and a 
new cultural identity was supposed to be constructed on the negation of historical 
memory.17 Yet, the republican social ethics had failed to provide an appropriate 
source of morality because, as Max Weber mentioned, the moral vacuum created by 
secularization at the public level can not be filled by science.18 Science had no 
relevance to the problem of morality. The problem was properly stated by Mardin:  
                                                 
 
14 İrem, “Kemalist Modernizm ve Türk Gelenekçi-Muhafazakarlığın 
Kökenleri” [Kemalist Modernism and the Roots of Turkish Traditionalist 
Conservatism], 89.  
 
15 For instance, Ziya Gökalp, the prominent advocate of Turkish nationalism, 
saw nationalism as a product of positive science. See, Ergun Özbudun, “Antecedents 
of Kemalist Secularism: Some Thoughts on the Young Turk Period,” in Modern 
Turkey: Continuity and Change, ed. Ahmet  Evin (Opladen: Leske, 1984), 32.   
 
16 Kemal Karpat, Turkey’s Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System 
(Princeton: N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), 21-22.  
 
17 Kevin Robins, “Interrupting Identities: Turkey/Europe,” in Questions of 
Cultural Identity, ed. Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay (London: Sage Publications, 
1996), 68. 
 
 
11 
The consciousness of the new Turks was to be rooted in science (“Western 
civilization”) which Atatürk repeatedly mentioned as the source of all-valid 
knowledge and behavior. But then the matter was not so simple, because 
“consciousness rising” aimed to elicit a set of characteristics which one 
expected the citizens of the new republic to possess. “Science,” as such, had no 
answer to questions regarding the building of national identity; nor did it tackle 
the issue of social identity, the orientation of the individual towards social 
ideals.19  
 
What offered by the military elites of the 1980 intervention was a new social 
morality rested upon the indigenous social and historical values including religion. 
Like the traditionalist conservatives, they took a critical attitude towards the 
modernity as total Westernization, and pursued a new articulation of modernity and 
the tradition. They thought that society could not be founded on a total rejection of 
the historical memory. Consequently, Atatürkism was reinterpreted in such a way 
that its pragmatist aspects rather than the prescriptive ones were strongly 
emphasized, which enabled to soften strict etatist and secularist tenets. They resorted 
to an understanding of Atatürkism as a scientific outlook for worldly affairs, a 
weltanschauung, which was at work during the time of Atatürk.20 Accordingly, the 
fundamental concepts and the ongoing policies underwent a radical change, though 
there was no backward move from the modernization reforms and ideals of Atatürk. 
The military leaders regarded religion as an indispensable part of moral and cultural 
                                                                                                                                          
18 Bryan S. Turner, Weber and Islam: A Critical Study (London, Boston: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), 153-154. 
 
 
19 Şerif Mardin, “Religion and Secularism in Turkey,” in Atatürk: Founder of 
a Modern State, ed. Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Özbudun (London: C. Hurst and 
Company, 1981), 211.  
 
20 Metin Heper, A Weltanschauung-turned-Partial Ideology and Normative 
Ethics: “Atatükism” in Turkey,” Orient 25 (1984). 
 
 
12 
source of society The underlying assumption of the present study is that by resorting 
to the Turkish social and historical values, and by incorporating religion into the new 
conception of modernity and social morality the military leaders of the 1980 
Intervention radically differed from the post-Atatürkian state elites and took a 
qualitative step from “maximal secularity” to “mere secularity.”21 They treated Islam 
in a more affirmative manner and discerned that a new modus vivendi was needed 
between the state and Islam.  
On the other hand, the military leaders’ affirmative approach do not conjure up 
that they lifted their reserve on politicization of religion or approved its political use 
in any means by the political parties or religious groups. Rather, their prime concern 
in religion was in ethical terms, which also reveals the limits of this new conception. 
Although religion was emphasized and encouraged by the hand of the state, the 
public expression of religiosity was not approved. The problem became more 
apparent after the transition to democracy in 1983, when Turgut Özal, the head of 
the Motherland Party and the prime minister, wanted further softening secularism 
and made religion a part of civil society. Evren, the then president and the leader of 
the coup criticized Özal for giving concession to the reactionary groups.  
Part of the suspicious attitudes of the state elites toward public appearance of 
religion is a result of the endurance of the traditional conception of the relationship 
between religion and modernity. As has already been noted, the modernizing elites 
of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century formulated a reverse relationship 
between religion and modernity which shaped the spirit of the subsequent reforms. 
Their philosophy of state-religion relationship in particular and religion-modernity 
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relationship in general was based on the assumptions of the “secularization thesis,”22 
which contains strong imprints of the Enlightenment’s ideological critique of 
religion. The fundamental assumption of the secularization thesis is that with the 
development of modernity the role and influence of religion declines, even 
eventually disappears.23 It becomes a marginal phenomenon due to the process of 
privatization. But, the expectations of the advocates of the secularization thesis can 
not be confirmed on historical and social grounds, despite the fact that there was a 
sharp decline in social significance of religion because, as Callum B. Brown noted, 
“religion can and has retained its social significance across the change from pre-
industrial to industrial society.”24 Moreover, since the 1980s the public visibility of 
religion has become more apparent throughout the world,25 which has also been the 
case in Turkey. It was also the process which, as Andrew Davison points out, 
produced perplexity among the social scientist due to the rise of theopolitcs in 
modern wold.26    
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The most important weakness of such a conceptualization is that it precludes 
the understanding of the public character of religion. Furthermore, it fails to capture 
the dynamic relationship between religion and modernity, which is vitally important 
to understand its public forms. In other words, the recent role of Islam in politics and 
its probable future trends can not be understood unless the interaction between Islam 
and the main aspects of modernity, especially those of the modern state and public 
sphere, is taken into account. As argued by José Casanova; 
[W]e are witnessing the deprivatization of religion in modern world. By 
deprivatization I mean the fact that religious traditions throughout the world 
are refusing to accept the marginal and privatized role which theories of 
modernity as well as theories of secularization had reserved for them. Social 
movements have appeared which either are religious in nature of are 
challenging in the name of religion the legitimacy and autonomy of the 
primary secular sphere, the state and the market economy.27 
  
 What happens when religion goes into public? In order to answer this 
question we need to comprehend the nature of “the public” or public sphere. In 
Casanova’s words, “the novelty of modernity derives precisely from the emergence 
of an amorphously complex, yet autonomous sphere, “civil society,” or “the 
social””28 which has an expansionist capacity to penetrate and transform both what is 
public, i.e. belonging to the state, and the private. In fact, what is lacking in the 
existing literature that tries to grasp the political nature of Islam is that it is unable to 
appreciate the impact of the development of this autonomous, transformatory and 
penetrating modern public sphere upon the religious domain. The modern public, as 
a product of the Enlightenment, was first shaped in the eighteenth century English, 
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French and German states as a strong ideological construct which played 
transformatory and progressive role in dissolving the absolutism.29 The same is true 
for the present state-society, private-public and religion-society interaction. It is the 
place where the private norms, values and manners meet with those of the so-called 
cosmopolitan. It is the place where, what Brian R. Wilson called as “internal 
secularization,”30 or “hybridization”31 takes place. This is why politicized Islam is 
far from being a monolith.32 There is a strong drive within the closed universe of the 
“community” to transfer to the public sphere and to share its symbolic universe. The 
development of an Islamic “sector” in Turkey after the 1980s, accompanied by the 
internalization of the secular public norms and manners, denotes that a deep change 
whose consequences will be determining the future course of Islamic communities is 
at work. For instance, the Tesettür [religious style wear] fashions organized by firms 
producing religious dress became a daily and accepted phenomenon among the 
Turkish Muslims.33 It is hard to legitimize all these practices within the puritan 
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ethics of religions, but, in practice, they have become accepted realities. It was noted 
that after transferring to the public sphere, the content of religious symbols, styles 
and manners were infused with those of the secular, albeit their forms remained 
religious.34 Similar changes also took place in the “idealized representations” of the 
religious advertisements, whose idealized worlds are just a symmetrical as their 
secular counterparts with some minor modifications of extreme points.35 These are 
neither just simple symbolic changes, nor superficial ones. Rather, they are the 
symptoms of radical changes taking place within the “community.” Thus, what we 
face today as Islam is difficult to understand within the traditional framework, and a 
careful examination of these changes is needed. The developments noted above 
confirm the hypothesis posed by Casanova that, “the more religion wants to 
transform the world in a religious direction, the more religion becomes entangled in 
“worldly” affairs and transformed by the world.”36 It tends to relinquish its totalistic 
claims and moves to the realm of civil society. Such developments took place in 
Spain, Brazil and Poland37 where the church was previously an establishment of the 
                                                 
 
34 Abdurrahman Arslan, “Seküler Dünyada Müslümanlar” [Muslims in 
Secular World], Birikim [Accumulation] (July 1997): 30-37; For similar 
observations, see, Sakallıoğlu, “Rethinking the Connections,” 18. 
 
35 For these changes and their consequences, see, Ümit Kıvanç, “Islamcılar 
ve Para-Pul: Bir Dönüşüm Hikayesi” [Islamists and the Money: A Story of 
Transformation], Birikim [Accumulation] (July 1997): 39-58; An interview with 
Nuray Mert, “Islamcılık Yoluyla Gelen Sekülerleşme, Devletin Laiklik Dayatmasına 
Ihtiyaç Bırakmayacak,” [There Will Be no Need for State’s Secular Impose after the 
Secularization Realized by the Hands of Islamism] Matbuat [Published Materials] 
(May 1995). 
 
36 Casanova, Public Religions, 49. 
 
37 Ibid. Casanova analyzes five cases, namely Spain, Poland, Brazil, 
Evangelical Protestantism, and Catholicism in the United States, in which the 
 
17 
authoritarian-totalitarian state, but later was transformed into an agent promoting the 
development of civil society and democracy. Similar developments can be observed 
in Turkey too. Nilüfer Göle described the process of the transformation of religious 
groups in Turkey as following:  
After twenty years, we are witnessing the differentiation of the paths followed 
by the Islamists in different national settings. A process of change is at work 
which is transforming these movements from a radical position to a more 
cultural oriented tendencies… It can be said that the Islamic actors, who owe 
their existence and power to the collective Islamic movement, have entered in 
interaction and exchange with the environment after they faced with the 
modern urban spaces, global communication networks, public discussions, 
consumption patterns and the rules of the market.38  
 
Therefore, despite the fact that there are some groups whose outlook can be 
described as “fundamentalist,” this label can not portray the dominant character of 
religiosity in Turkey. What we witness today is the “public Islam”39 in close 
interaction with the cosmopolitan universe of the public realm. Open democratic 
channels also have encouraged this process because the democratic practice itself has 
training effect on the actors. As observed by Guillermo O’Donnell, the existence of a 
majority of democrats among the population necessitates a long period of practice in 
political democracy, and “in no known case does there appear to have been a 
majority of democrats before the advent of democracy.”40  
                                                                                                                                          
religious establishments work as elements of civil society and contribute to the 
consolidation of democracy. In the former three cases, the church previously 
supported authoritarian states, but later they were transformed into civil societal 
elements. It is important to notice that religion does not inherently act in 
authoritarian manner. Rather the way that the religion acts vary in relation to the 
social and political environments in which it resides. 
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1.3 The Subject-Matter and Methodology 
As Ergun Özbudun aptly observed, “no picture of contemporary Turkish politics 
would be complete without a discussion of the military, which since its first 
intervention in 1960, has been one of the most important actors in the country’s 
politics.”41 In fact, the military has been the most important actor in the 
modernization of Ottoman-Turkish society and in setting up of the Republic. Thus, 
to study the relationship between the military and religion or secularism is crucially 
important to understand not only the role of the military Turkish politics and the 
character of Turkish secularism, but also the whole course of political development 
or modernization in Turkey because these two agents have always been at the center 
of this process. Such a study is also important because without looking at the role of 
the military, it is hardly possible to grasp the trajectory of the change in this regard.  
As has already been noted, one of the permanent features of Turkish politics 
has been the presence of the military in politics. During the republican period there 
were three direct military interventions in politics, and two of them included a new 
ordering of the state in a radical manner. In addition to these interventions, the 
military’s position within the general administrative structure of the state has 
gradually been extended through the legal arrangements made by the military leaders 
after each intervention. The most important change was the establishment of the 
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National Security Council (NSC) after the military intervention of 1960. The NSC is 
made up of the five top military commanders, four civilian members, and the 
President (namely the Chief of the General Staff, the commanders of Land, Air, 
Navy and the Gendarmerie, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the Minister 
of the Internal Affairs and the Minister of the Foreign Affairs). The position of the 
NSC within Turkish politics has been critical because after a gradual process of role 
expansion, it has become an agent with the ability to impose its policy preferences 
upon the civilian political actors. 
 The actual presence of the military in Turkish politics has had far reaching 
consequences on conducting of politics in Turkey. Although the Turkish military did 
not intend to establish enduring authoritarian military regimes and each intervention 
was followed by a quick return to the barracks after restructuring democratic rules 
and procedures, “an unusual phenomenon in civil-military relations,”42 the military 
leaders have always been suspicious of the civilians and local political demands. The 
civilian supremacy in Turkey remained in an ad hoc manner, and the military has 
exercised high level of political autonomy within the Turkish political system.43 The 
autonomy of the military worked vis-a-visthe civilian political leaders and against 
the articulation of the peripheral demands to the general body politic. The military’s 
political concern was not conditioned by its self-interest but rather it was a result of 
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identification with the national interest,44 an identification which has a long 
historical tradition. Having imagined itself as the unmovable core of the state, the 
military began to consider itself as the sole guardian of state principles without any 
possibility of compromise. Consequently, the military, as the principal guardian of 
the principles of the state, adopted an elitist outlook on policy making in Turkey, and 
kept its hold on the whole polity. 
The underlying characteristic of the central norms and principles in question 
was their central and impersonal nature filtering those of the local ones. These norms 
have constituted an autonomous domain of the state, and on the basis of these norms 
the state has maintained a conception of the public sphere with narrow boundaries 
defining not only the content of whole policy making, but also the basic attributes of 
those who have the right or legitimacy to be represented in the public realm. In this 
sense, the state, which has been structured by the military-bureaucratic elites, turned 
out to be an agent defining the hallmarks of a wide range of issues such as politics, 
culture and identity. This narrow definition of the public and political space in 
Turkey has created important difficulties in the articulation of the local-particular 
interests to the public-general interests, which is vital for the consolidation and 
smooth functioning of democracy.  
 Secularism occupies a core place in the norms in question. Secularism and 
the military are close phenomena in Turkish politics. The close relationship between 
these two was established through a long period of reforms aiming at modernization 
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of the Ottoman-Turkish state and society from the top down. Due to certain 
historical developments that will be explained in detail in the following chapters, the 
two central constitutive agents of the Ottoman state, namely Islam and the military 
were split and the relationship between them was reversed. The military, once a 
defender of the religious ideology, turned into a principal initiator and guardian of 
secularism, which eventually gained an extreme character. Not surprisingly, the 
military’s conviction that the civilians had deviated from the principle of secularism 
was an important motive behind the three military interventions.45  
 In terms of methodology, a historical approach is necessary because the 
invention of such a kind of secularism has a long historical past and it is difficult to 
conceive of its recent character without looking at its past. The issues of 
secularization and secularism have been the most prominent topics of Turkish 
modernization since the nineteenth century. The modernization reforms in the 
Ottoman Empire started to save the state from decline above all by modernizing the 
military institution. Although at the beginning the military was an object of 
modernization, in due course, it turned out to be the subject of modernization.46 
When the Ottomans recognized that they had fallen behind the Western states, the 
military and the bureaucratic elites, which were close associates, began to think that 
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in order to save the state from decline, it was necessary to introduce new techniques 
and methods in the military and administration inspired by a Western secular 
outlook. Thus, secularism was adopted by the Ottoman ruling strata as a principal 
policy choice and an instrument of modernization through Westernization. The 
historical antagonism between Islam and modernity, which marked the state elites’ 
approach towards Islam and the dominant intellectual tradition, was established in 
this initial period, and has remained alive up to now. As noted before, the Ottoman 
westernized reformers saw an incompatibility between modernization as 
Westernization and Islam.47 From that point of view, it can be firmly claimed that 
the meaning of modernization in the Ottoman-Turkish context has been very close, if 
not the same, to that of secularization. Once formulated in this way, modernization 
was assumed to be successful to the extent that secularization was achieved on 
social, cultural, political and individual levels. In essence, secularization became a 
concomitant part of modernization, and the project of modernity was transformed by 
the state elites into a project of civilization.  
 Consequently, the place of religion in the state and society was the main 
problem which drew the demarcation line between the Westernists and the 
Traditionalists, the two dominant intellectual currents throughout the history of the 
Turkish modernization process. The Westernists who were influenced by the 
Enlightenment tradition, particularly by its extreme rationalist French version, 
claimed that civilization was a totality, and therefore, should be adopted totally, a 
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view which clashed with that of the Traditionalists who claimed that spiritual and 
material aspects of civilization, i.e. culture and religion, and scientific and 
technological achievements should be separated, and the scope of the reforms should 
be limited to the scientific and technological achievements.48 
 The battle between the Traditionalists and the Westernists who were made up 
of the military-bureaucratic elites and the intellectuals was won by the Westernists. 
This battle has deep historical roots closely associated with the highly bureaucratic 
state tradition and with the norms around which the state was structured in the 
Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman state which was established by ghazis, the religious 
warriors, was a militant entity which, in turn, shaped its political culture. Based on 
the idea of conquest, there emerged a state which was structured in the military-
bureaucratic elite whose primary aim was to represent and preserve the interests of 
the state vis-a-visthat of society.49 In this highly autonomous state, no privilege had 
existed similar to the Western aristocracy and nobility except for the military. As 
Halil İnalcık aptly observed, “it was the fundamental rule of the Empire to exclude 
its subjects from the privileges of the military.”50  The transition to modernity also 
differed radically from the experiences of the Western countries. As pointed out by 
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Ergun Özbudun, “neither mercantile bourgeoisie nor the landowners developed into 
a class that could effectively control and limit, much less capture, the state.”51 
Therefore, the Ottoman-Turkish modernization project remained as an elite 
modernization, and this elitist character has been the most enduring trait of the 
Ottoman-Turkish polity.52 In the absence of intermediary autonomous elements of 
civil society, which marked the feudal tradition and transition to modernity in 
Western Europe, central bureaucracy has remained the only agent with an ability to 
determine the whole course of change in the Ottoman-Turkish society. 
 At the beginning, i.e. in the classical period, the two core institutions of the 
Ottoman state, i.e. Islam and the bureaucracy, which in the succeeding centuries 
went separate ways, were at the center of administration, and both enjoyed similar 
privileges. As observed by Şerif Mardin,53 the Ottoman state was both religious and 
bureaucratic. The Islamic character was derived from the fact that the primary aim of 
the sultan was to preserve the Islamic community, and Islam was the official 
religion. The bureaucratic character stemmed from the bureaucracy’s chief concern 
in preserving the state. Moreover, the military’s basic aim as the preservation of the 
state shaped their attitude in conducting governmental affairs in an pragmatic and 
empirical manner, an ideology which can be defined as “reason of the state.” 
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 The pragmatism of the bureaucratic strata paved the way to a secular tradition 
in the Ottoman Empire. Unlike the situation in the sixteenth century in which the 
ulema was in a powerful position, by the eighteenth century the power shifted to the 
secular bureaucratic strata of the Ottoman government. Since their principal concern 
was to preserve the state, they gained a kind of secular mentality.54 As noted by 
İnalcık, by the eighteenth century, “devoted extremely to secular interests of the state 
and free from formalism and the bonds of tradition, they were ready to become 
faithful instruments of radical administrative reforms.”55 They were the faithful 
reformers who initiated radical secularizing reforms in the nineteenth century in the 
Ottoman Empire which culminated in the proclamation of the Tanzimat in 1839. For 
the purpose of the present study, some peculiar characteristics of the Ottoman 
reforms could be identified as follows: in the reform period, the initiative remained 
in the hands of bureaucracy which was passed into the hands of the military in the 
last period of the Ottoman Empire; the reforms gradually displaced mainly two 
important components from the state and bureaucracy, namely Islam from the state 
and the ulema from the bureaucracy; by extending the power of the center towards 
the periphery through military and administrative reforms, the periphery was further 
penetrated by the center, which meant that the modernization or Westernization 
policies went parallel with centralization; as a natural result of the bureaucratic 
pragmatic and rationalist outlook, the Ottoman elites found positivism as the best 
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realizable solution to the decline of the state, from which a kind of scientifically 
constructed secular nationalism was derived in the beginning of the twentieth 
century.56 
At the end of the World War I, which was also the end of the Ottoman state, 
only the military remained capable of coping with the serious problems faced by the 
country. After the War of Independence, a new state was established on a completely 
new and radically different legitimacy basis. Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic, the military leaders of the War of the 
Independence did what the previous state elites had imagined to be a solution to save 
the state. They completely secularized the state and implemented important policies 
to initiate secularization at the societal and individual levels. The most important 
reform at the institutional level was the proclamation of the Turkish republic in 1923 
along with the abolishment of the sultanate and caliphate. This was followed by 
cultural reforms. The education was unified and secularized. The dress was changed. 
The religious orders were closed down. Yet, the radical aspects of the republican 
reforms could be found in the republican imagination of political community and 
political ideology employed to define a new identity for that community. The 
concept of umma- the religious community-was replaced with that of the nation 
defining new boundaries of political community, and secular and rationalist 
nationalism was adopted as the new ideology.  
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 The secular nature of Turkish nationalism also illuminates not only the 
ground on which the republican elites imagined a new collectivity, but also the 
normative framework from which they were inspired. This ground was Western 
science. As Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu observed, “the modernist position of Mustafa 
Kemal and his cadres involved a firm belief in nationalism as a specifically 
“modern” phenomenon, which was best represented by European rationalism.”57 
Thus, science, as the underlying motive and formative force of republican 
philosophy, was offered as a new source of morality.58 Consequently, the republic 
aimed at constructing a kind of individual who was “rationalist, ant-traditionalist, 
anti-clerical person approaching all matters intellectually and objectively.”59 
Religion played a marginal role in this individual’s life. By looking at the central 
place of science in the early republican ideology, i.e. in Atatürk’s time, it can be 
argued that the early republican state had a scientific mentality with a strong 
emphasis on the practical requirements of life and pragmatism, but not a hard 
ideology.60 Although the authoritarian policies of the early republican state compel 
us to think that its actions were directed by some definite and systematized set of 
ideas, its authoritarian measures stemmed from the character of the modernization 
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policies. As a continuum of the Ottoman tradition, the republican modernization was 
an elite modernization,61 and its declared aim was to reach and even surpass 
contemporary civilization. The state intervention in social affairs can be clearly 
observed by looking at the understanding of statism, one of the principles of 
Atatürkism. Levent Köker argued that the principle of statism in the republican 
context has a wider meaning than simply being an economic principle. It contained 
an attainment of an ultimate goal: contemporary civilization which was conceived 
through the norms of the Western civilization. Thus, it is an expression of an 
interventionist bureaucratic-authoritarian state.62 
 It was after Atatürk that the military-bureaucratic elites transformed 
Atatürkism into a state sponsored ideology made up of prescriptive tenets.63 The 
process started after the death of Atatürk, whose place was occupied by the hard-
liners of the Republican People’s Party, the only political organization at that time 
established by Atatürk. The policies of secularism gained “excessive anti-clerical 
positivistic characteristics which were labeled later as an official dogma of 
irreligion.”64 The move of the military to the central position of the state has had a 
strong impact on the maintenance of such a kind of secularism. Atatürk was careful 
in keeping the military out of politics, and there was also no worry on the part of the 
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Ideology and Normative Ethics: “Atatükism” in Turkey,” Orient 25 (1984): 83-94. 
 
64 Karpat, Turkey’s Politics, 271; See also, Metin Heper, “Islam, Polity and 
Society in Turkey: A Middle Eastern Perspective,” Middle East Journal 35 (1981), 
352. 
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military because of Atatürk’s presence. After Atatürk, the military placed its belief in 
İnönü. But, when the government changed due to the transition to multi-party 
politics, the military along with the bureaucracy began to identify itself with the 
state, which was not an alien phenomenon to the Turkish polity. Not surprisingly, 
one of the main reasons behind the military intervention of 1960 was the attempt of 
government to take some liberalizing measures concerning secularism. The military 
intervention took place because the military thought that the Democrat Party 
government had deviated from the principles of Atatürkism, especially those of 
secularism. The same was true for the 1971 Memorandum and for the intervention of 
1980 as well. Besides these interventions, the military has always been in a deterrent 
position to any compromise on secularism. Yet the 1980 intervention brought a new 
perspective in approaching to religion and understanding of secularism.  
Along with the basic question outlined before, the following questions will be 
addressed in the present work. 
 i. From which particular perspective can we understand the political role of 
the military in Turkey? 
 ii. Under what historical conditions was the “maximal secularity” established, 
and what was the role of the military? 
 iii. What were so particular to the 1980 Military Intervention in terms of 
understanding of secularism and the state-Islam relationship? 
 iv. What were the implications of the new conceptualization of secularism 
and the role of religion in society for the established secularity tradition that was at 
work until 1980 in Turkey? 
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1.4 The Organization of the Work 
This study consists of five chapters. The following chapter, Chapter Two, aims at 
analyzing the historical roots of political activism of the military and maximal 
secularity tradition in Turkey. It is argued that the chief determinant motive behind 
the maximal secularism in Turkey is the elitists political culture of the Ottoman-
Turkish polity. Since the elitism stems from the historical state tradition, the political 
activism of the Turkish military can hardly be understood in the light of the literature 
developed on civil-military relations. In other words, the existing literature is not 
appropriate to explain the political activism of the Turkish military because, as 
pointed out by students of the Turkish politics, the Turkish case is very exceptional. 
Its exceptional nature springs from the existence of a high level of 
institutionalization patterns which, unlike the cases in other “developing” countries, 
is the chief factor explaining the presence of the military in Turkish politics and the 
exceptionalism in question.65 Since the excessive institutionalization is a peculiar 
characteristic of the Ottoman-Turkish tradition, a historical and comparative analysis 
is needed to understand the case in question. Chapter Two compares the Turkish 
case with the European states which have state traditions and offers an alternative 
framework to understand the institutionalization patterns and the role of the military 
in the process of the formation of these patterns. It is argued that the role of the 
military is central not only to any state tradition, but also to the development of the 
                                                 
 
65 Metin Heper, “Transition to Democracy Reconsidered: A Historical 
Perspective,” in Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives, ed. 
Dankwart A. Rustow and Kenneth Paul Erickson (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 
196; Ergun Özbudun, “How Far from Consolidation,” Journal of Democracy 7 
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polities either in a democratic or autocratic way. The state tradition illuminates the 
role of the military and the nature of the Turkish secularism as well. 
Chapter Three dwells upon the development of secularism in the Ottoman-
Turkish context. Along with the course of Turkish secularism, it tries to provide an 
answer to the question: “Why has the Turkish secularism been developed along an 
authoritarian line?” The answer could be found in the Ottoman-Turkish political 
culture which is colored by an autonomous state tradition, coupled with the elitist 
nature of the Turkish modernization project. It also delineates the historical stages of 
development of Turkish secularism along with the changing attitudes and roles of the 
state elites. 
 Chapter Four aims to ascertain the changes that occurred after the 1980 
military intervention. Why did the military leaders change their attitude towards 
religion? This chapter also analyzes the way in which the military leaders of the 
1980 intervention interpreted secularism and articulated modernity and religion with 
precise implications for the established secularity tradition. 
Chapter Five focuses on the relationship between the Özal government, which 
was formed after the transition to democracy in 1983, and the military leaders who 
constituted the Council of Presidency, particularly the relationship between the 
Prime Minister Özal and the President Evren regarding secularism and Islam. It also 
questions the limits of the changes brought by the 1980 intervention. 
I hope that this work will contribute to understanding the role of the military in 
politics, the state-religion relationship and the Turkish politics as well.  
 
 32 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 
THE STATE AND MODERNIZATION: THE HISTORCAL 
ORIGINS OF THE POLITICAL ARMY AND SECULARITY 
TRADITIONS 
 
 
The aim of the present chapter is to conceptualize the civil-military relations and the 
secularity tradition in Turkey within a historical and comparative perspective. 
Secularism in Turkey was developed as a response to modernity whose forerunners 
were the military and bureaucratic elites; thus, in order to understand the secularity 
tradition and the relevance of the bureaucratic and the military elites to this tradition, 
it is necessary to investigate the in which the formation of modernity took place in 
Turkey. What kind of social and historical dynamics have shaped the civil-military 
relations and secularity tradition in the process of formation of modernity in Turkey 
is the central question that the present chapter also addresses.  
The prominent assumption of this chapter is that the political activism of the 
military and the maximal secularity tradition in Turkey are closely related to the 
historical state tradition, which has been the main actor in shaping the political 
culture in Turkey. Therefore, it is necessary for the problem in question to trace the 
genealogy of this highly autonomous state by focusing particularly on historical, 
social and political dynamics. In political terms, when the autonomy of the state is 
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concerned, the critical question is centralization, which includes a radical 
redefinition of the relationship between center and periphery.1 Centralization, which 
is a concomitant feature of modernity, is the process in which the center, i.e. state, 
extends it sphere vis-à-vis the periphery. The state elites, made up of the military and 
the civil bureaucracy, were central to this process that was experienced first as the 
process of formation of the national states in Western Europe.2 The ways that 
societies came to terms with modernity and resolved the center-periphery cleavage 
had far-reaching consequences for the subsequent polity traditions, variations within 
polities, and particularly for the formation of the relationship between the central 
elites as the representatives of the state and the local elites representing the people or 
society. In other words, different social and historical dynamics paved the way to 
different polity outcomes and, although in some societies a smooth reconciliation of 
the center and periphery occurred along with the well-functioning liberal 
democracies, as in England, in some societies a kind of tension has developed 
between the representatives of the center and those of the periphery that made the 
establishment of democracy a difficult task. The latter was particularly the case in 
France where the Revolution was followed by a series of social and political 
upheavals, and the conflicts could not been resolved in a smooth way, which led to 
sharp divisions within society.3  
                                                 
1 S. N. Eisenstadt, Fundamentalism, Sectarianism and Revolution: The 
Jacobin Dimension of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
62-68. Eisenstadt conceptualizes this process as "the charizmatization of the center." 
 
2 Anthony Giddens, The Nation State and the Violence (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1985),  103-116.  
 
3 For a comprehensive elaboration of the role of social classes and social 
conditions in formation of modernity in different social settings see, Barrington 
Moore, The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in 
Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993).  
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The prominent assumption of this chapter is that there are two crucial social 
and historical dynamics in the formation of modern polities that led to the variations. 
These were the primordial political structures and the scope of the military 
modernization in the process of state formation. As will be explained in detail below, 
in societies where the medieval representative assemblies that characterized the 
feudal societies of Western Europe existed and possessed considerable autonomy, 
the transition to modernity did not generate serious political conflicts and relatively 
well-functioned liberal democracies were established, unless these representative 
institutions were destroyed by the military modernization. Yet, in cases where the 
representative assemblies were either absent or weak, or were destroyed by the 
military modernization, the outcome was either autocracies or unstable democracies. 
The main difference between these two cases is that, unlike the first group of 
societies, in the latter societies there emerged a highly autonomous center, i.e. the 
state vis-a-visthe periphery or society. A lasting tension between central interests and 
local interests, between central-peripheral norms and between the central and the 
particular wills is the distinguishing feature of the polities in these societies. There is 
a strong tendency towards elitism in these societies, which, in turn, leads to a kind of 
centralist approach to policy-making without infiltrating the local or peripheral 
interests, norms and values. The state in these societies by structured in the civil and 
military bureaucracy, so they enjoy the political right to interfere in sphere of the 
civilians. As such, they are not only the locus of the state but also the representatives 
and guardians of the state interests vis-à-vis those of the societal.4  
 Accordingly, the types of secularism and/or secularization processes are 
closely related to the polity traditions. In historical terms, the separation of the state 
                                                 
4 For the polity variations and the role of the primordial political structures in 
variation of the polities in different contexts, see Metin Heper, ed., The State and 
Public Bureaucracies: A Comparative Perspective (New York: Greenwood Press, 
1987). 
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and the church, which pushed religion towards the periphery, was a decisive step in 
the formation of the modern states;5 and like center-periphery relations, different 
models of state-church separation have emerged in accordance with the degree of the 
autonomy of the state. As will be further analyzed below, in state societies a sharp 
separation of state and religion took place after a process of bitter political 
confrontations. Thus, once established, secularism in such societies gained an 
excessive character bestowing high autonomy on the state vis-à-vis religion; 
however, in stateless societies, a smooth separation of the state and church occurred 
as a result of a gradual process of secularization.  
Turkey is the par-excellence for the state-society since, as will be elaborated 
in detail below, there has been an autonomous historical state heritage in the 
Ottoman-Turkish society, which was embodied in civil and military bureaucracy.6 
Therefore, the political activism of the military and the secularity tradition in Turkey 
have to be understood in relation to such a state and polity tradition, which is almost 
absent in the so-called "developing countries." In the Ottoman-Turkish tradition, the 
military and bureaucratic elites have been the representatives of the center acting on 
behalf of the state, and an understanding of their historical and present role in the 
political system necessitate a historical approach that traces the formation of this 
tradition to its very origins. Thus, it is hardly possible to understand civil-military 
relations in Turkey by addressing the existing literature, which has extensively been 
developed on the basis of political experiences of the developing countries. Rather a 
comparison of Turkey with the societies of the Western Europe with state tradition 
gives us a more definite picture of the problem in question.  
                                                 
5 Pierre Birnbaum, "State, Center and Bureaucracy," Government and 
Opposition 16 (1981); 58-77. 
 
6 Metin Heper gives a well-elaborated account of the state tradition in the 
Ottoman-Turkish context. See, Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey 
(Walkington, England: The Eothen Press, 1985). 
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On the other hand, the state in the Ottoman-Turkish context has been more 
dominant than it was in the West European tradition since Turkey had neither a 
feudal past, in which there existed countervailing powers limiting the power of 
center, nor experienced a bourgeoisie revolution which, generally speaking, led to 
the formation of democracies in Western Europe. In the absence of these social 
formations, the modernization in the Ottoman-Turkish context was carried out by the 
military-bureaucratic elites, which resulted in total penetration of the periphery by 
the center paving the way for the emergence of a strong state. Consequently, the 
state elites in the Ottoman-Turkish political life maintained privileged position vis-à-
vis the political elites who were the representatives of the periphery. They set the 
fundamental boundaries within which the political game would be played.  
Not surprisingly, secularism in Turkey went beyond the boundaries of the 
common pattern, i.e. simply separation of the state and the church, and it has turned 
out to be an instrument not only to secularize the nation as a whole but also to put 
religion under the control of the state. The creation of a monolithic public sphere, 
where no religious visions and representations were allowed, became one of the 
main ideological and political priorities of the state elites; thus, no affiliation 
between religion and attributes of the so-called “modern life” was approved. Since 
the transition to democracy, it has been the main subject of contention between the 
military-bureaucratic elites as the representative of the state and the political elites 
representing the people.  
 This chapter also attempts to provide a theoretical account for the 
understanding of the political activism of the Turkish military and secularism within 
the above framework. It begins with a literature survey on the civil-military relations 
through a critical perspective because when the political activism of the military or 
the civil-military relations is concerned, there is a huge literature, even an orthodoxy, 
and most of the studies on the political role of the military in Turkey share, to a 
certain degree, the main assumptions of this so-called “orthodoxy” developed on the 
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political experiences and civil-military relations of the developing countries. 
Although, the problem in developing countries stems from the absence of an 
autonomous “public” in general, in Turkey it springs from the highly autonomous 
nature of the public,7 therefore, an explanation on what is meant from the autonomy 
of the state in political theory is given in the subsequent part along with an 
elaboration of social, political and historical conditions under which the weak and 
strong or autonomous institutionalization patterns have emerged. Following this, the 
corresponding patterns of secularization are analyzed with an explication of the 
Ottoman-Turkish case within the outlined framework.  
 
2.1 An Overview of the Problem of Civil-Military Relations 
Literature which aims at understanding the political activism of the Turkish military 
developed more or less under the influence of the perspectives which have 
dominated the political science literature throughout the world. The studies on the 
political role of the military were activated by the breakdowns of the civilian regimes 
and military interventions in the non-Western world, especially after the Second 
World War. Although the pioneering studies of Samuel P. Huntington and S. F. 
Finer address civil-military relations in general regardless of the particular polities 
like developed or underdeveloped ones, in due course the interest has shifted to the 
so-called “developing polities” because the military interventions became a common 
characteristic of these polities.8 The military interventions and the rise of 
                                                 
7 Metin Heper, “The Strong State as a Problem for the Consolidation of 
Democracy: Turkey and Germany Compared,” Comparative Political Studies 25 
(1992): 171-173. 
8 The pioneering studies referred here are the following: S. N. Finer, The Man  
on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1988). This book originally appeared in 1962 from Pall Mall Press, 
and in the 1981 edition, Finer added a new chapter entitled “The Man on Horseback-
1981.” In this chapter, he evaluated the former expectations and re-examined his 
views within the framework developed on the subject since 1962; Samuel P. 
Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959). 
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authoritarian regimes in Latin America, Asia, Africa and the Middle East 
undermined the optimistic expectations of the Modernization Theory whose basic 
assumptions developed on the belief that the experiences of the developing polities 
would be similar to those of the developed world.9 As a consequence, a sharp 
distinction between developed and underdeveloped polities has appeared in the 
studies trying to find out the reasons behind the breakdown of the civilian 
governments and the military interventions.  
 Four main lines can be identified in the literature concerning the problem of 
civil-military relations focusing on what motive(s) lead(s) the military to intervene. 
The first approach tries to explain the military interventions by looking at peculiar 
institutional characteristics of the military. According to the advocates of this 
approach, there are certain institutional features peculiar to the military that make it 
prone to intervene to politics. Huntington in his seminal study argues that the 
modern problem of the civil-military relations lies in the professionalism of the 
military.10 The professionalism of the officer corps with its different ethics and the 
Hobbesian conception of man necessitates a different and autonomous sphere of 
competence different from that of the civilian which creates the problem in civil-
military relations and in civilian control of the military.11 The increase of the 
                                                                                                                                          
 
9 The Modernization paradigm is one of the main approaches in the study of 
the “development” of the non-Western world and is made up of a huge body of 
literature. For a comprehensive and critical study of the theories of development and 
modernization see, Ronald H. Chilcote, Theories of Comparative Politics: The 
Search for a Paradigm (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981); Irene L. 
Gendzier, Managing Political Change: Social Scientists and the Third World 
(Boulder, London: Westview Press, 1985).   
 
10 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 7 
 
11 Ibid., 32-63; Huntington was also aware of the weak points of this 
perspective. In one of his relatively recent articles, he pointed out that the 
developments in the civil-military relations of the authoritarian regimes significantly 
differed from this model. See, Samuel P. Huntington,  “Reforming Civil-Military 
Relations,” Journal of Democracy 6 (1995): 10. 
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professionalism is also a way of keeping the military from the civilian affairs since it 
makes the military less interested in civilian matters. The criticisms to this approach 
have been made on the basis of the fact that it is possible to co-exist both a high level 
of the professionalism and the military’s involvement in politics. In order to clarify 
this problem, for instance, Alfred Stepan differentiates the old professionalism from 
the new one which has arisen from the internal use of military power to control the 
domestic revolutionary movements in different parts of the world.12  
 The fact that in developing countries the most modernized institution has 
been the military has been taken as another institutional feature leading militaries to 
intervention. Since the militaries are the most “westernized” and “scientifically 
minded” institution in society, they are more development oriented and they 
intervene into politics to initiate modernization policies, the policies that dominated 
the agenda of the developing nations during the World War II and the Cold War 
periods. The reform oriented interventions were viewed a healthy mechanism of 
change since they were carried out against the traditional and conservative 
governments.13  
                                                                                                                                          
 
12 Alfred Stepan, “The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military 
Role Expansion,” in Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future, ed. Alfred 
Stepan (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1973), 51-58. 
 
13 Samuel P. Huntington, ed., “Introduction,” in Changing Patterns of 
Military Politics (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1962), 13; Samuel P. Huntington, ed., 
“Patterns of Violence in World Politics,” Changing Patterns of Military Politics 
(Glencoe: The Free Press, 1962), 40; Lucien W. Pye, “Armies in the Process of 
Political Modernization,” in Political Development and Social Change, ed. J. L. 
Finkle and R. W. Gable (New York, London:  John Waley and Sons, 1966), 277-
283; The professional rationality, the influences of military technology upon society, 
and the modernizing influences of the military bureaucracy are the most emphasized 
factors in the analysis of the role of the military in the modernization process and the 
problem of civil-military relations from an organizational perspective.  For a good 
account of this point of view see, Marion J. Levy, JR., “Armed Forces 
Organizations,” in The Military and Modernization, ed. Henry Bienen (Chicago, 
New York: Aldine Atheron, 1971), 41-78; Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: 
Military Coups and Governments (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Pretice-Hall, 1977), 38; 
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 Finer, in his classical work,14 compares the organizational peculiarities of the 
armed forces to the civilian organizations, and claims that the armed forces have 
three massive advantages in comparison to the civilian organizations. Their 
organization enjoys higher superiority; when compared to the civilian organizations, 
they have a highly emotional symbolic status, and they enjoy monopoly over the use 
of the arms. Therefore, the problem is not that why they rebel, but why they ever 
obey the civilians.15 The reason behind their obedience is that they are trained for the 
security purposes; thus they lack the capability to administer the civilian matters, 
especially the economic ones. But the main weakness is that they lack the 
legitimacy. The military interventions take place where the public attachment to the 
civilian institutions is weak or non-existent, whereas in polities where it is high the 
possibility of intervention is weak.16  
 The second approach accentuates the class origin of the officer corps in 
explaining the military interventions. The officer corps all over the world is recruited 
from the middle or lower classes. As Nordlinger notes; “All student of the military 
intervention agree on one proposition if no other; the officer corps is recruited from 
the men who come from middle-class background.”17 In this approach the military is 
analyzed in two ways: either they are taken as the representative of the middle class 
                                                                                                                                          
For a critical account on the modernizing role of the military see, Ali Mazrui, 
“Soldiers as Traditionalizers: Military  Rule and the Re-Africanization of Africa,” 
World Politics 28 (1976): 246-272. For Mazrui, it is not necessarily the case that all 
actions of the military take places along the modernizing line. Some may result in 
traditionalization.  
 
14 S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback.  
 
15 Ibid., 5.   
 
16 Ibid., 18.  
 
17 Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics, 32. 
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and the principal supporter of that class or are considered as an independent 
organizational entity seeking the corporate interests of its own. 
 In the process of the decline of the traditional landowners the only way to get 
security and prosperity is to find a place in state bureaucracy. The military along 
with the bureaucracy constitutes a new class pursuing its interests. The reason behind 
the military interventions is the group orientation of the army, the groups that the 
army speaks for and the interests it represents.18 Manfred Halpern and José Nun see 
the military’s involvement in politics, especially in the Middle East and Latin 
America, as the military’s attempt to protect the middle class interests which suffer 
from the political conflicts.19  
  The third approach, developed by Guillermo O’Donnell, relates the military 
interventions and authoritarianism to the economic development strategies that were 
adopted by Latin American countries, particularly to the import substitution 
industrialization.20 This approach is merely societal because it aims to find out the 
causes of the military interventions and authoritarianism in society, not in the 
                                                 
 
18 Manfred Halpern, “Middle East Armies and the New Middle Class,” in The 
Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, ed. John J. Johnson (Westport, 
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981). This book was first published in 1962.  
 
19 Halpern, “Middle East Armies and the New Middle Class,”; José Nun, 
“The Middle Class Coup,” in The Politics of Conformity in Latin America, ed. C. 
Veliz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 66-118; Henry Bienen notes that the 
debate on the military in post-World War II Europe and United States was about the 
interests of the military within the framework of interest group politics rather than 
the modernizing aspects of the military institution which was considered as an aspect 
of militaries in modernizing countries. For a different treatment of the military in 
developed and developing polities and the modernizing role of the military in 
developing countries see, Henry Bienen, ed., “The Background to Contemporary 
Study of Militaries and Modernization,” in The Military and Modernization 
(Chicago, New York: Aldine, Atheron, 1971), 37-39.    
 
20 Guillermo A. O’Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic 
Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley: University of 
California, Institute of International Studies, 1979). 
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organizational characteristics of the military. The main argument in this approach is 
that until the year 1930, the economically dynamic and politically effective groups in 
agrarian areas were producing exportable goods in Argentina and Brazil. But the 
crisis of 1930 affected their economies and accelerated domestic industrialization, 
which in turn created new political forces. These new forces, which agreed upon 
developing domestic market and industrialization, formed a coalition against the 
landed oligarchy, foreign-owned industry, and free trade. This coalition, which was 
also a ground of the populist policies, was maintained until the easy phase of the 
import substitution strategy was exhausted.   
 The strategy was based on the specialization in the production of the finished 
consumer goods (light and non-durable). It made them heavily dependent upon the 
foreign intermediate and capital goods, and technology. When the easy phase of the 
import substitution industrialization came to and end, it generated various problems 
such as the foreign exchange shortage, unsatisfied demands of societal sectors for 
consumption and that of industrial sector for the intermediate and capital goods. At 
the end, it dissolved the coalition, and a new strategy was needed based on the 
exclusion of the popular sectors from accessing to politics. This is what the military 
regimes have done in Latin America. The military intervened and set up a new 
bureaucratic authoritarian state, whose characteristics were the exclusion of popular 
sectors from politics for the benefit of the upper classes, restoration of order, 
normalization of economy and depoliticization of the masses and policy issues.21  
                                                 
21 Ibid. 55-68; Guillermo O’Donnell, “Tensions in the Bureaucratic 
Authoritarian State and the Question of Democracy,” in The New Authoritarianism 
in Latin America, ed. David Collier (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1979), 292-293; In addition to O’Donnell, see, David Collier, ed., “Introduction,” in 
The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1979), 4; idem., “Overview of the Bureaucratic Authoritarian Model,” The 
New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1979). Collier’s book provides a good insight to understand the Bureaucratic 
Authoritarian model and its development in Latin America, including some critical 
essays, such as Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s “On the Characterization of 
Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America.” This article sees bureaucratic 
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 The fourth approach, which is a societal one, looks at the political cultures of 
the countries where military’s involvement in politics is a common aspect of politics. 
As already been pointed out, military interventions are found in certain countries, 
i.e. developing countries that share some fundamental sociological features. This 
theoretical framework was offered by Huntington,22 partly in his analysis the 
political experiences of Latin American countries. This was partly a response to the 
modernization theory,23 which claimed that the economic development in less 
developed or “underdeveloped” countries would inevitably lead to the political 
development and eventually democracies would be established. However, the 
political experiences undermined this expectation because military interventions, 
authoritarianism, and the breakdown of the civilian regimes dominated the scene 
after the World War II. Huntington argued that there were substantive differences 
                                                                                                                                          
authoritarianism as a kind of “regime” rather than a state. Cardoso sees the 
authoritarianism in Latin America as a phenomenon stemming from developments in 
the international capitalism. Due to the division of labor in the international capitalist 
economy, there has been an associated dependent development in the periphery, 
namely in Latin America, which forced the internationalizing bourgeoisie and the 
state (i.e. the military) to reach an agreement on restructuring of the domestic 
markets. Although, they incorporated the middle class when they needed it, the basic 
strategy was the exclusion of already activated popular sectors from politics in order 
to maintain stability. The military was decisive in the system. For the associated 
dependent development and its relation to authoritarianism, see, Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso, “Associated-Dependent Development: Theoretical and Practical 
Implications,” in Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies and Future, ed. Alfred 
Stepan (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1973). Cardoso is a prominent 
student of so-called dependency theory which tries to explain the authoritarianism in 
Latin America in terms of the dynamics of international capitalism, giving emphasis 
on center-periphery relations. He revised the classical theory to avoid determinism. 
For more details, see, Chilcote, Theories of Comparative Politics, 308-309.   
 
22 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, 
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968). 
 
23 For a comprehensive discussion of the origins and of the prominent 
assumptions of the modernization theory and its intellectual roots in the history of 
Western thought see, Reinhard Bendix, “Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 9 (1967): 292-346.   
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between these countries and the developed countries, which stemmed from the gap 
between participation and institutionalization. The main problem that these countries 
faced was the incompatibility between participation and institutionalization. In these 
praetorian societies,24 “The rates of social mobilization and the expansion of political 
participation are high; the rates of political organizations and institutionalization are 
low. The result is political instability and disorder.”25 Since the existing political 
institutionalization is unable to moderate the participation, the political system 
breaks down, and the military intervention comes out as the only way to provide 
political stability.  
The most important contribution of Huntington, which also made his theory 
the most durable one in the analysis of the military interventions and the political 
conditions in the developing countries, was his accentuation on the role of the 
institutionalization in the political stability. As will be elaborated in detail below, the 
states in most of the developing nations share the features that characterize the 
patrimonial societies, i.e., weak institutionalization patterns. Given the fact that these 
states were established after the independence wars, they lack an "autonomous 
public," which requires the institutionalized norms defining the fundamental rules of 
the game. Yet, the political activism of the military in Turkey stems not from the 
weak institutionalization patterns, but from strong institutionalization patterns, i.e. 
strong state; thus, a state-centered approach is needed. Before the discussion of the 
state tradition and its relation the political activism of the military, and 
                                                 
24 Praetorian societies are characterized as follows: “In such societies, politics 
lacks autonomy, complexity, coherence, and adaptability. All sorts of social forces 
and groups become directly engaged in general politics. Countries which have 
political armies also have political clergies, political universities, political 
bureaucracies, political labor unions, and political corporations. Society as a whole is 
out-of-joint, not just the military.” Ibid. 194. 
 
25 Ibid., 5. 
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corresponding traditions of secularization, a review of the literature on the Turkish 
military is given in the following part.  
 
2.2 Perspectives on the Civil-Military Relations in Turkey 
As has already been pointed out, the literature on the political activism of the 
Turkish military has been developed under the influence of the above perspectives, 
or at least it shares their prominent assumptions. At the general level, it can be 
argued that in these works the matter is seen either from the societal or from the 
organizational perspective. Some works are rather eclectic while combining the two 
main perspectives.  
 The early works on the Turkish military point out its modernizing role and 
see its involvement in politics as a phenomenon stemming from the modernizing 
mission of the military, which is the most and sole modernized institution in society. 
Dankwart A. Rustow argued that “for nearly two hundred years, the soldier has been 
Turkey’s foremost modernizer.”26 The whole course of the Ottoman-Turkish 
modernization that started in the nineteenth century and resulted in the establishment 
of republic was carried out under the leadership of the military.27 Daniel Lerner and 
Richard D. Robinson also made similar observations. The military’s modernizing 
role was not only seen in historical terms, but also their role in socialization of the 
rural population was emphasized. The people coming from the rural areas first meet 
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modern way of life, skills and concepts during their military services by which they 
acquire psychic mobility, which encourages national sentiments and identity.28 The 
military intervention occurs, as in 1960, when the civilian leadership fails to satisfy 
the military’s expectations in terms of the social change and dynamic growth, which 
reflects their modernizing mission.29 
 In the same vein, Ergun Özbudun, in his seminal work,30 explained the 
political activism of the Turkish military as a response to the conservative policies of 
the Democrat Party government. Although Özbudun criticizes the overall 
assumptions of the professionalist, political institutionalization and the military’s 
modernizing role approaches, and points out the exceptional characters of the 
Turkish case, he sees the coup of 1960 as a reformist one and as response to 
Democrat Party’s “(1) increased authoritarianism, (2) ambivalence toward 
modernity, and (3) ultra-conservative social and economic policies.”31 In a sense, his 
approach is close to the one which sees the political activism of the military as an act 
originating from the military’s insistence on the modernization policies and the 
politician’s concessions from this program. Furthermore, Özbudun sees the military 
                                                 
28 Daniel Lerner and Richard D. Robinson, “Swords and Ploughshares: The 
Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force,” in The Military and Modernization, ed. 
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leftism, i.e. military’s interest in economic and social reform issues, as an expression 
of its class interests. Relying on the hypothesis that “the armies recruited from the 
lower social strata tend to be more socially progressive and reform minded than the 
armies of feudal or upper-class origins,” Özbudun argues that the military’s concern 
in reforming national economy and social system could be explained by its class 
origins.32 Although he avoids the class determinism, he sees the military’s social 
background as an influential factor in their efforts to crate “a more balanced 
economic growth and a more equitable distribution of wealth, upon which alone a 
healthy democracy could be built.”33  
 The approaches which try to explain civil-military relations in Turkey on the 
basis of the military’s autonomy within the political and administrative framework 
give priority to the military’s organizational capabilities and features. For instance, 
Gencay Şaylan relates the military’s political activism to military’s special kind of 
conception of politics, which is a product of a certain kind of political culture 
dominated by an idea of strong state and specific conception of democracy.34 Hikmet 
Özdemir considers military’s political position as an outcome its strategic location 
within the general-political administrative machine.35 By its very beginning the 
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primary task of the military in Turkey has been to maintain public security (asayiş) 
and it has extensively used for that purpose which gradually resulted in the legal-
institutional autonomy of the military.36 As a result, the military opposed to the 
religious policies of the DP government in 1950 after the transition to democracy. 
Later the “task” became to defend the country against the “communist challenge.” 
As a result of this neo-professionalism and the role expansion, the military has 
moved to the strategic positions of decision-making and gained substantive 
autonomy. Similarly Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu observes that the Turkish military, 
historically committed to preserve the general interest embodied in Atatürkism as 
official ideology and to a certain kind of democracy, has managed to extend its zone 
of influence by increasing its autonomy in a condition in which no other societal 
force was able to restructure order.37 In this long tradition, the post-1980 
developments, in regards to the military’s autonomy, represent a shift rather than the 
continuity.38 
 The approaches that emphasize adopted economic development strategies in 
explaining the military interventions, like O’Donnell, point out the stabilizing role of 
the Turkish military, especially in the periods of crisis.39 Çağlar Keyder, and Irvin C. 
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39 The class interest is not only a rarely emphasized factor in explaining the 
political activism of military in Turkey, but also has a weak explanatory power. An 
exception is Feroz Ahmad who thinks that the main motive behind the 1960 military 
intervention was the deterioration of the economic conditions and prestige of the 
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National Security Council, through which the military has been able to impose its 
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economy. His approach to 12 September, however, is O’Donnellian. See, Feroz 
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Schick and Ahmet Tonak argue that the military intervention of 1980 was a response 
to the economic strategy that aimed at the integration of the Turkish economy to the 
developed capitalist world economy through developing its internal market.40 The 
strategy had worked well until the exhaustion of the internal market. However, by 
the beginning of the 1970s, when the internal marked was exhausted, one faces two 
important results of the import-substitution industrialization strategy: a serious 
economic crisis which manifested itself especially as the foreign exchange shortage 
and a radicalized labor unions. The aim of the military interventions was to provide 
suitable conditions for the stabilization programs offered by the International 
Monetary Found, which aimed at transforming import-substitution strategy into an 
export-led one. Particularly, the aim of 12 September was to complete the economic 
program framed by the 24 January 1980 decisions. 
 A vast amount of works trying to explain the political role of the Turkish 
military emphasize the military’s commitment to the legacy of Atatürk and to the 
ideology of Atatürkism. For these works, the main reason behind the military 
interventions in Turkey is the civilians’ deviation from the Atatürkism.41 The 
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underlying argument in this approach is that the Turkish military is committed to 
democracy and reluctant to intervene unless the civilians make concessions from the 
legacy of Atatürk. Thus, the reason behind the interventions is not the military’s 
selfish appetite, but civilians’ irresponsible and ambivalent attitudes towards the 
principles of Atatürkism. The military’s commitment to Atatürkism was evaluated 
along with the military’s historical modernizing mission and its devotion to carry on 
the country in the line of modernity. Since Atatürkism and its principles means to 
reach contemporary civilization, the military’s mission again appears as a guarantor 
of modernization. Thus, the approaches, which see the military as a guardian of the 
legacy of Atatürk, implicitly or explicitly, attributes a modernizing role to the 
military and theorize within the theoretical framework which explains the political 
role of the military in the developing nations on the basis of the military’s 
modernizing role. The historical legacy and present position of the Turkish military 
fits the case better and makes these views more appealing. 
 The fact that military interventions generally have taken place in certain 
societies, i.e. developing societies, discards the institutionalist explanation since all 
armies share similar institutional characteristics but some armies intervene into 
politics. Thus, not the organizational features but societal conditions need to be 
investigated. As for the middle class approach, it may explain some interventions but 
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it is not the case that all interventions have been done on behalf of the middle class 
in which the social origin of the military is rooted. For instance, in Brazil the military 
acted against the middle class, and the traditional bureaucratic part of the middle 
class lost their influence as a result of the policies adopted by the military leaders.42 
In Turkey the main consideration of the military has been the state without an 
affinity to class or sectional interests. The nature of the military interventions in 
Turkey has shown that it acted autonomously from the social groups.43  
 The Bureaucratic-Authoritarian model may work in some Latin American 
countries but in Turkey, despite the fact that the military intervention of 1980 
coincided with the stabilization program of 24 January Decisions, the main interest 
of the military was the restructuring the order. Moreover, the military leaders did not 
intend to institutionalize an authoritarian military regime, and “the initiative for 
withdrawal- a return to barracks- was undertaken by the armed forces themselves, a 
most unusual phenomenon in civil-military relations.”44 The Turkish case poses 
further difficulties since the Turkish military differs from the most of the non-
Western militaries with respect to its historical origin. Unlike the armies of the most 
of the non-Western countries, the Turkish military is neither an ex-colonial army, i.e. 
established in the struggle of national liberation, nor a post-liberation army which 
came into existence after the achievement of national liberation.45 It is true that 
Turkey experienced a deadly War of Independence in which the military was partly 
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re-established, but this was not a qualified break from its long historical tradition. 
The historical importance of this is that the military’s conducts in politics has been 
bounded by some norms internalized by the military throughout its long historical 
experiences. On the established norms delineating the relationship between the 
military and people in Turkey Serif Mardin observed that there has always been a 
counter set of norms on the part of the people, namely “popular opinion” which 
prevented the military from establishing enduring military regimes, since these 
norms were also respected by the military.46 
 The established norms and traditions imply high level of institutionalization, 
but how does the high level of institutionalization exist with a political army in a 
society at the same time? Huntington’s contribution in this respect is important since 
he pointed out the political consequences of weak institutionalization patterns, but 
needs some supplements. Since it is impossible to establish strong 
institutionalization in a short span of time, the historical heritage becomes important 
in understanding the existence or non-existence of institutionalization. Moreover, not 
only the absence of institutionalization, but also the existence of a high level of 
institutionalization is important in understanding different polities. In other words, 
the critical variables in understanding different polities are the historically inherited 
political culture in general and the institutionalization level of the state and the 
norms and values around this state is structured in particular.  
 Huntington was aware of the importance of time in the process of 
institutionalization,47 but he did not systematically analyze the historical background 
of the weak institutionalization patterns, partly because of his area of study, i.e. the 
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newly established states of Latin America, Africa and Asia. Therefore, the 
generalizations which claim that the political military is a characteristic of weak 
states and societies48 has no relevance to the Turkish case since, unlike the states in 
question, the state in Turkey has always been strong enjoying the capacity to impose 
its preferences upon society.49 Therefore what is needed to understand the political 
role of the military, the dissension between state and religion and the role of the 
military in formation of such relationship is to trace the genealogy of strong 
institutionalization patterns.50 In other words, the question of how have strong 
institutionalization patterns emerged becomes significant in understanding the whole 
polity and political culture that shapes the actions of political actors.  
 Strong institutionalization patterns, as used here, refer to the autonomous 
domain of the sate vis-à-vis the society. In this conception, the general way of policy 
making does not take place as the pluralists conceptualize it, i.e. in a way that 
pollicies are made on the basis of the preferences of the different political groups or 
actors which are represented by their relative power. Rather, in societies having 
autonomous state tradition, there exist the preferences of the state, embodied in the 
civil and military bureaucracy as well. It is argued that the role of the military in 
formation of strong institutionalization patterns is vital especially at the initial level 
of the state formation. As Keith Krause argues, “the struggle to control the 
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institutions and instruments of the organized violence has been central to the 
emergence of the modern state, and its conception of representative political 
institutions, civil-society and civil-military relations.”51 It was in this process, i.e. the 
formation of the national state that the state and religion went into schism, i.e. into 
separate ways. Therefore, Turkey must be compared with the societies of Western 
Europe having state traditions, not the weak states of Latin America, Africa and 
Asia. A historical and comparative approach can illuminate the emergence of 
autonomous state and the role of the military in formation of such a state. Before the 
elaboration of the historical traditions, it is necessary to discuss here what is meant 
by the state tradition and state autonomy in political theory.  
 
2.3 The State as an Autonomous Agent 
As pointed out before, the tension between state and Islam in Turkey has been 
established throughout a long historical process, particularly in the process of 
modernization, and the role of the military-bureaucratic elites in the formation of 
modernity in Turkey has been determining. Therefore, in order to understand the 
contention between state and religion in Turkey, it is necessary to examine the role 
of the military-bureaucratic elites, which necessitates the explanation of the political 
activism of the military in Turkey.  It has been argued that the political activism of 
the military in Turkey can not be understood by addressing the literature developed 
on the military interventions in developing countries, since unlike these countries, 
the problem in Turkey arises from the extremely autonomous state. Therefore, the 
genealogy of this extremely autonomous state needs to be traced to its antecedent 
origins.   
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 In the political and social science literature, a political conception of the state 
has widely been dominating the scene. In this conception, the state is not a legal 
entity that merely claims the monopoly over the violence as developed by Weber, 
but a political entity shaping the course of policy making and the content of the 
whole polity.52 In this formulation, the state is not a mere reflection or the totality of 
the sectional interests, rather a notion of the public interests developed independently 
of classes and different sections of society.53  The pioneering study in this respect is 
J. P. Nettl’s “The State as a Conceptual Variable,” which more or less shaped the 
subsequent state-centered studies.  With regards to the centrality of the state, Nettl 
declared that “the concept of the state is and ought to be treated as a variable in 
social science, as a reflection of the varying empirical reality within which social 
science concern itself.”54 In the same vein, Pierre Birnbaum argued that to the extent 
that the formation of an autonomized public area is concerned “the state is seen as an 
independent variable around which the entire system in all its aspects recognizes 
itself.”55  
The state centered approach was developed partly as a response to the pluralist 
conception of politics in which the state is treated as an arena in which different 
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social groups ally with one another,56 and to the Marxist view of the state which sees 
the state as an epifenomenon, a reflection of class conflict found in class societies. 
However, in the pluralist and Marxist conceptions, the state has no independent 
existence from society or societal groups, and it is not a part of the game.  But in the 
state-centered approach which is undertaken here, the state is formulated 
independently of society and social groups, an autonomous agent shaping social 
groups and imposing policies on society. As argued by Özbudun, “state autonomy 
refers to the insulation of the state from societal pressures and to its freedom to make 
important decisions.”57 In other words, the state as formulated here is taken vis-a-vis 
civil society, and, as Metin Heper noted, to the extent that there is a state highly 
differentiated from society, we can talk of the phenomenon of the state and the levels 
of stateness corresponding to the different institutionalization patterns of various 
polities.58 Since the institutionalization patterns show significant differences among 
countries, the level of “stateness” also differs regarding the polities of these 
countries. It is stated that “once we accept society as a pluralist entity made up of 
associations and collectivities, it may be the case that the greater autonomy of the 
state vis-a-visother collectivities becomes an empirical question for each individual 
case.”59 In other words, “in empirical reality there are states not the state.”60  
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The state autonomy or “stateness” as conceptualized here is not a fixed 
phenomenon. It shows significant differences among polities and within the same 
polity at different periods.61  To the extent that the goals and policies are formulated 
independent of society and implemented over actual resistance of society, one can 
talk about the capacity of states.62 It can be said that a society having an autonomous 
state tradition has a state high in capacity, whereas a stateless society is expected to 
have a state with low capacity. “A shift towards a “state” society involves a 
preference for bureaucratic and legalistic methods of conflict resolution and for 
technical criteria in decision-making. Both the presence of bureaucrats in politics 
and the form of institutions and procedures of policy making illustrate this 
phenomenon.”63 
Kenneth Dyson summarizes overall characteristics of the state societies and 
stateless societies as follows:  
 
State societies exemplify strongly non-economic, non-utilitarian attitudes 
towards political relations, which attitudes deny that the public interest is 
simply the sum of private interests; a rationalistic spirit of inquiry; a stress on 
the distinctiveness of state and society, whether in terms of the special function 
of the state or in terms of the peculiar character of its authority; a 
consciousness of institutions which reflects the strength of legalism and 
codification within the political culture and reveals itself in the ubiquity of 
formal organizations and their detailed constitutions; a concern for 
formalization and depersonalization  which lend a “republican” character to the 
political system.... an emphasis on impersonal political symbols of community; 
a stress on the unitary character of “public power”, whether the state itself is 
centralized or federal (the state is a generalizing and integrating concept); a 
moralistic view of politics which involves strongly collectivist and regulatory 
attitudes, a notion of the inherent responsibilities of the executive power and 
an active conception of the administrator’s role; and, even when parliamentary 
and party government is accepted, the idea that the executive power is a public 
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institution that is detached from, and has a basis of authority outside, 
Parliament.64 
 
By contrast, the “stateless” societies are characterized by the lack of the notion 
of the autonomous public interests, instrumental conception of government and 
pragmatic view of politics, the tradition of pluralism and debate, mutual respect and 
tolerance among citizens and high level of civility.65  
The historical, intellectual and cultural factors have been identified which are 
central to the existence of an autonomous state. If there is a historical tradition of an 
isolated sovereign state in a society, there emerges a strong state. Another is 
intellectual in such a way that if the political ideas and the norms of policy making in 
any society incorporate a sovereign state, the possibility of the emergence of a strong 
state is high. There is also a cultural element in terms of the ideas held by individuals 
of a country about a generalized concept and cognition of the state. If this concept of 
the state is active in the perceptions and actions of individuals, the probability of 
existence of a strong state is high.66   
In shaping modern institutional dynamics of societies, namely, in direction of 
either strong or weak institutionalization patterns, antecedent cultural traditions have 
special importance. S. N. Eisenstadt67 identifies three types of societies with 
different antecedent political regimes that have produced different outcomes for 
subsequent regimes; the imperial, imperial-feudal and patrimonial societies. Imperial 
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and to a large extent imperial-feudal societies are characterized by a high level of 
distinctiveness of the center from the periphery both in structural-organizational and 
symbolic terms. In these societies the center is concerned with the periphery not only 
to extract resources but also to reconstruct it according to the postulates of the center. 
On the other hand, in patrimonial societies there is no symbolic and structural 
distinction of the center from the periphery. They also lack an autonomous elite 
formation, and the differentiation is based on status.68 
 The variations between imperial and imperial-feudal societies in terms of the 
center and periphery relations and their subsequent political evolutions are 
important. Heper69 notes that the imperial and imperial-feudal societies show 
important differences with respect to the degree of the autonomy of their centers and 
the level of incorporation of local elites to the central political structure. The main 
difference between imperial and imperial-feudal societies is that in imperial-feudal 
societies there are some peripheral forces, namely, the forces of civil society, acting 
vis-a-visthe center, hence, relatively decreasing the degree of autonomy of the 
center. But in imperial societies, the center totally dominates the periphery, and the 
level of autonomy of the central authority is high. Consequently, it can be argued 
that “stateness” is high in societies with an imperial heritage and low in societies 
with an imperial-feudal heritage. In addition to the particular structuration of the 
center and periphery, Heper claims that the previous forms of the relationship 
between central and local forces have significant effects upon the subsequent 
political developments, particularly upon the institutionalization of the state, and he 
divides imperial-feudal societies into two categories according to the nature of the 
relationship between the center and these countervailing peripheral forces: the 
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centralized feudalism and decentralized feudalism.70 In the centralized feudalism, the 
conflict between central and peripheral forces was resolved through consensus, and 
consensus was established as a fundamental way of problem resolution, thus, there 
emerged a weak state. But in decentralized feudalism, the conflict in question was 
not resolved by using consensus as a fundamental mechanism of conflict resolution; 
thus, the state emerged above the society and set the ideological parameters for the 
politics.71 These different historical-political-cultural patterns led to different 
political outcomes in different settings, hence, different configurations of civil-
military relations.  
 
2.4 State Formation, the Role of the Military and Different Outcomes of 
Historical Traditions  
Under the postulates of the above formulations, it is possible to understand 
comparatively different political experiences of the Western and non-Western 
countries including the Ottoman-Turkish society. Western countries represent the 
imperial-feudal societies in which some countervailing powers to check central 
authority existed. Since the center was not totally autonomous and there were 
intermediary structures between the state and society, the state formation in the 
process of the transition to modernity resulted in a smooth reconciliation of the 
periphery and a stable democracy. The power was gradually concentrated in the 
elected representatives of the people or nation accompanied by the decrease in power 
of the appointed officials. But the outcome of the imperial heritage was radically 
different. Instead of the smooth reconciliation of the peripheral forces into the central 
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political structure, the modernization efforts in these societies intensified the 
centralization and there emerged a strong state setting the ideological parameters in 
politics. In other words, the modernization efforts in imperial societies did not result 
in instituting a system in which the power was successfully transferred to the elected 
representatives of the people. There has always existed a tug-of-war between the 
elected representatives or the representatives of particular interests and that of the 
general interest. Yet, in the centralized feudalism, the incorporation of the periphery 
into the center did not generate the tension between center and periphery, but in 
decentralized feudalism the state extended its scope vis-a-visthe periphery, and the 
reconciliation produced serious tensions reinforcing the central norms which were 
manifested in republican radicalism. England is the best example of the centralized 
feudalism whereas France represents the ideal case for decentralized feudalism. The 
Ottoman Empire was characterized by the imperial heritage with no intermediary 
structures.72 As will be elaborated in detail in the following pages, the Ottoman-
Turkish state had been extensively strong one which was structured in the military 
and bureaucracy, and there always existed a potential antagonism between the 
representatives of the state and that of the people.  
In England, a relatively well-integrated society was established in the 
beginning of the fourteenth century. The local leaders and the English kings 
recognized each other’s rights and social and political developments culminated in 
the polity of estates-Standestaat.73 It gained its unity under one monarch in a very 
early period beginning in the tenth century, and by the fifteenth century a kind of 
national identity had emerged which made the English centralization experiences 
easy and different from the rest of Europe.74  As pointed out by Bertrant Badie and 
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Pierre Birnbaum,75 the English aristocracy did not fight against the king to gain 
autonomy; rather, the aim of the English aristocracy was to put some checks on the 
king’s power. Of the relationship between the crown and the local forces, Dyson 
notes the following:  
 
The political system rested on a complex process of bargaining between the 
Crown and the great landed magnates which had, by the early seventeenth 
century, given way to a pattern of co-operation and conflict between 
“Country,” which was represented in the Commons, and “Court”. Monarchical 
authority was viewed as conditional. The monarch was not above or outside of 
the community, but was a member of the “community of the realm.76  
 
 Consequently, the monarchy was not interested in establishing a strong 
authoritarian bureaucracy in the process of the establishment of the center. 
Moreover, the estates opposed to the centralizing efforts of the monarchy, and 
although the efforts continued after the fall of the Stuarts, the focus of these efforts 
was the Parliament.77 The power of the parliament has been great since the monarchs 
adopted the model of the “king-in-the parliament” which meant that sovereignty 
rested upon the Crown-in-Parliament. In addition, parliament became the instrument 
of territorial representation and the articulation of various interests.78  
The principal consequences of these different traditions were also different in 
terms of the identification of the state, and the formation and training of elites. The 
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state in England has had a strong identification with individuals;79 hence, the training 
of the elites in England, unlike its counterpart France, has addressed itself to society 
not to the state. The elite socializing institutions have legitimacy bases in society 
independent of the state and “the bureaucratic-state-conscious intelligentsia,” which 
is a prominent feature of the state societies, has been lacking in England due to its 
stateless tradition.80  
 The French case, on the other hand, represents the opposite one in which 
decentralization of authority was very high in the ninth and tenth centuries. The local 
and central authorities were in continuous wars which resulted in the absolute rule of 
Louis XIV  (1643-1715). Since it was difficult to establish consensus as a way of 
solving the fundamental conflicts due to the continuous tug-of-war between forces, 
the French State emerged as a strong and autonomous one imposing its norms upon 
society.81 The issue of centralization had already been on the agenda of the French 
political life. “From Hugh Capet to Louis XIV, from French Revolution to Napoleon 
III and the Gaullist regime, the French state has steadily expanded its control over 
civil society and constituted itself as an autonomous power, an immense and 
hermetic administrative machine capable of dominating all peripheral power 
centers.”82 For France and Prussia Charles Tilly observed that “the kings were able 
to undermine the Estates after considerable effort, and at the expense of erecting 
large administrative structure to supplant them.”83  In France, the territorial ruling 
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dynasty dissolved the local estates and created a centralized state by establishing an 
apparatus of rule under the command of the monarch,84 a process that worked 
against the power of civil society or the intermediaries. Thus, the Estates-General did 
not evolve in the same direction as the English Parliament, and its existence 
depended upon the central authorities.85 
The role of the bureaucracy and the norms under which the socialization of the 
bureaucrats took place were different from the stateless societies. Unlike the officials 
of England, they identified themselves with the state, cutting off their ties from and 
imposing their norms upon civil society.86  They became the instruments of public 
power, and the state tradition included the narrow definition of the role of political 
parties.87 The profound political conflicts were vivid phenomena of the nineteenth 
century France. The state in this century turned into an arena of unresolved conflicts, 
which reinforced the state elites to adopt the policies aiming at promoting their 
autonomy through establishing public institutions and keeping the state away from 
direct involvement in contradictions and upheavals.88  The same trend continued 
during the twentieth century albeit in a relatively weak fashion. The bureaucratic 
reforms of the Gaullist regime increased the autonomy of the state, serving only the 
national interest through the reforms in the bureaucracy and by a limited 
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parliamentary system of the Fifth Republic.89 The result was a strong state highly 
differentiated from civil society with a politically strong bureaucratic apparatus. 
Thus, the functioning of democracy in France was not as smooth as it was in 
England. 
Most of the societies in the non-Western world fall into the category of 
patrimonial societies that failed to establish viable centers, which promoted the 
development of a relatively autonomous public, an apparatus needed for the smooth 
functioning of the state. “The capacity to create political institutions” says 
Huntington “is the capacity to create public interests.”90 The weakness public or its 
total absence means also the absence of consensus among the groups seeking private 
interests and the lack of central norms defining the fundamental rules of the game. 
Governments in Latin American, Africa and most of the Asian societies are founded 
upon the unpredetermined consent91 lacking procedures to direct political debates 
and the rules to transfer political power. Alain Roquié notes on the political 
conditions of Spanish American nations that “the Spanish American nations were 
established in wars of independence. The new republic had an army even when they 
did not have a state.”92 The wars against the colonial powers destroyed the Spanish 
institutions and encouraged the fragmentation of territorial and administrative unity, 
which, in turn, resulted in total anarchy.93  Political allies during the nineteenth 
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century took place along the patron-client relationship,94 and there was the 
persistence of self-centered individualism which strongly involved distrust for other 
groups95 and which prevented the development of autonomous political institutions. 
Consequently, all efforts towards modernization resulted in praetorianism, and 
authoritarian military regimes became the permanent features of these societies. 
Among the above categories, the Ottoman Empire is best described as an 
imperial society96 with a strong center without intermediary power structures.  
Although France has been described as the ideal type of state society and the French 
state as an ideal type of the state,97 it can be claimed that the Ottoman-Turkish state 
fits this ideal type better than the French state since state has been stronger in the 
Ottoman-Turkish context than in France. The Ottomans developed a state tradition 
which was absent in non-Western or “so-called” Third World countries.98 
As has been noted before, the Ottoman state was established by ghazis (the 
holy warriors) as a militant entity, which, shaped its political culture. The military 
was an important factor in establishing the state that was based on the idea of 
conquest. The Ottomans fought against internal and external enemies which led the 
Ottoman statesmen to take negative attitudes towards the intermediary power 
holders. Although the Ottoman state and the role of the military, as the primary focus 
of the present study, will be elaborated below in detail within the context presented 
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above here it will be meaningful to elaborate how did these primordial structures 
shape subsequent political developments in the process of transition to modernity, 
and what was the role of the military in this process? 
 
2.5 The Military and the Evolution of Different Polities 
So far the effects of the antecedent regime types on the existing polities have been 
investigated, and it has already been pointed out that different historical traditions 
produced different outcomes in the process of the formation of the modern state in 
terms of the degree of stateness. The role of the military both in the formation of the 
modern state and in the establishment of modern polities was not discussed. In other 
words, the given framework should be completed with a consideration of the 
military’s role. What was the role of the military in the development of modern 
polities and in variations of these polities from each other? In which way did the 
military modernization determine subsequent courses of democratic consolidation? It 
is, here, argued that the military is central to any state tradition.99 The crucial point in 
the relationship between state-making and the military found its apt expression in 
Tilly’s aphoristic maxim: “War made the state, and the state made war.”100 Similarly, 
it is claimed that “warfare and military rivalry played a fundamental role in the 
origin and development of modern European states.”101 Otto Hintze also argued that 
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“all state organization was originally military organization, organization for war... 
Out of this martial organization there first developed a more severe government with 
coercive power over individuals, and it increased in strength the more frequently 
wars were waged.”102 On the relationship between war and state making Krause 
argued, “The impact of war on state-making manifest itself in the political realm 
through the extension of territorial control and the acquisition of a monopoly of 
force, the emergence of centralized rule and administrative structures and the erosion 
of local autonomy of particularity.”103 Similarly, Tilly argued, 
 
 It [the war] produced the means of enforcing the government’s will over stiff 
resistance: the army. It tended, indeed, to promote territorial consolidation, 
centralization, differentiation of the instruments of government and 
monopolization of the means of coercion, all the fundamental state-making 
process.104 
 
 The initial phase of state formation was characterized by a coalition of state 
makers and war makers because the state-making necessitated to create new political 
and socio-economic institutions to extract resources in order to feed their expanding 
war machines and finance the wars.105 After the consolidation of the power in favor 
of the state-makers, as observed by Stein Rokkan, a new stage came into scene 
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which included an extension of space of the state towards periphery.106 It was the 
nature of this extension of the center towards the periphery that determined the 
ensuing patterns of different polities, and the military modernization was crucial in 
this process. Although the role of the military in the process of state-making has 
been emphasized in social and political science literature, its role in formation of 
different polities or political cultures was almost neglected. One exception is Brian 
M. Downing who has shown that the nature of the military modernization in the 
process of transition to modernity was crucially important in the political evolution 
of the western societies.107 On the basis of his work, it was the ways of the military 
modernization in the process of transition to modernity that determined the path of 
subsequent developments both either in democratic or in autocratic directions 
throughout the world.  
Downing108 suggests that there are some peculiarities in Europe originating 
from the medieval past that brought liberal democracy. They also distinguish the 
European civilization from other civilizations. The existence of the representative 
assemblies, which were very important institutions in establishing liberal 
democracies, is something peculiar to Europe. The relationship between the military 
modernization and the medieval representative institutions is crucial to understand 
the origins of both liberal democracy and autocracy. In societies where military 
modernization destroyed the representative assemblies and relied on domestic 
resources to finance wars, there emerged strong and centralized monarchical states, 
and the monarchs established expansive autocracies. However, in societies, where 
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the military revolutions did not take place and alternative methods of financing wars 
were developed, the establishment of liberal democracy proved to be an easy task. 
Through the military revolution or military modernization which took place in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, “the process whereby small, decentralized, self-
equipped feudal hosts were replaced by increasingly large, centrally financed and 
supplied armies that equipped themselves with ever more sophisticated and 
expansive weaponry.”109 
Although Downing analyses a set of countries ranging from Europe to Asia, 
for the present purpose his analysis of England and France is enough to make a 
comparison between them and Turkey.  
England’s relatively easy resolution of the center-periphery conflict, its smooth 
transition to liberal democracy and the establishment of a weak state with a self-
functioning civil society spring from the endurance of its medieval representative 
institutions, since English society did not experience the military revolution to the 
same level as France and Brandenburg Prussia. In the mediaeval England the 
military organization was decentralized, and the control of the armed groups was 
local. These decentralized military groups had certain rights and immunities which 
gave the notables the right to negotiate with the crown. This state of affairs 
prevented the crown’s domination over the military, which in turn, prevented the 
expansion of the royal power too.110  
During the Tudor period (1485-1609), England underwent radical changes 
such as the Reformation, governmental reform and economic growth. But the strong 
figures of the time who were interested in these issues neither intended to establish a 
military-bureaucratic absolutism nor destroyed the parliamentary processes. They 
made a coalition with the gentry and shared power with other social classes within a 
                                                 
 
109 Ibid., 10. 
 
110 Ibid., 159-160. 
 71 
consensual framework. Moreover, the wars were financed by parliamentary 
subsidies. When England was involved in the continental wars in the late 
seventeenth century, the number of soldiers remained relatively small, and the Bank 
of England found required financial resources for war helped by the comparatively 
well developed economy of England. Consequently, the efforts towards state-
building of that era experienced neither military revolution nor military centered 
bureaucracy.111 The result was a smooth functioning liberal democracy. 
France, on the other hand, followed a different trajectory in the process of state 
building. In a very early period, Philip Augustus (1180-1223) established both 
central and local institutions. The Hundred Years’ War did not necessitate a large 
army, and the mobilization of resources remained small. Although from the 
fourteenth century to the early seventeenth century France was involved in numerous 
wars, none of them were as influential as the Thirty Years’ War that led France to 
military modernization and to the destruction of the medieval constitutionalism. 
These wars showed the French statesmen that a modern, well-equipped standing 
army was necessary to do well in wars. This necessitated extra taxes, which were 
implemented without the consent of local parliaments and which sometimes 
exceeded the legitimate limits. The revolts coming from the estates were suppressed 
by 1653. This suppression cleaned the way for centralization,112 and at the end, the 
French monarchs established a military-bureaucratic absolutism.113  
                                                 
 
111 Ibid., 162-163 
 
112 Ibid., 113-127. 
 
113 The French experience was a common phenomenon in the continent. For 
the war and the state in the continent Hintze noted: “In the continental states the 
army became the very backbone of the new centralized greater state. In order to 
enable the French crown to fight Spain and Austria, Richelieu suppressed with force 
the particularism of the provinces and thus created a unified absolutist state, such as 
was hitherto unknown... The Prussian state of the eighteenth century actually rested 
more on the army than upon its disconnected territories. Austria and Spain in general 
 72 
Revitalized local assemblies were unable to provide stable bases for liberal 
democracy because of their exclusion from the Bourbon state of the eighteenth 
century, and the promise for democracy after the Revolution was followed by terror, 
chaos, and military intervention provoking old class, regional, and religious 
antagonisms. But the Revolution destroyed the military-bureaucratic absolutism, 
which opened the path to a liberal democracy, but with a state “intrusive and rather 
authoritarian or at least administrative.”114 Therefore, the state in France remained 
sharply differentiated from civil society and the functioning of democracy met 
various difficulties if it is compared with the democracy of England. Moreover, the 
bureaucracy, in France has politically been more autonomous than in England. There 
has always been the corporate interests of the state in the French political tradition or 
an autonomous domain of the state norms defining the rules of the game, which 
manifests itself in French Jacobinism. The military-bureaucratic elites have been the 
representatives of this Rousseauian general will of the state vis-a-visthe particular 
will of the people.  
Accordingly, secularism and the role of religion in society is one of the most 
important subjects of controversy of these two wills. In other words, the sharp 
differences in the secularization traditions of different nations have been an outcome 
of their polity traditions. On the basis of the theoretical framework developed above, 
one may expect that the experiences of secularism and secularization in state 
societies might be different from the stateless societies. As Jose Casanova noted; 
 
 If the modern state in its own right is also carrier of process of secularization, 
then one should expect different patterns of state formation, let us say in 
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France, England and the United states should also have some effect on 
different patters of secularization.115 
In fact, the institutionalized forms of secularism and the whole secularization 
processes are closely related to the state tradition, and in state societies we find an 
extreme secularism along with a traumatic process of secularization whereas the 
stateless societies have adopted minimal secularism, and experienced a relatively 
smooth secularization process.  
 
2.6 Variations Within Polities and Different Paths to Secularization 
In the following part the relationship between polity traditions or political cultures 
and the types of secularism will be analyzed. Some definitions will be given to 
illustrate the controversy around the concepts of secularism and secularization. 
David Martin,116 one of the prominent students of sociology of religion, claims 
somewhat in an exaggerated fashion that the term “secularization” is an obstacle to 
the developments of the sociology of religion and offers to erase it from the 
dictionary of sociology. Although such a view is open to discussion, it reveals the 
ambiguity behind these concepts. Here the definition of Peter L. Berger is borrowed. 
By secularization, Berger means “the process by which sectors of society and culture 
are removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols.”117 The 
societal aspect of secularization manifests itself in the institutions as the notable 
decline of the influence of religion. In the Western history, this process was 
experienced as the separation of church and the state, expropriation of church lands, 
and secularization of education. When the cultural aspect of secularization is under 
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focus, the reference goes beyond the socio-structural processes. It implies a gradual 
decline of the religious contents in arts, philosophy, literature and science. Moreover, 
science becomes the most important secular perspective on the world. So, an 
analytical distinction can be made between “objective” side of secularization as the 
secularization at the socio-structual level and the “subjective” side indicating the 
secularization at the consciousness  level.118  
 On the part of politics, the most important subject in terms of secularization 
is the relationship between religion and the state. Particularly, separation of the state 
and church has a special historical significance since it has been the ultimate 
purposes of secularist movements. In the social and political theory, there have been 
different formulations of the relationship between religion and the state that more or 
less influenced the actual historical developments and paved the way for different 
traditions. This does not mean that these theoretical formulations were the principal 
determinants of different paths to secularization. Neither these theories nor the forms 
of secularization were independent of the political cultures of countries and of the 
political climate in which they were theorized. 
 With regard to the relationship between the state and religion, four main 
groups of theoretical views can be identified. The first group sees the state as 
subordinate to religion. The state has no independent existence from religion and the 
state is based on the norms derived form religion. The thinkers who were also the 
members of clergy, such as Calvin, Luther and Bossuet developed this view. The 
second group gives the privilege to the state and sees religion as a subordinate of 
state. This view was developed by the influential political thinkers, such as 
Machiavelli, Hobbes, Montesquieu and Rousseau. They sometimes mention of a 
religion serving state, and sometimes claim that the state should determine religion. 
The Turkish separation between state and religion has been very close to this view. 
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The third group demands full divorce of state and religion. Particularly, Locke and 
Tocqueville have more liberal outlook on religion. They support the view which sees 
state and religion as different and independent domains. Moreover, they remark that 
religion and the church must be independent of the state. Tocqueville says the state 
has no competence on religion, and religion must be free and must have an 
autonomous area in society. This is the most liberal tradition of secularization 
developed especially in Anglo-American traditions. The last view developed by 
August Comte not only claims the priority of state over religion, but also offers a 
new religion for society. For him, the humanity had replaced God without forgetting 
his functions. What Comte offered was nothing than a secularized religion loaded by 
atheistic-humanistic tenets. The humanity religion of Comte excludes any 
transcendentality.119 This form of secularization differs from previous three views in 
some important respects. The most important one is that the aim is neither simple 
separation of the state and religion nor the subordination of the religion to the state. 
It includes the interference of the state into religious matters, and strongly implies 
that the state has the right to develop some judgments on religious issues and to 
impose it upon society. This is what has been called “laicism” developed particularly 
on the bases of the French political experience. The cases in which the state develops 
an alternative ideology and imposes on society fall in this category. As already 
been pointed out, the form of secularization, i.e. the nature of the state-church 
relationship depends upon the political culture, particularly the autonomy of the state 
vis-a-viscivil society. The more the state is weak, the more liberal form of 
secularization develops, and in such stateless societies the state-church separation 
took place relatively in a peaceful manner in the secularization process. This 
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development characterizes the Anglo-American traditions. Conversely, it is highly 
possible to find an extreme secularity in state societies, and deep conflicts and 
confrontations in the secularization process, which is the case in France and to same 
extent in Turkey. 
 Within this framework, Martin E. Marty’s classification of different 
experiences of secularization provides us with useful categories for understanding 
these traditions of secularization in different polities.120 Marty differentiates the 
continental secularity from Anglo-American secularity tradition on the bases of the 
state’s attitudes towards religion. In Continental Europe, particularly in France, we 
find “maximal secularity” which “involved a formal and unrelenting attack on gods 
and churches and a studied striving to replace them.”121 In the Anglo-American 
historical experience, there was a gradual and increasing ignorance of gods and 
churches without attempts to replace them. There were no god-killers. This type of 
secularism was called “mere secularity.”122 Marty differentiates American tradition 
from that of England, and calls it as “controlled secularity.” The most important 
difference of America from England is that in America religion is an extremely 
private matter. In the United States institutional religion survived and continued to 
progress, but, it accepted a kind of a division of labor in society by addressing itself 
to personal, familial and leisured sectors of life renouncing its claims on public 
sphere. There is an accepted separation of public and religious spheres, and public 
sphere gained its autonomy independent of religion.123  
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 If the American, British and French traditions are looked upon together, it 
can be seen that there are no substantial differences between the American and 
British traditions, especially if they are compared with the French tradition. Marty 
was also aware of this similarity.124 In England and the United States, a smooth 
reconciliation between the state and religion has occurred in the process of the 
formation of modernity. No serious confrontations between the state and church took 
place in comparison to the French secularity tradition. As an ideal form of the strong 
state tradition, the French state has always been suspicious of religion. The 
Reformation process produced deep conflicts that continued without resolution until 
the Revolution. Reformation was developed in a small minority Protestant sect 
called Huguenots demanding a kind of government limited by natural agreement and 
some religious guaranties from the absolute monarchy. But the center never 
preferred to resolve conflicts in a peaceful way. They were neither recognized by the 
absolute rule nor given any guarantee. A bloody war took place between the catholic 
center and the Huguenots in the marriage ceremony of Henry of Navarre, a 
Huguenot, on August 24, 1572 which resulted in the death of 6000 men, a 3000 of 
whom were killed in Paris only. The policies of Henry of Navarre, who came to 
power as a convert to Catholicism and announced a new decree called the Edict of 
Nantes in 1598 giving Huguenots religious tolerance, did not produce smooth 
reconciliation of conflicts between the state and the Huguenots. Rather, it created a 
state within the state since it allowed these groups to establish their own armies and 
cities. Soon after, Louis XIV revoked this Edict in 1685 in an attempt to abolish all 
intermediary structures between the state and society.125 This was a state building 
process which was also a process of the penetration of the state into civil society. 
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This autonomization process also worked against religion in France, which means 
that the process of state building went also parallel to the process of secularization. 
In Badie and Birnbaum’s words, this process was experienced as follows: 
 
The autonomization may also be seen at work in the growing separation of 
Church and state, the gap between the two widening steadily from the time of 
the French Revolution to the final break, which came in 1903-5 with the 
passage of a series of laws redefining the status of the Church, a milestone 
marking the state’s achievements of legitimacy in its own right. Secularism 
may thus be seen as one of the primary indicators of the progress of state 
building in France, marking the step-by-step separation of the state from all 
other social systems. Since we are here reading France as an ideal of a state 
political system, it should come as no surprise that the French pushed 
secularism to its extreme limits.126 
 Thus, it was not surprising that the Revolution took hard measures against the 
established religion and instituted legal secularization in decisive manner. The 
number of the clergy was reduced, the religious orders were banished, and the lands 
of the church went under state control.127 Education was taken away from the control 
of the church. The intellectual climate was not different from the general picture. 
The intellectuals, who were the advocates of the Revolution, developed anti-clerical 
and often anti-religious outlook with new philosophical systems, which also 
dominated the scene in the post-Revolutionary France. In fact, as noted above, one 
of the most important differences between the French and Anglo-American 
secularity was related to the nature of these new ideas. The French philosophical 
systems were developed as alternatives to the religious thought systems. They were 
offered as new secular religions providing answers for everything, including 
alternative ceremonies for men through the ideas of Edgar Quinet, Ernest Renan, 
Edmond Scherer, Saint-Simon and August Comte.128  
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 The main result of this pattern, which is a product of a confrontation between 
the religious dissent and a revolution with an explicit secular ideology at large, is 
that religion is a political issue. There is a massive confrontations between “massive 
secularism” and “massive religion” and “to the extent that secularism is successful 
there is a partial tendency to erode institutional adherence and belief together.”129  
 The situation in England was entirely different. As an ideal example of a 
weak state tradition, in which the conflict between the center and local forces did not 
produce sharp confrontations, the English path of secularization did not produce a 
radical secularist attitude towards religion. Unlike the case in France, “the 
Protestantism of England has prevented any massive confrontation of religion with 
secular radicalism.”130 The English secularists were not against religion; rather their 
claim was the separation of the state and the “church.” Their demand was to 
establish national churches, not to destroy the religious establishment. One of the 
most important differences between England and France was that the English 
secularists were nationalist; unlike their French counterparts, they did not formulate 
it as an ideology alternative and counter to religion.131 Moreover, the absence of a 
sharp conflict between the state and religion prevented the development of secular 
religions formulating secular vocabularies as a substitute for existing religion. Martin 
describes the attitudes of English intellectuals as follows: 
 
[T]he most important aspect of English intellectuals is their capacity to absorb 
new ideologies within Christian categories. New knowledge, like that of the 
higher criticism or of the physical sciences after the mid-nineteenth century, 
tends to be reinterpreted without causing widespread collapse of faith. New 
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ideologies, liberalism, democratic socialism, existentialism, take on a 
variegated Christian coloring. Intellectuals select those aspects of Christianity 
which are closest to their intellectual attitudes, whether they involve world-
weary pessimism, medieval nostalgia or the utopian optimism of a Kingdom of 
God on earth.132 
 
 Consequently, in England the transition to modernity and the development of 
secularism were quiet and smooth leaving no issue of conflict between the state and 
religion. But the transition in France brought about various clashes after the 
Revolution. In England, unlike in France, the state does not define itself as “laic.” 
The  king is also the head of the Anglican Church. Religious education is given in 
the public schools. The French laicism does not, however, accept an “unsecular” 
state. It defines itself as “laic.” The religious education is done outside of the public 
schools.133  After the official separation of the state and Church, which was occurred 
in 1905, the Catholics and the laicists (read also the state) became more fearing and 
suspecting towards each other. It was after the Second World War that a notable 
mutual recognition was established between them. The Christian Democratic Party 
was allowed to establish, and the Church gained some initiatives on primary 
education.134 Although the state still defines itself as laic in France today, hot debates 
on the share of religion in public sphere and the secularization of laicism itself135 are 
                                                 
 
132 Martin, The Religious and the Secular, 118. 
 
133 Osman Turhan, Türkiye’de Manevi Buhran, Din ve Laiklik [Moral Crisis 
in Turkey, Religion and Laicism] (Ankara: Şark Matbaası, 1964), 42-43. 
 
134 Stuart Mews, Religion in Politics (U.K: Longman, 1989), 75-76. 
 
135 Oliver Abel notes that in extreme secular countries, particularly in France 
and Turkey, laicism has been transformed into a kind of civil religion and national 
identity, and if that kind of change occurs, laicism must also be subjugated to the 
principles of secularism. See, Oliver Abel, “Dinlerin Etiği Olarak Laiklik” [Laicism 
as the Ethics of Religions], in Avrupa’da Etik, Din ve Laiklik [Ethics, Religion and 
Laicism in Europe], trans. and ed., S. Dolanoğlu and S. Yılmaz (Istanbul: Metis 
Yayınları, 1995), 29-30. 
 81 
taking place which are all natural consequences of developments along the liberal 
democratic line after the Second World War. Today, the religious life is under the 
guarantee of the state, and the church is extending its space in society, albeit the 
state’s counter claims. 
 It is not an accident that the picture in Turkey resembles to that of France, 
since both societies have similar state traditions. As has already been pointed out, the 
state in Turkey is even stronger than that of France; thus, one may come across a 
more extreme form of secularism, which is almost absent in Western countries. The 
relationship between secularism and the state tradition in Turkey will be mentioned 
in the end of the following part, and a detailed analysis of the historical development 
of secularism in Turkey, along with the role of the state elites, is the subject-matter 
of the third chapter, but it is necessary to elaborate comparatively the Turkish state 
tradition within the framework developed above, which enables us to understand the 
origins of elitism and the “maximal secularity” tradition  in the Ottoman-Turkish 
context.  
2.7 The Ottoman-Turkish Experience: A Comparative Perspective 
So far the role of historical dynamics in formation of the modern polities, their 
principal effects upon the variations of polities and corresponding secularization 
traditions have been comparatively discussed, particularly by addressing the English 
and French cases. It has been argued that in shaping of modern polities, the 
antecedent regime types and the nature of the military revolution were crucial. The 
relatively smooth formation of democracy without serious troubles in England was a 
result of the centralized feudalism, which made it possible to reconcile the center-
periphery cleavage in a consensual manner, and relatively undestructive military 
modernization, which remained small in scale. However, in France where the 
decentralized feudalism did not allow the reconciliation of the cleavage in question 
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in a peaceful way and centralization necessitated the massive mobilization of the 
military, the formation of modernity has faced serious crises and there emerged a 
strong state vis-à-vis  civil society, which has manifested itself in the republican 
radicalism. Elitism, embodied in the military and bureaucracy, has been the most 
important characteristics of these polities. Accordingly, in stateless societies 
secularization process generated neither serious upheavals nor massive 
confrontations between rival forces and, at the end, there emerged “mere secularity,” 
whereas in state societies massive secularism confronted massive religiosity and 
religion remained as a political issue.136 As a result, in state societies “extreme 
secularity” has developed with an explicit secular ideology. England and France 
were examined as the examples for stateless and state societies respectively. A 
comparison of the Turkish case with the English and French cases within the 
framework developed above gives important insights not only to understand the 
whole adventure of the Ottoman-Turkish political tradition, but also the difficulties 
that Turkey faced both in transition to democracy and in its overall adventure in 
coming to terms with modernity. In other words, it enables us to understand why has 
the formation of modernity in Turkey generated immense tensions between the state 
and society, the state and religion in Turkey?  
 As noted before, in terms of the autonomy of the state and the existence of 
the corporate public interest vis-a-vis  the private or the societal one, Turkey is 
similar to France since in both cases the state extended its domain vis-a-visthe 
periphery in the modernization process. But in Turkey the state has been more 
autonomous than France because there were two main differences at the very 
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beginning, which differentiated the Turkish historical experience not only from 
France but from the whole Western tradition as well. First, there were no strong 
intermediary structures as compared to their Western counterparts. Second, at the 
very early stage of state formation, there was a standing central army which, unlike 
the situation in the feudal tradition, signified the existence of a highly differentiated 
center. In addition to these distinguishing features which worked contrary to the 
formation of an autonomous civil society, the process of military modernization has 
evolved in a way which produced a strong and autonomous state. In other words, the 
military modernization went together with centralization and further penetration of 
the periphery by the center which made the subsequent developments towards 
representative institutions more traumatic than its Western counterparts.   
It has already been noted that the Ottoman empire was an imperial society 
showing substantive differences from the imperial-feudal societies of the medieval 
Europe in terms of the absence of intermediary power structures, i.e., the elements of 
civil society which decreased center’s ability to penetrate the periphery. In the 
absence of such countervailing social forces, the Ottoman State succeeded to 
dominate the periphery and impose its own central norms upon it, which resulted in a 
particular idea and institution of the state. 
The Ottoman state neither faced with the revolts coming from the periphery, as 
in decentralized feudal France, which necessitated the establishment of an 
autonomous yet not omnipotent state- because it was unable to dominate the 
periphery totally- nor was there the formation of the center in a consensual 
framework, which was the case in centralized feudal England. Rather, the Ottoman 
statesmen adopted a different outlook and absorbed different norms which, 
consequently, gave the way to a different, yet an omnipotent state tradition. 
Moreover, all centralization reforms directed to modernize the society, i.e., the 
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efforts to create a Western-like society, paradoxically, resulted in strengthening of 
the central power. The military along with the bureaucracy was the very backbone of 
this tradition and the subsequent developments.137 
 The military character of the Ottoman state has a long history, and its origin 
could be traced from the beginning periods. The Ottoman state was formed around 
the fourteenth century in Asia Minor as a small Seljukid principality devoting itself 
to the ghaza, the holy war.138 The former military character of the state has always 
been important for its subsequent institutionalization patterns. In Halil Inalcik’s 
words,  
 
Its initial ghazi frontier character influenced the state’s historical existence for 
six centuries: its dynamic conquest policy, its basic military structure, and the 
predominance of the military class within an empire that successfully 
accommodated disparate religious, cultural and ethnic elements.139   
 
Although at the initial stage the Ottoman sultans made a kind of coalition with 
some aristocratic elements of society, they gradually deployed these centrifugal 
forces from the state, and the state bureaucracy was filled with servants cultivated 
from the royal slaves.140 The rationale behind the power of the sultan and in central-
local relations was based on the “old Oriental maxim that a ruler can have no power 
without soldiers, no soldiers without money, no money without the well-being of his 
subjects, and no popular well-being without justice.”141 This was the raison d’état of 
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the notion of the public interest which gave the ruler the right to formulate laws 
independent from the sacred law, despite the fact that in theory the sultan was the 
servant of god and these laws could not be in conflict with the sacred law. Called the 
örf-i sultani142 the adab tradition gave the way to a secular tradition which was later 
assimilated by the bureaucratic elites  that brought a secular state-oriented 
tradition.143  
Under such state of affairs, the development of elements of civil society 
remained alien to the Ottoman-Turkish polity.144 In general, 
 
The Ottoman society was divided into two major classes. The first one, called 
askeri, literally the “military,” included those to whom the sultan had 
delegated religious or executive power through an imperial diploma, namely 
officers of the court and the army, civil servants and Ulema.145 The second 
included the reaya, comprising all Muslim and non-Muslim subjects who paid 
taxes but who had no part in the government. It was a fundamental rule of the 
Empire to exclude it subjects from the privileges of the “military.”146  
 
Thus, there has always been a sharp distinction between the center and the 
periphery not only in political but in social and cultural terms as well; this has been 
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the most prominent cleavage of Ottoman-Turkish political life which has remained 
influential until recent  periods.147 
By the second part of the sixteenth century, the classical state structure faced 
serious bottlenecks originating partly from the economic and the military 
developments in Europe and partly from the internal disintegration of the Empire 
due to the financial crisis, a process which was accompanied by the development of 
alternative social forces, namely ayans.148 But the ayans were far from to be 
transformed into an alternative civil societal element for the center. As Özbudun  
properly observed, 
 
The rise of a class of local notables (ayan) in the eighteenth century, who often 
combined local social and military power with the connections to central 
government and tax-farming privileges, did not fundamentally alter this 
[center-periphery relations] state of affairs. The status of the ayan can in no 
way be compared to that of feudal aristocracy in Western Europe, since it 
remained essentially a de facto situation lacking the legal basis and political 
legitimacy of the latter. Besides, the effective centralization drive under 
Mahmut II (1808-1839) deprived the ayan of much of their political 
influence.149 
When the silent components of the Empire raised their voices against the 
center, i.e., when the traditionally stratified groups were politically aroused, the 
state-society dichotomy was developed in the following way. In Karpat’s words:  
 
Society developed and differentiated into new occupational groups with new 
thoughts and demands corresponding more or less to the technological and 
economic stimuli, and expected a change in government functions accordingly. 
But the government, consisting of the throne and the central bureaucracy and 
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considering itself synonymous with the state and subjects to its own traditions 
of authority was unable to understand and cope functionally with the problems 
created by change.150 
 
 At the beginning, the center seemed to ally with them, but they did not evolve 
into nobility and aristocracy, and when the center found sufficient power, it replaced 
them with central agents.151 The government’s eventual answer to this development 
was centralization.152 The reform movements, which culminated in the declaration of 
Gülhane-i Hatti Hümayünü, despite its radical claim to redefine the status of subjects 
vis-à-vis the state, aimed at the increase the power of the center and centralization in 
all aspects of society.153 At the initial stage, the subject of the reforms was 
bureaucracy, but in the following decades, the military took the initiative and to a 
large measure determined the course of modernization reforms. The power and 
position of the bureaucracy within the state composition were strengthened from the 
eighteenth century, and in due course, the bureaucracy, which devoted itself to the 
secular interest of the state without traditional bounds, became the faithful 
instrument of radical secular administrative reforms.154 Unlike the previous periods, 
“it becomes difficult, however, to see an identity between the sultan and the state in 
later centuries... The ruling groups in time became the servants of the state rather that 
those of the sultan.”155 In other words, by the Tanzimat period (1839-1876) one 
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could face the state elites in its modern sense, composed of the military and the 
bureaucracy striving to save the state from decline.156 Consequently, when the 
modernization efforts were introduced, the Ottoman society lacked the principal 
social forces that marked the whole course of modernization in Western Europe such 
as the bourgeoisie, aristocracy, peasantry, working class and the like.157 In the 
absence of these forces, the whole initiative in the modernization project was taken 
by the civil and military bureaucracy; thus, it generated no social upheavals or 
multiple confrontations of different social groups and state and society at various 
levels, which would brought the power change. In other words, it remained as an 
elite modernization project which took place as a further widening of the control of 
the center over the periphery indicating that the tension between center and 
periphery was not resolved.  
 
2.7.1 Centralization and the military modernization in the Ottoman Empire and the 
Establishment of the Republic 
When the political center of the Ottoman Empire felt that their power was in decline 
against the internal and external enemies, their initial response was centralization by 
initiating some reforms in administrative structure of the state and in the military, a 
point that has already been made. The most important reforms were taken along the 
military lines to introduce new and modern technology and to create a modern 
western military organization, which “were part of sporadic efforts to re-establish a 
strong central authority.”158 For that purpose, as early as 1720, Çelebi Mehmet was 
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sent to Europe to pursue whatever could be taken from them. However, the actual 
reforms started in the eighteenth century in the army by establishing some military 
schools staffed by the foreign teachers (mainly French) with non-religious books 
spreading information about the West.159 The eighteenth century military reform 
came to its culmination by the establishment of the New Order Army (Nizam-i 
Cedid) in the period of Selim III (1789-1807). In 1807 the New Order Army was 
dissolved by a coup led by the Janissaries and with their allies opposing the 
centralization reforms of the sultan.160 Mahmut II who destroyed the Janissaries took 
the last step in this direction and paved the way to the military modernization in the 
Ottoman Empire. 
The establishment of modern schools for military purposes was a decisive step 
both in the establishment of a modern military organization and in the intellectual 
history of Ottoman-Turkish modernization. Humbaraci Ahmet Paşa (1675-1744) (a 
Frenchman converted to Islam) helped to establish a  modern School of Mathematics 
(Hendesehane), and was an important actor in modernization of the cannon foundry 
(tophane), the powdermill (baruthane), and arsenal (cebhane).161 The most 
significant step was the establishment of the School of Medicine and the Military 
Academy, which became the hotbeds of secular intellectuals162 who later became the 
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faithful supporters of secular ideas and the reform movements in the 
Constitutionalist and Republican periods.    
It was in these schools that first nationalist movements accompanied by a 
Western inspired positivism developed among the students, and began to take the 
place of Islam as the new foundational ethics for the state, society and the individual. 
It was offered by the state elites as the principal solution to Turkish quest for 
modernity and, early in game, a reverse relationship was established between Islam 
and modernity. The party of Union and Progress was organized by the men coming 
from the ranks of the military educated in these schools who later took power and 
proclaimed the Constitution of 1908. Not surprisingly, the same leaders organized 
the Republican movement after the defeat of the Ottoman state in the World War I. 
The Ottoman reforms in military and society will be discussed in detail in the 
following chapter in relation to secularization and modernization of the Ottoman 
state and society. It is necessary here to note some of their general characteristics to 
understand the ultimate consequences of the reforms in terms of the changes in the 
relationship within the groups of central power block and between the center and 
periphery. The general characteristics of the Reform period can be summarized as 
following: First, the modernization aimed at the restoration of central power by 
promoting military modernization through introducing western technical and 
administrative models. Second, the reformers mainly were the men educated in the 
military schools that were established as part of the modernization efforts. They 
gradually consolidated power and took the control over the government in the period 
of the Union and Progress. Third, the reforms largely worked against a particular 
institution and a section of the bureaucracy: Islam and the Ulema. All reforms more 
or less weakened the institutional hold of Islam and the position of the Ulema. 
Finally, the central-local cleavage was intensified by the reforms since the 
centralization reforms resulted in further penetration of the periphery. By abolishing 
the social hold of Islam, which was the binding instrument of the periphery to the 
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center,163 and systematically extending the state machinery to society without an 
affinity to local representatives, the center-periphery cleavage was even further 
radicalized. Moreover, the military modernization in the Ottoman Empire took place 
in the same way that as it produced autocracies in Europe. In other words, two 
critical developments, which were important according to Downing,164 for the 
emergence of autocracies in Western Europe, were at work in the Ottoman Empire. 
First, the military modernization destroyed the nascent peripheral forces, which were 
weak in comparison to their Western counterparts. Second, the wars in the second 
half of the eighteenth century, which were operated especially against Russia, 
necessitated extra revenues which were supplied by the internal resources by means 
of instituting extra taxes.165 These developments put the state elites not only in a sole 
position to shape the direction of the modernization reforms, but also strengthened 
the position of the military vis-a-visthe other sections of the state-the bureaucracy 
and the sultan. The military opted a kind of strong state which accentuated the 
general interest without an affinity to the private or the particular interest. The 
expression of any particularity was denied on behalf of the high interests of the state, 
an understanding which also constituted the rationale for the republican reformism.  
 The elitist character of the Ottoman-Turkish polity also colored the picture of 
the secularism in Turkey. In other words, the one-sided position of the state elites 
marked the secularization reforms and state-Islam relationship throughout the 
Ottoman-Turkish modernization period and after. Since the primary motive behind 
the modernization project was to overcome the Ottoman decline, which was 
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perceived by the state elites as the widening of the gap between the West and the 
Empire in the military power, and to recapture the power that once possessed by the 
Empire, religion was considered as the main cause for the backwardness, an idea 
borrowed from the thinkers of the French Enlightenment. Relying on the 
Enlightenment’s critic of religion, the modernizing state elites formulated a reverse 
relationship between Islam and modernity; thus, secularism seemed to them as the 
principal solution both for saving the state and attaining modernity. It was for this 
reason that from its very beginning all modernization reforms were carried out with a 
strict secularist outlook.  
Thus, not surprisingly, the Turkish secularism resembled the French secularity 
tradition, i.e. “maximal secularity,” because of the similar state traditions. Especially 
in terms of objective secularization, i.e., the secularization at the institutional level, 
the Turkish case is closely similar to the French case, yet differs from one important 
respect. The church in France maintained itself as being an institution, autonomous 
and belonging to civil society, but in Turkey, the state maintained its control over 
religion by incorporating it into the state apparatus. In France, the Revolution was 
first of all against the monarchy to displace the nobility, but not directly against 
religion. However, in Turkey, all reforms, which were carried out during the 
modernization period, aimed directly or indirectly at breaking the hold of religion on 
society, which was considered responsible for the backwardness of the Ottoman-
Turkish society. Thus, once established, secularism took an extreme form in the 
hands of the state elites, including the suppression of all religious collectivities along 
with the state’s reserved right of interference into religious affairs.  
Unlike the Western Europe where multiple confrontations between state and 
religion took place which included various compromises, in Turkey “the state elite 
has been in a singular position to influence and structure the political course and 
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discourse of Islam.”166 The establishment of the republic, which was proclaimed on 
the total rejection of the Ottoman past did not change the intrinsic nature of the 
polity- elitism. Although it brought a radical break in the value system with a new 
social philosophy on which the new society was supposed to be constructed, it 
maintained the basic pattern in center-periphery relations with an explicit elitist 
outlook.  
The Republican period represents the radicalization of the reforms started in 
the eighteenth century, and as has already been noted in that sense, it was a 
continuum rather than a substantive break from the past. The elitist nature of the 
Ottoman reform movement also tinted the character of the republican reformism. As 
argued by Frederick W. Frey; “The Kemalist revolution was both continuation and 
culmination of Turkey’s historic struggle over elite modernization. It resulted in the 
victory of the modernizers and effective general modernization of the national 
elite.”167  In regards to the center-periphery cleavage the republican reforms did not 
bring radical changes. Despite the fact that structural changes have taken place both 
in the Ottoman and Republican periods, which contained radical alterations 
especially in the Republican period,168 “one of the basic and most enduring patterns 
is a strong tendency toward elitism.”169 Even it can be said that the republican 
reforms represent further intensification of the centralization and center-periphery 
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cleavage since the new state was based on a new value system different from the 
value universe of the periphery.170 The new state was established after a long period 
of wars which destroyed a great empire resident in a large territory and after a deadly 
war of Independence for which the last resources of the country were mobilized. The 
loss of the Empire in a short span of time increased the fears and prejudices of the 
architects of the Republic for the remnant territory, and intensified the elitist 
attitudes of the civil and military bureaucracy. As Mardin points out, “between 1920 
and 1923, the fear that Anatolia would be split on primordial group lines ran as a 
strong undercurrent among the architects of Kemalism trying to establish their own 
center, and it remained as a fundamental-although often latent- issue of Kemalist 
policy to the end of one party rule in 1950.”171 Thus, the expression of any 
particularity was considered as harmful to the harmonious fabric of society. 
Therefore, Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Republic, opted to institutionalize a 
strong state capable to direct the modernization reforms already started. His primary 
aim was to create a well-integrated society around a nationalist ideology and bring 
the whole nation to the level of contemporary civilization. The core of the changes 
was carried out in the value system of society. Science as a sole means of foundation 
of state and society was substituted for religion. For him science, not religion, was 
the true instrument of attaining the goal of contemporary civilization; hence, he tried 
to disestablish Islam in social and political life, and substituted it with science. 
The central agents of the new project of modernization in Atatürk’s view were 
the military-bureaucratic elites which were also in a position to show the true 
direction to the people until they would gain an adequate rationality through the 
                                                 
 
170 For the changes in the value system of the center by the establishment of 
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education.172 Heper173 argues that unlike the post-Atatürkian state elites,  Atatürk 
believed in the capacity of the people to reach contemporary civilization but they 
should be helped by the educated elite. In a sense, the educated elite, or intelligentsia 
was given a temporal task or duty, i.e., the education of the people until they would 
gain an adequate rationality. Therefore, he believed that reforms had to be imposed 
“from above.”174  For that purpose he introduced various reforms to break the ties 
with the past, which he considered to be the barriers to the actualization of the 
potential of the people. Although he based his power on his charisma and the 
military, he did not see the military as the best instrument of legitimacy. The elitist 
tradition of the Ottoman-Turkish politics constituted a center of gravity; thus, soon 
after the death of Atatürk, the military-bureaucratic elites appeared as the guardians 
of the state, and they transformed the legacy of Atatürk into an ideology, a closed 
system of ideas filled with extreme prescriptive tenets.175 The latent cleavages 
became manifest after the transition to democracy, which brought peripheral forces 
to the center as the representative of particular interests and local values. Having 
depended upon an extremely autonomous concept of “public interest,” the military 
and the bureaucratic elites have always adopted suspicious attitude towards any 
expression of private interest and social differentiation which both were the direct 
outcomes of modernization. As a result, their understanding of democracy has 
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radically been different from that of the civilians. This understanding of democracy 
places sole emphasis upon the concepts such as the unity and integrity of the nation 
and society, classlessness, and coherence that were derived from populism, one of 
the principles of Atatürkism, which in fact, has a long history in Turkey.176 They 
understood democracy as an end in itself which meant “promoting the general 
interest through debate on reason and not as a means to promote as well as reconcile 
“interests” vis-a-visthe problems of liberal democracy in Turkey.”177 Consequently, 
they have always seen the political parties to be involved in harmful activities, and 
when they thought that the civilians had deviated from Atatürkism, they intervened 
into politics on behalf of it.178   
Secularism and religion lie at the center of the contention between political and 
military elites. As it will be elaborated in detail in the following chapter, it can be 
said that secularism and the interpretation of the role of religion in society have been 
two critical subjects on which the views of the military and civilians diverge mostly. 
In all military interventions one of the prominent claims of the military was the 
civilians deviation from the principle of secularism. Even, as noted by Binnaz 
Toprak, the state elites have seen “the expression of religious interests through the 
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interest groups or political parties... as alarming, rather than as a natural outcome of 
electoral politics.”179   
The following part traces the historical stages and conditions under which the 
state elites moved to the center and the “maximal secularity,” which was direct 
outcome of the enduring elitism, was established in the process of the formation of 
modernity and within the framework developed in this chapter.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
 
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TURKISH SECULARISM: THE 
STATE  ELITES AND SECULARISM IN TURKEY 
 
 
 
 
3.1 The Ottoman Secularization as the Instrument of Modernization  
The Ottoman-Turkish secularization and its close relevance to the state elites have 
important historical determinants, and an understanding of them necessitates a 
careful look at the place of religion and the relationship between religion and the 
state in the Ottoman society. In addition, the modernization reforms and the rationale 
that guided these reforms are also crucial to understand the development of 
secularism in Turkey. In general terms, secularization in Turkey was neither an 
administrative device designed to put an end to schisms, as developed in Western 
Europe, dividing society into different conflicting fronts,1 nor was it an initiative of 
the state to get rid of the Church which possessed strong independent institutional 
network, a phenomenon totally absent in the Ottoman-Turkish tradition. To be sure, 
 99 
it was initiated by the state, but only as an instrument of modernization project 
imposed upon society from above, by an elite group already present in the Ottoman 
state machinery. Thus, the shift of power from traditional religious group to secular 
reformist forces as well as the basic elitist composition of the Ottoman state, seems 
vital to understand the nature and the Ottoman-Turkish secularization policies and 
the established secularity tradition.  
 The primordial elements of the Turkish secularism were already present in 
the traditional configuration of the Ottoman state. In the previous chapter it has 
already been pointed out that despite the theory that religion was the ultimate end in 
the Ottoman state philosophy, due to the military and bureaucratic character of the 
polity, the state had always priority over religion in the Ottoman polity. In other 
words, the state had a dual character, the religious and the bureaucratic. As Mardin 
observed: 
It [the state] was Islamic in the sense that Islam was the religion of the state 
and that the Sultan’s primordial role was that of the leader of the Islamic 
community; it was “bureaucratic” in the sense that working for the 
preservation of the state colored the practice of Ottoman officials. Endangering 
the state was what -by definition- made a movement heretical. At times, such 
as the seventeenth century, the style of government was more “Islamic,” but by 
the middle of the eighteenth  century, the pendulum had swung to a more 
bureaucratic style.2 
 
 The  move of the bureaucratic elites to power center of the state was a result 
of a process in which the survival of the state became the main issue of debate 
among top ranking Ottoman statesmen. At the end of this process, the Ottoman 
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York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1969), 9-17.  
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bureaucratic strata took upon itself the responsibility of saving the state from decline, 
and Westernization was offered as the only solution by the state elites. This opened a 
new chapter in the Ottoman-Turkish history with a new agenda that marked the 
political discourse in the following centuries: modernization as “Westernization.” 
The rationale of the bureaucratic elites was different from that of the Ulema, and as 
aptly noted by Metin Heper,3 they adopted adab tradition that accentuated  necessity 
and reason in policy formation rather than religious sources, which had strong 
secular connotations.  Since the increase of the power of the bureaucracy brought the 
adab tradition, or secular outlook, to the center of the Ottoman state, the rise of the 
elites to the top of the power hierarchy and of secularization developed as 
simultaneous processes in the Ottoman context, a natural outcome of the Ottomans’ 
search to regain the strength previously possessed by the Ottoman state. When the 
Ottoman statesmen recognized that the Western states had become stronger than 
themselves, it became apparent with the Ottoman defeats resulting in loss of territory 
in the Western frontiers, particularly after the Treaty of Passarowitz (1718), their 
initial response was to adopt the new Western military and administrative techniques 
to catch up with the Western nations.4 Along with the recognized weakness against 
the West, there was another motivating factor which led the Ottoman statesmen to 
reform the state machinery. As Kemal Karpat observed, the internal factor created by 
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the peripheral forces, which demanded autonomy and raised their voices to share the 
central power, was important to the same extent as the external factor.5 In the same 
vein, Avigdor Levy noted that “the  impulse for military reform stemmed from two 
sources: the need of the central government to maintain, or restore, its control over 
the bureaucracy and the military and suppress the centrifugal forces threatening to 
break up the state from within, and second, the necessity to defend the state against 
external enemies.”6 In order to break the power of the local elements, centralization 
policies became the principal motto and solution of the Ottoman state elites.  
 The first attempts at modernization included the introducing of the press in 
1727 by Ibrahim Muteferika, a converted Hungarian, and the establishment of a 
military school in 1734 called “Hendese”  to train the military engineers in Üsküdar 
by Humbaracı Ahmet Paşa (1675-1747), another European convert whose real name 
was Comte de Bonneval. Through these schools, modern sciences began to enter into 
the Ottoman schools and the public.7 Various books on military, geography and 
medicine were published, which were high in number. After the war with Russia in 
1787, the Ottoman statesmen recognized that the reforms could not be successful, 
unless the traditional structures in the society and the state changed. In order to 
closely observe the Western governments and the militaries, permanent embassies 
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were established in the prominent European capitals.8 One of the tasks of these 
embassies was to prepare the reform proposals based on their observations. Other 
important steps were taken by the establishment of a new army by Selim III, 
independent of the Janissaries, called the “New Order” (Nizam-i Cedid), and the 
establishment of the School of Engineering.9  
 The reforms gained new impetus in the period of Mahmut II who occupied 
the throne between 1808-1839. The scope of reforms was then extended and the 
rationale behind these reforms changed substantively. During the reign of Mahmut 
II, one may see that the reforms, which had already been initiated a few decades ago, 
turned into intensive policy programs comprising large areas of state and society. 
Mahmut II knew that the creation of a modern state was only possible through some 
social and administrative reforms, and he was also aware of the difficulties that he 
could face. Bernard Lewis wrote on that dilemma, “no real progress towards reform 
would be possible until all power other than that emanating from him had been 
eliminated, and the Sultan’s will made the sole source of authority in the provinces 
as well as in the capital.”10 Therefore, he decided to eliminate all intermediary social 
forces.11 He succeeded in destroying the Janissary who was an opposing institution 
against the new innovations and a powerful enemy of the newly established armies. 
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He set up a new army called Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye in place of the 
Janissaries. He continued his campaign of centralization by abolishing the timars,12 
increasing supervision on vakfs (religious endowments) and local agencies of the 
state, establishing new communication networks including newspapers, post services 
and new roads, and promoting civil officials both in proficiency and honesty.13 
Moreover, he established new military schools staffed by foreign specialists and new 
schools called Mekteb-i Maarif (School for Secular Learning) for future recruitment 
as government officers.14  
 Administration and the cultural arena went also under reforms. Mahmut II 
abolished some old governmental positions. For example, he created Porte which 
became the center of the Ottoman government, and abolished Sadrazam whose place 
was filled by a new men called başvekil (the prime minister) with new departments. 
He also tried to give a new context to the state by propagating the principle of 
equality before the law  which was an important step toward the consolidation of the 
modern state.15 The cultural realm also underwent similar reforms. The Western 
manner of life, for instance, was promoted by the state. The most important reform 
in that respect was the change of the dress of the military and later of the civilians, 
especially the dress of the state servants. Fez became a compulsory headgear.16 The 
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reforms that were carried out in the reign of Mahmut II (1808-1839) were extremely 
important in terms of centralization and modernization within the context of whole 
Ottoman reform period. As summarized by  Eric J. Zürcher, 
Like the policies of Slim III and all those of his great rival and inspiration, 
Mehmet Ali Pasha, they were ultimately aimed at the strengthening of the 
central state through the building a modern army. All his reforms can be 
understood as means to that end: building a new army cost money, money had 
to be generated by more efficient taxation, which in turn could only be 
achieved through a modern and efficient central and provincial bureaucracy. 
Better communications were needed to extend government control and new 
types of education to produce the new-style military and civil servants the 
sultan needed.17 
 
 The modernization of the Ottoman army, or the military modernization, had 
far reaching consequences for the subsequent reforms because the military became 
the main agent to carry out the following reforms. The process of formation of the 
modern state in the Ottoman-Turkish context was not different from Europe. As has 
already been argued in the Second Chapter, the establishment of the modern armies 
was central to the state-building process, particularly to centralization, modernization 
and secularization. The main attributes of modernization such as centralization, 
secularization, and extension of the state towards the periphery were preceded by the 
military modernization, and were achieved by means of modern armies. 
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 A radical move towards further secularization and modernization in the 
Ottoman Empire was the proclamation of the Tanzimat Fermani [The Imperial Edict 
of Tanzimat] in 1839. This era, which is known as the Tanzimat Period (1839-1876), 
was marked by further reforms aiming at the reorganization of the state and the 
redefinition of the status of the people vis-a-visthe state. Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu 
which was proclaimed by Mustafa Reşid Paşa in 1839 could be considered as a 
continuation of the reforms of Mahmut II directed to create a new conception of an 
impersonal state and a new conception of the equality of the subjects formulated 
around the concepts of law and justice regardless of their religious and ethnic 
origins. The radical aspect of the Hatt-ı Hümayunu was related to religious 
minorities, which were subjected to different treatments in the Empire. It proclaimed 
that all the people belonging to the Ottoman state were equal before the law and had 
equal status vis-a-visthe state. It also included the safeguards of life and property, the 
reorganization of the financial structure, a just taxation system and reforms in the 
administration.18 The judicial system was subjected to various reforms, which 
included the translation and promulgation of the French Penal Code into the Turkish 
which was followed by the establishment of the mixed courts in 1847, and the 
adoption of the Commerce Code and Maritime Code, respectively in 1861 and 
1863.19   
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 Along with the successes, the Tanzimat period was also marked by various 
failures and frustrations. For instance, although the Tanzimat reformers had great 
aims to modernize society and create a modern state based on the European model, 
they were far from accomplishing them completely. Moreover, it generated new 
tensions within the state machinery. The Tanzimat reforms created a central 
bureaucracy, which also granted new rights to the bureaucrats. With these new legal 
rights, they became an influential group holding power vis-a-visthe sultan and the 
other branches of the government.20 After 1870, they began to use arbitrary methods 
in governmental affairs, which contradicted the fundamental philosophy of the 
Tanzimat.21 Fueled by the failures in economic and social life, the Tanzimat created 
serious frustrations among the Ottoman intellectuals, which pave the way for a new 
search on the part of the Tanzimat intellectuals. Among them, a new group of 
opposition called the Young Ottomans who were also the members of the ruling elite 
with few exceptions.22  
 The Young Ottomans who instituted the First Constitution in the Ottoman 
Empire in 1876 took a critical posture against the imitative reforms of the Tanzimat. 
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However, what they demanded was not different from that of the advocates of the 
Tanzimat. They, too, demanded constitutional reforms, freedom, equality before the 
law and the adoption of the “good” aspects of the Western world which included 
more than the technical innovations. In this respect, they were in the same line with 
the reformers of the Tanzimat. On the basis of the Constitution of 1876, one may 
come across the first Ottoman Parliament opened in 1877 in the Ottoman-Turkish 
history.23 The Parliament was made up of members from different ethnic and 
religious communities of the Empire. Although the Parliament was dissolved in 1878 
by Abdülhamid II, in historical terms, it was a significant experience in the Empire 
since this was the first constitutional experience in the Ottoman-Turkish political 
history. 
 The first Ottoman Parliament was dissolved by Abdülhamid II (1876-1908) 
in 1878 who put an end to the reform process in the constitutional arena. 
Accordingly, the influential figures of the period, such as Namık Kemal and Mithat 
Pasha, were sent to exile. Abdülhamid II adopted a different outlook towards the 
state-religion relationship. If all policies of Abdülhamid II are taken into 
consideration, a paradoxical outlook can be discerned regarding state-Islam 
relationship and modernization in general. Although Abdülhamid gave priority to 
religion, he intensively maintained the modernization reforms in other domains of 
the state and society such as education, railways and communications throughout his 
reign. In this period, most of the Muslim geography was colonized by the Western 
powers, especially England and France. Abdülhamid II thought that if he propagated 
the political role and importance of the hilafet, he could mobilize the Muslim world 
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against these colonial powers. To achieve this purpose, he followed pan-Islamist 
policies which were accompanied by a viable revival of religious movement inside 
of the Empire.24 Abdülhamid II’s style of rule was based on the suppression of all 
opposition movements through authoritarian measures, including extensive use of 
secret intelligence and police force. The authoritarian measures inevitably paved the 
way for the formation of secret organizations, aiming to overthrow the ruler and to 
reinstall a constitutional government. As will be elaborated below, it was in this 
period that an organization, whose ambitions determined the fate of the country in 
the following decades, came into existence. Thus, in that respect, this period has 
special significance in the Ottoman-Turkish modernization and secularization 
history. 
 As has already been noted, despite the fact that Abdülhamid II preferred a 
religious oriented outlook to the internal and external policy issues, his period was 
marked by extensive reforms which meant the continuation of the secularizing and 
modernizing reforms of the Tanzimat. In the legal arena, a set of laws to regulate the 
organization of justice and the operation of the courts was promulgated in 1879 
which was followed by the establishment of the Ministry of Justice. Some new laws 
were also proclaimed about the nizamiye (mixed) courts, previously established to 
regulate the affairs between Muslims and non-Muslims. In regard to communication, 
the efforts included the construction of railways which linked different centers of the 
Empire to the important centers, such as Damascus and Medina, Hayadarpaşa and 
Izmit, Istanbul and Edirne. The expansion of railways was also in accordance with 
                                                                                                                                          
23 Zürcher, Turkey, 69-78. 
 
24 Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 253-261. 
 109 
the pan-Islamist policies of Abdülhamid II. In this respect, one of the most important 
improvements was done in the telegraph service which was spread throughout the 
Empire. The telegraph was the most valued means of communication because it 
enabled the center to supervise the whole periphery.25 
 The legal and judicial reforms and the improvements in communications 
played a crucial role in solution of the daily problems faced by the state. Yet, the 
classical question of the Ottoman tradition, i.e. how to save the state from decline, 
found its actual answer in educational reforms in this era. In fact, Abdülhamid II 
spent his most intimate efforts on educational reforms, particularly in educating the 
Muslim subjects. In order to spread the primary and secondary education, he opened 
new schools in Anatolia, Arab provinces, and the Balkan provinces where Muslims 
were majority. He opened some higher learning schools in Istanbul and some other 
great cities of the Empire.26  
 The educational reforms of Abdülhamid II were also supported by his close 
associates. Lewis observes that the Grand Vizier of Abdülhamid, Mehmet Said Paşa 
(1838-1914), saw educational reforms as “the first prerequisite to any further 
improvement”27 and prepared a report explaining the significance of education. The 
school of Mülkiye was reorganized in 1877 to educate the bureaucrats. He also made 
important improvements in War School ( Harbiye) and added new schools of naval, 
medical, and artillery. The reforms were extended to the establishment of “the 
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schools of finance (1878), law (1878), fine arts (1879), commerce (1882), civil 
engineering (1884), veterinary science (1889), police (1891), customs (1892) and an 
improved new medical school 1898).”28 The school of Galatasaray which became 
the favorite school of the sons of the ruling class was reformed and the number of 
the Turkish students was increased. Moreover, the first Turkish university was 
opened in 1900 which was named as Darülfünun and later became the University of 
Istanbul.29 On the differences between the military schools and the civil schools 
established during the Abdülhamid and Young Turks’ periods, Heper30 observes that 
the military schools were more important than civil schools both in number and in 
quality. For the civil bureaucrats there was only Mülkiye as high school, but for the 
military, one may see War School, Naval, the Artillery, and School of Engineering. 
These military schools were the place where lots of students from various regions of 
the country and from different sections of society were socialized according to the 
Western norms.  
 The rule of Abdülhamid postponed the development of opposition but never 
prevented its emergence. In fact, as Berkes pointed out “the Hamidian regime did not 
foresee that a policy of political suppression would breed a generation manifesting 
intellectual characteristics antithetical to the dominant features of the regime’s 
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ideology.”31 The principal outcome of the Hamidian regime was a group of 
intellectuals full with the materialist outlook who aimed, first of all, to force 
Abdülhamid to put the Constitution at work, and then to initiate necessary reforms in 
order to save the country from decline. The succeeding Second Young Turk period 
was marked by intensive political movements first developed in the form of secret 
organizations, and in due course became open, which compelled Abdülhamid to 
proclaim the Constitution. 
 The schools established before Abdülhamid and by Abdülhamid himself were 
the places where new western norms were internalized by the students. Extensively 
filled wits secular tenets, a new secular ideology began to take place among students 
in these schools, which later turned into a political program of saving the state. 
Especially, the new military schools were the fertile soil for the diffusion of the new 
ideology. It was in the Military Medical School that the first secret organization, 
İttihad-i Osmani (The Ottoman Union) founded by İbrahim Temo, Abdullah Cevdet, 
Mehmet Reşad and İbrahim Sukuti in 1889 emerged. In the same year, this 
organization joined İttihat ve Terakk-i Cemiyeti (The Union and Progress 
Association) which was founded in Paris by a group of the Young Turks led by 
Ahmet Rıza, one of the prominent figures of the Young Turks who published a 
newspaper Meşveret.32 The new organization grew rapidly and found supporters 
from different sections of society, especially from the military and the bureaucracy.  
                                                 
 
31 Berkes, The Develpment of  Secularism, 290.  
 
32 Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler: İttihat ve Terakki, Bir 
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Age, a Generation, and a Political Party] (Istanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1989), 
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In the same period, in Egypt, Murad Bey (Mizancı Murad) began to publish a 
newspaper, Mizan, which was criticizing the policies of the Sultan. He was also 
aware of the developments in Paris. Instead of Paris, he went to Geneva and 
established a Young Turk association and continued to publish Mizan there. He 
returned to Istanbul after the invitation of the Sultan who promised the Young Turks 
leaders some official posts if they had returned to Turkey. One important 
development in this period related to the Young Turks was the arrival of Prince 
Sabahattin at Paris. The Young Turk leaders decided to hold a conference in Paris in 
order to centralize the movement and  arrive at some principles for action in 1902.33  
In this Conference, two main fronts emerged within the Union and Progress. The 
first group led by Prince Sabahattin was supporting the reform aiming at 
decentralization, and was evaluating foreign intervention into the internal affairs 
justifiable if promoted their aim. The second group led by Ahmet Rıza opposed any 
external interventions. Their strategy was based on a strong centralized state and on 
preserving the already existing Sultanate. At the end of this process, the Young 
Turks were split, and Prince Sabahattin formed a new organization under the name 
of Teşebbüs-ü Şahsi ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Cemyeti (The Society of Private Initiative 
and Decentralization).34   
 The division was partly due to the differences of the sources of the ideas. 
Ahmet Rıza was a disciple of August Comte, thus, his reform proposals were laden 
by extreme positivist tenets. The positivist slogan “union and progress” was chosen 
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as the official name of his organization, but Prince Sabahattin adopted the ideas of 
Le Play and his disciple Edmond Demolish (1852-1907) who analyzed the strength 
of the Anglo-Saxons under the ideas of Le Play, and concluded that their power had 
originated from the decentralized administrative system.35 However, because of the 
Unionists desire to strengthen the state coupled with the traditional conception of the 
sovereign state, the official ideology throughout the Union and Progress period 
remained positivism, and the ideas of Prince Sabahattin found no supporters.36 
 The Young Turk associations were founded in different parts of the Empire 
and under different names. In Damascus, Vatan ve Hürriyet Cemiyeti (Fatherland 
and Freedom Society) was formed by some officers including Atatürk.37 The most 
important one was founded in Salonica by the officers of the Third Army under the 
name Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti (The Ottoman Freedom Society) which became the 
most dominant group among others and took the whole initiative when it merged 
with the Union and Progress. Discontent was high in society, but particularly in the 
Balkan provinces where the foreign influence and intervention had been extensive, it 
was openly expressed. The possibility that Macedonia could be split from the Empire 
due to a conspiracy of certain foreign powers caused alarms among the officers of 
the Third Army. Enver Bey, the most influential Unionist figure, initiated a 
resistance movement against the Sultan in the mountains of Resne in 1908, and he 
was followed by Niyazi Bey who brought a few hundred men with him. The men of 
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the Sultan who were sent to deal with this problem were killed by these resisting 
revolutionaries. The outbreaks were spread in the whole Balkan provinces and 
reached to the Second Army resident in Edirne. People joined the movement and 
raised their revolt against the Sultan especially in Salonika, Monastir and Kosova,. 
Now, the Union and Progress sent more concrete political demands to the Sultan. At 
the end, the revolt resulted in the proclamation of the Constitution of 1876 in the 
Balkan provinces and in sending an ultimatum to the Sultan demanding the 
proclamation of the constitution. Abdülhamid conceived the seriousness of the 
events and reinstated the Constitution of 1876, and opened the Parliament. This 
event also marked the beginning of the Second Constitutionalist period.38  
 The Second Constitutionalist period developed under direct or indirect 
influences of the Union and Progress. Although it did not take over the control of the 
government directly at the beginning, all developments took place under the control 
of the Union. One year after the revolution of 1908, a religious oriented revolt 
supported by the opposition took place in Istanbul demanding the return to Sharia, 
an event which is known in the Turkish history as the “31 March Event.” The bloody 
nature of the movement alarmed the Unionists and encouraged them to use hard 
measures against the revolt. They sent Hareket Ordusu [Mobile Army], which was 
established by the Unionists in Salonika, to Istanbul in order to suppress the 
movement.39 One of the officers of the army was Atatürk who later became the 
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39 On this famous 31 March Event Sina Akşin, a prominent student of the 
Turkish history, notes that to say that the event was merely a religious one does not 
give us the true picture of it. Although the motto of the revolt was “we want the 
Sharia,” the true reason behind the revolt was opposition developed against the 
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fouder of the Republic. The army suppressed the movement and dethroned 
Abdülhamid in 1909. The movement was important in the history of the Union 
because after that event the gap between the Union and the government narrowed. 
Mahmut Şevket Paşa, the Chief of the General Staff, became the leader of the Union, 
and began to impose his ideas upon the Organization.40 After this event, the Union 
took authoritarian measures against the opposition as Abdülhamid II did. The period 
between 1908 and 1913 was marked by the forming and dissolution of various 
governments which ended with famous “Bab-ı Ali Baskını” (The Sublime Porte 
Raid) on January 23, 1913 after the loss of the Balkan territories. A group of the 
Unionist officers, led by Enver Paşa, made a raid on the Sublime Porte during a 
cabinet meeting and killed Nazım Paşa, the Minster of War. The Union forced the 
Kamil Paşa government to resign, and took direct control of the state. It was after the 
assassination of Mahmud Şevket Paşa that the Union suppressed all the opposition 
groups and became the only political force until 1918 in the Empire. The last 
remnants of democracy were henceforward repealed by the Unionist government.41  
  Although the Unionists returned to authoritarian measures in conducting the 
governmental affairs, they maintained the modernization reforms as their 
predecessors. They created a new provincial system of government, and developed 
the first municipal organizations in the Empire which later became the basis of the 
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municipal government system of the Republic. As to the secularization, the Union 
and Progress period witnessed various reforms parallel to the intensification of the 
Westernization reforms in all aspects of life. The European twenty-four hour system 
was taken as the new time measure and the costume and manners were westernized. 
Especially the dress of women became European in style. The most important 
reforms were implemented in the field of education. The Unionists were successful 
in establishing a primary and secondary educational system totally along a secular 
line. They opened new colleges to educate teachers and some specialized 
institutions, along with the reorganization of Istanbul University. A further 
development in this respect was the extending of the scope of education to the 
female students that was a novel phenomenon in the social life of the Empire, which 
increased the appearance of women in public life.42  
 The institutional reforms of modernization or secularization denoted a 
gradual process through which the traditional relationship between the state and 
religion was dissolved, and religion was pushed away from the center of the state. 
Yet the ground on which reforms were realized was not a vacuum. It generated far-
reaching consequences for the subsequent fate of the reforms. There was a gradual 
alteration in the inherited composition of the power block, which sometimes took 
place after bitter confrontations. The balance between the civil bureaucracy, military, 
sultan and Ulema changed in favor the military, and the Ulema was discarded from 
the block. Moreover, there was a radical shift in the mentality of the secularizing or 
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modernizing elites, which is crucially important to understand the subsequent 
political developments both in the Ottoman and the republican periods, since it was 
the final move of the military to the center of power with a new weltanschauung that 
set the basic parameters of secularization and modernization which remained at work 
until recently, albeit with some notable changes. The following part analysis this 
process with its theoretical implications around the questions such as how was the 
relationship between Islam and modernity articulated in this new weltanschauung? 
What kind of patterns was produced by this conceptualization between the state 
(read the state elites) and religion? In other words, to what kind of tradition did the 
above developments lead in Turkey? 
 
3.2 The Rise of the Military to Power and the Emergence of a Secular 
Weltanschauung  
The initial rationale of the Ottoman institutional reforms gives us only the primary 
concern of the Ottoman statesmen, i.e. saving the state from decline, but as already 
been noted, it says little about the principal results of these reforms and of their 
theoretical implications for the state-Islam relationship and for the general 
relationship between Islam and the modernity as it was conceived by the state elites. 
It is evident that at the beginning, the reforms were not conducted through a 
conscious effort to secularize the state and society, but they were conscious efforts to 
regain the military power possessed earlier by the Ottoman state. Secularization was 
a natural outcome of the chosen strategy on the part of the military-bureaucratic 
elites to attain this goal, i.e. modernization through Westernization. Yet, whatever 
the initial concerns of the military-bureaucratic elites were, it inevitably paved the 
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way to new understandings and the proposals with novel rationale which were 
beyond the horizons of the early reformists.  
It was in the following decades, i.e. by the end of the nineteenth century, that 
the total displacement of Islam became the primary issue of the proposals and 
debates among the state elites who were also the products of the same reforms. This 
means that a radical shift in the weltanschauung of the state elites took place 
throughout the reform periods.43 This was especially the case in the Young Turks era 
in which several rival ideologies emerged from different political groups concerning 
the problem “on which proposal the state would be restructured.” Therefore, as has 
already been noted, the shift in the weltanschauung of the state elites, which brought 
new secular concepts, is crucial to understand the whole adventure of the Ottoman-
Turkish secularization process and the role of the military in shaping this process. 
 The most important development with respect to the secularization of the 
weltanschauung was related to the changes in the vocabulary of new ideas. Even in 
the period of the Young Ottomans which was relatively an early date, one can see 
that new ideas were articulated via secular concepts. For instance, Heper observes 
that Namık Kemal and Ziya Paşa “posed the concepts of fatherland and patriotism 
against the concept of umma, of religious community”44 and placed sole emphasis on 
the state and nationality. Even this conceptual departure in itself denotes that the 
rising intellectuals and the military-bureaucratic elites were already at a search for a 
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new secular weltanschauung to make it as the new foundation stone of the state. In 
the Young Turk period, a total divorce between the state elites (the military and the 
bureaucratic elites)  along with the  intellectuals and Islam took place. There was a 
new cultural background that deserved special attentions, which made the 
development of such secular ideologies possible. 
 Concerning the nineteenth century, Heper points out the Ottoman state elites 
had a basic assumption: “In order to save the state the space of the value system 
based on the superstition should be narrowed, and a new secular educational system 
should be established. In a social condition lacking entrepreneurial Muslim middle 
classes and maintaining a strong state tradition the true saver of the state were the 
ruling elites educated in the secular schools.”45 Thus, the newly established secular 
schools were placed at the center in shaping this new weltanschauung. Again 
Heper46 remarks that cleavages in the Ottoman society developed along the cultural 
lines due to the fact that social forces based on economic differentiation were absent. 
In this particular social setting, knowledge and the type of education were more 
important in shaping the cultural cleavages than socio-economic background. The 
new schools offered secular education, which also meant that the world view of the 
new powerful social forces were shaped by secular ideas. In fact, the new secular 
schools became the hot bed of secular ideas, and secular ideologies found their most 
fertile soil in these schools among which the military schools played the most 
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significant role. The new ideology emerged in the Ottoman Empire was radically 
different from its counterparts in Europe which dominated the agenda of the masses 
in the course of the formation of modernity. Unlike the utopias and great 
philosophical traditions such as humanism, individualism, liberalism, and later 
Marxism, conservatism and nationalism which dominated the Renaissance and the 
post-Renaissance centuries in Europe,47 in the Ottoman Empire, only science with its 
strict positivistic and materialistic content was adopted as the fundamental world 
view and an ideology by the state elites for the new foundation of the state and the 
society.48 Şükrü Hanioğlu, in his seminal work, mentions how science gained 
substantive and prescriptive meanings in the conception of the Ottoman intellectuals. 
In his words; “for Ottoman intellectuals science attained the status of religion, and 
faith in science usurped the position of religious belief; thus “science” became 
endowed with a transcendent meaning.”49 In other words, religion was replaced by 
science. “The impact of contemporary science on Ottoman intellectuals was so 
profound that many became convinced that in such a “century of progress” every 
aspect of life would be regulated according to science.”50 
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 The impact of science on the Ottoman intellectual fabric was so profound that 
it gained a hegemonic status in a sense; thus, non of the ideological groups was in a 
position to take a critical position towards it. For all branches of politically active 
thought in the Young Turk period, the privileged theme in the Ottoman society was 
progress (terakki). Although there were several currents of thought during the Young 
Turk period, two general trends can be discerned: the Islamists and the Westernists.51 
Yet, they shared the basic problematics of the time, i.e. saving the state and progress. 
The accent on science and progress in their ideas also shows how modern science 
had a deep effect on the minds during the period in question. As has already been 
pointed out, a common point shared by the Islamists and the Westernists was 
“progress,” the process which had been achieved by the “civilized” Western nations. 
The search for a powerful state and the goal of attaining the progress were inevitably 
transformed into a search of new civilization, for which the Western civilization was 
offered by the Westernists. According to the Westernists in order to achieve the 
progress and save the state, the Western civilization had to be adopted in all fields of 
life and with all of its aspects.52 The traditional structures of the Empire, the most 
                                                 
 
51 In the literature one may face with different divisions of the schools of 
thought during the Young Turk period. This is partly a result of the fact that it is 
difficult to identify clear boundaries between them. For instance, in Westernists we 
may see an extreme Westernist figures. For example, Abdullah Cevdet wanted total 
adoption of the elements of Western civilization, and was an anti-religious person. A 
moderate figure like Celal Nuri Ileri, meanwhile, suggested partial adoption of the 
Western civilization. The same is true for other schools. In general, four schools 
such as Westernists, Islamists, Ottomanists and the Turkists can be identified for this 
period. Berkes and Karpat divide them into three such as Westernists, Islamists and 
the Turkists. Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 337-346; Karpat, 
Turkey’s Politics, 20-31. Since the Turkists were also modernist and aimed at 
Westernization, they can be considered together with the Westernists. The above 
distinction was borrowed from  Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 234.  
 
 122 
dominant of them being Islam, were obstacles to progress and ought to be replaced 
by those imported from the West. The agenda of the Islamists was dominated by a 
reverse rationale. For them, Islam was not an obstacle to progress, but was a true 
instrument of becoming strong. Another recurrent theme in the writings of the 
Islamists was that “true” civilization was only possible with Islam, and the Western 
civilization has its origins in the old Islamic civilization.53 Thus, science and 
technique could be borrowed, but nothing was needed in morality and manner. Only 
material aspect of Western civilization was legitimate for the Islamists.  
 The final victory was won by the Westernists since they allied themselves 
with the leading group of society: the military. Among the intellectual, bureaucratic 
and military elites, the military was more prone to welcome the positivist and 
materialist ideas.54 It is commonly believed among the students of the Turkish 
politics that the military was in a leading position in the reform period, i.e. Young 
Turk period, which witnessed various secularization reforms.55 The role of the 
military in making a revolution was emphasized in the initial stage of the Young 
Turk movement. In the First Young Turk Congress which was held in 1902, the 
members discussed the ways by which Abdülhamid could be overthrown, and the 
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use of the military was offered to dethrone him, which was also repeated in the 
Second Congress of the Young Turks in 1907.56  The developments within the 
Empire did not deceive them, and the military ended the rule of Abdülhamid paving 
way to the rule of the Union and Progress.  
 The rationale of the military which was a product of its positivistic outlook 
determined the direction of subsequent reforms. Hanioğlu points out how one of the 
newly established military schools became suffused with positivism and materialism 
as follows:  
The role of the Royal Medical Academy played through the socialization of its 
students is noteworthy. This institution had been a spawning ground for 
materialist and anti-religious ideas for decades when the Young Turk 
movement emerged there. Senior fellows required pious students to read 
chapters from Darwin’s works in order to unseat their convictions. Most of 
these students were astonished... and soon after they usually converted to 
“scientific” materialism.57   
 
 That is why the Turkish nationalism, from its very beginning, developed on 
scientific and rationalistic bases and was injected into the weltanschauung of the 
Union and Progress. The rise of nationalism as dominant ideology was a result of the 
final move of the military to the leadership position. The wider acceptance of 
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nationalism among the military, bureaucracy and the intellectual circles was the most 
important step in the Ottoman secularization process because from the beginning the 
Turkish nationalism evolved at the expense of religion, with its scientific and 
positivistic content. As it was pointed out by Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, in Turkey, 
nationalism was conceived “as a specifically “modern” phenomenon, which was best 
represented by European rationalism.”58 The positivist-rationalist nationalism then 
was offered as an alternative to Islam. It was not only an ideology which defined a 
particular group of people in a certain way, but also a new kind of political unit,59 i.e. 
the nation vis-a-visümmet (the religious community) whose definition was based on 
a secular conceptual matrix. In the Turkish case, the adoption of nationalism 
represents both a radical break from the so-called ancién regime  and a new 
definition of the basis of legitimization, i.e. the nation. In order to understand the 
way in which nationalism and Islam were articulated (or disarticulated), an 
elaboration of the ideas of the theoretical fathers of Turkish nationalism is needed. 
 The most prominent figure of the Turkish nationalism was Ziya Gökalp who 
also became the ideologue of the Young Turks and the theoretical father of the 
Republican reforms. In Gökalp’s view, the nation “could not be founded only on 
race, geography, political affinity or mere will power, but must chiefly based on 
culture”60 which was intensely defined on the basis of language. In accordance with 
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the Gökalpian understanding of nationalism, secularism plays significant role since 
he thought, “the Turkish nation would come into existence as a result of the 
breakdown of Islamic ümmet under the impact of the modern technology of Western 
civilization, whose constituent elements were democratic, secular nationalities.”61 
Thus, a total separation of the state and Islam was considered as indispensable 
prerequisites to built the Turkish nation and create a nationalist ideology. 
 Gökalp was not in a position to deny the role of Islam in society. In a sense, 
he tried to reconcile three different views which were dominant in his time, namely 
Westernism, Islamism, and Nationalism, in such a way that they were not obstacles 
for each other. Since the domains of them were different, it was possible to belong to 
Western civilization, Islamic religious community, and the Turkish nation at the 
same time.  Yet, the synthesis that Gökalp tried to achieve did not give equal weight 
to each of them in his general system. By a careful observation, one can notice that 
Gökalp was not successful in this synthesis. Andrew Davison points out that, to most 
of the Gökalp’s interpretators, nationalism and modernity were more important than 
Islam in Gökalp’s writings.62 The place of religion was in the conscience of the 
people. Instead of religion, society became the supreme authority of ideas and 
morality. He was strongly influenced by the social philosophy of Durkheim who put 
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greater emphasis on society than the individual. Durkheim’s society became “nation” 
in Gökalp’s theory of nationalism. Uriel Heyd aptly noted how this modification 
produced radical implications: 
For Durkheim’s society he substitutes nation, which for French sociologist is 
only one of the various social groups to which modern man belongs. 
Consequently, he transfers to the nation all the divine qualities he had found in 
society, replacing the belief in God by the belief in the nation; nationalism had 
became a religion.63  
 
 The place of religion in the new set up of society and the state also aroused 
the intellectual interest of the other intellectuals in the same period. One of the most 
influential intellectuals was Yusuf Akçura whose view of the secular nationalism 
was more influential than the views of Gökalp in the official formulation of Turkish 
nationalism in the newly established republican state. In comparison to the view of 
Gökalp, Akçura’s conception of secularism was more radical, hence secular, because 
he did not include religion as an ingredient of the nation. Akçura developed his view 
in his essay entitled Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset64 [Three Styles of Politics] in which he 
discussed three different views intellectually active in the Young Turk period. These 
views were Pan-Ottomanism claiming to create an Ottoman nation from the existing 
Ottoman population with different ethnic and religious origins, Pan-Islamism whose 
ideas focused on the unification of the Muslim people, and Pan-Turkism aiming at 
doing the same thing for the Turkish-speaking people in the world. One of his most 
important differences from Gökalp as regards nationalism was his conception of 
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nation which was based on race rather than culture. For Akçura, it was impossible to 
realize former two projects because:  
In the present history, existing  currents are race-based. Religions, because of 
their very nature, are losing their power and political significance. They are 
becoming more private rather than social. Freedom of conscience has replaced 
religious unions. Religions have ceased to be a matter of society and  become 
guides for the hearts of the people. They are only the ties of the conscience 
between man and God. Therefore, they only maintain their social and political 
significance to the extent that they serve, help, and are integrated to the races.65  
 
 The Republican nationalism was a synthesis of Gökalp and Akçura in such a 
way that it took linguistic-centered cultural conceptualization of Gökalp as the basis 
of nation, and like the view of Akçura, omitted religion as a constituent component 
of nation. 
 The importance of the development of Turkish nationalism in the 
development of Turkish secularism was not limited only to its emergence as an 
alternative source of norms and as an instrument of the legitimization of power. 
Moreover, its positivistic implications played significant role in the development of 
Turkish secularism because it put great emphasis on the formative role of modern 
science in creating the Turkish nation. Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire, says 
Karpat, “appeared not only as a political solution to the survival of the state, but also 
a means or channel for the introduction of science and progress for the new political 
unit: the nation.”66 On the proximity of the nationalism and positivism in the Turkish 
history Mardin observed that “the emerging Turkish positivist generation of the 
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1890s was also a nationalist generation.”67 The most brilliant explanation of the 
relationship between modern science and nationalism, which also shows the frame of 
mind of the period in question, can be found in Gökalp’s view. As quoted by 
Özbudun, Gökalp thought “in order to join the ranks of contemporary nations, 
certain conditions should absolutely be fulfilled. At the top of these comes the drive 
towards science... A modern nation is a creature which thinks in terms of the positive 
science.”68  
 All of the above steps toward secularization had far-reaching effects on the 
subsequent developments, particularly on the developments in the Republican period 
in terms of secularism and on the role of the military in the process of secularization. 
These developments meant that at the end of the Ottoman Empire, there had already 
occurred at the substance level the “objective secularization” or what Heper called 
“institutional secularization as disengagement”69 and the “subjective secularization” 
or secularization at the consciousness level, or, “normative secularization as 
desacralization, i.e. the concept that life can be lived in accordance with human 
rationality.”70 Although the extent of secularization was limited to the educated 
public, it was also an effective public, which, in the succeeding decades, imposed 
secularization upon whole society from above. Özbudun properly summarizes 
overall contributions of the Young Turk period to the development of Turkish 
secularism in Turkey as: 
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By emphasizing the superiority of rational and scientific thought, by enlarging 
considerably the domain of secular political authority and, above all, by 
making Turkishness the predominant component of the corporate identity, the 
Young Turks provided an essential link between the Ottoman reforms and the 
Turkish revolution.71 
 
 The injection of the secular and positivist nationalism into weltanschauung of 
state elites radically changed the attitude of the military-bureaucratic elites toward 
Islam. It seems that the military-bureaucratic elites relied on the assumptions of the 
“secularization thesis,” even on its extreme conception, which claims that 
“modernization (itself no simple concept) brings in its wake (and may itself be 
accelerated by) the diminution of the social significance of religion,”72 as extreme 
interpretations add, in due time it disappears.73 Thus the relationship between 
religion and state turned out to be problematical. The initiative came from the 
military which dominated power towards the end of the Young Turk period and 
structured the State-Islam relationship. Their attitude can be described as the “cast-
iron theory of Islam,” which runs, according to Nur Yalman, as following: 
The Quran is the Word of God. The  word of God is unchangeable. New 
societies and political conditions are very different from eighth and ninth 
century Caliphates. Therefore, Islam, which has fallen out phase with life, can 
not be adapted to modern circumstances today. Consequently, modern life can 
not be organized around Islamic principles.74  
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 The cost-iron theory of Islam shows the mentality by which succeeding 
reforms were carried out. In the last period of the Ottoman Empire, the military 
remained as the only organized group capable of bringing this rationality to its 
logical conclusion, i.e. to completely disestablish Islam in society, and was ready to 
do this. The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War gave the 
opportunity to the military not only to secularize the country, but also to change the 
rules of the game of politics in a fundamental way. By the end of the War, only 
nationalism, in the form that explained above, albeit cleaned of its Turanic tenets, 
remained a powerful ideology.75  
   
3.3 Secularism and the Military in the Early Republican Period 
The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the War resulted in a nationalist struggle in the 
Anatolian land of the Empire against Greece under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk, which culminated in the establishment of the Republic in 1923. What 
remained as a major actor from the Ottoman state was the military which was also 
the only agent able to use the initiative to tackle the problems faced by the nation. 
Under the leadership of Atatürk, the military fought against Greece and saved the 
Anatolian land. Guided by him, the military was ready to bring the reforms that had 
been initiated long before to its logical conclusion, i.e. completely secularizing the 
state. In a sense, the Republic was a radical response to the old master problem: 
“How to save the state?” The republican answer was a total displacement of religion 
through deliberate secular reforms. The difference between the nineteenth and early 
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twentieth century modernizing elites and Atatürk lies in the fact that Atatürk, 
although acted along the same Westernizing line, brought the scope of reforms far 
beyond the horizons of the former reformers. This was the radical side of the reforms 
of Atatürk.   
 When the secularization reforms of the Republican period are concerned, the 
mainstream orthodoxy of political writings is prone to pose the issue as a series of 
legal and institutional arrangements introduced by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the 
founder of the Republic, with a secular spirit directed to the superstructural level of 
society, and little attention has been paid to their implications in terms of culture and 
individual identity. However, an exact understanding of the Republican reformism 
and secularism, and their far-reaching consequences in terms of secularism and 
secularization of the Turkish state and society necessitate a careful look at not only 
the superstructural arrangements, but also their relations to the whole modernization 
project of Atatürk and his followers. It is true that almost all of the reforms of 
Atatürk were concerned with the legal-institutional level of society, and all aimed, 
either directly or indirectly, at disestablishing institutional Islam from the state 
machinery and society. Yet, without relating these reforms to the primordial goal of 
Atatürk, we can not grasp the full picture. The secularization reforms should be 
evaluated according to their relations to the fundamental goal of Atatürk and his 
future expectations. What was the fundamental goal of Atatürk? In what way did 
Atatürk define the new individual? What kind of identity was offered to the new 
individual? On what grounds was the new state to be based? In what way was the 
new political collectivity conceptualized? These interrelated questions are crucial to 
understand the secularizing reforms of Atatürk.  
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 The ultimate Atatürk goal that Atatürk had formulated for the nation was to 
reach to the level of contemporary civilization. It was the main rationale behind the 
reforms and all actions were justified on the basis of the “requirements of 
contemporary civilization.”76 In order to reach the level of contemporary civilization, 
it was necessary to create a modern national state based on a national sovereignty. 
Contemporary civilization, national state, nation, nationalism, modern science and 
technology, progress and national unity were the keywords which constituted the 
conceptual matrix of Atatürk’s thought. In Atatürk’s view contemporary civilization 
had a clear address, i.e. Western civilization, which was, for him, a product of 
modern science. What was considered an obstacle to this goal had to be eliminated. 
The institutional part of the reforms were instituted both to get rid of the outmoded 
parts of the state preventing its development in a secular fashion, and to create new 
institutions required for a modern state. The cultural side of the reforms were 
concerned with creating the socio-cultural ground for a modern national state, 
namely creating a nation as a new political collectivity. 
 Atatürk’s conception of the modern state was both an inspiration of the 
western nation state model and a critique of the Ottoman state. As pointed out by 
Heper,77 Atatürk’s criticism of the Ottoman state is important in understanding his 
conception of the modern state. According to Atatürk, if the conquest policy of the 
Ottoman sultans is examined, it can be seen that “all these attitudes and actions of 
the mighty sultans were based on their personal passions that they had for the foreign 
                                                 
 
76 Mardin, “Religion and Secularism in Turkey,” 210. 
 
77 Metin Heper, “A Weltanschauung-turned-Partial Ideology and Normative 
Ethics: “Atatürkism” in Turkey,” Orient 25 (1984): 85-86. 
 133 
policy.”78 To the extent that the state was expanded on the basis of the personal 
passions the Ottomans were forced to give concessions to different ethnic and 
religious groups that brought the state to disaster. Instead of the selfish wishes of the 
sultan, the state had to be based on the sovereignty of the people.79 It must be 
organized on the principles of modern science; thus, a full separation of the state and 
religion was an essential requirement. It was for this reason that the opening of the 
National Assembly in Ankara in 1920 and the proclamation of the Republic  were 
followed by a series of reforms. In 1922, before the proclamation of the Republic, 
the sultanate was abolished. The abolishment of the Sultanate was, as also claimed 
by Atatürk himself, a logical end of a process started in the early period of the 
Independence War which gradually introduced the sovereignty of the nation. For 
example, after the opening of the National Assembly, a new constitution was 
accepted in 1921 to provide a legal base for the daily working of the government and 
to sustain the Independent War against Greece. The Constitution stipulated that 
sovereignty belonged to the nation without any reservation, and the Assembly called 
itself the true representative of the nation.80 It also collected in itself the legislative 
and executive powers, and gradually discarded the Istanbul government. Under these 
conditions the abolishment of the Sultanate was only the official declaration of a de-
facto situation. Although the Constitution put the nation in a position of the sole 
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holder of the right of sovereignty, the members of the Assembly were not clear on 
the ultimate implications of the existing situation. This became clear when the 
abolishment of the sultanate was discussed in the Assembly. A committee was 
formed to elaborate the issue and prepare a bill. In the mixed committee of the 
Assembly, where the religious groups raised their opposition to the bill, it became 
apparent that the committee could not reach a decision. Atatürk intervened into 
affairs and made the following explanation in a harsh tone of voice:   
Three commissions met under the chairmanship of the Hoca Müftü Efendi. 
They discussed the issue. The jurists and theologians claimed by their specious 
reasoning that the sultanate and Caliphate could not be separated.... We were 
also listening to their discussions from a corner of the room. Under such 
conditions it seemed impossible to solve the problem. We understood this... 
Then I climbed on a table and made the following statement: Gentlemen, I 
said, the sovereignty and sultanate can not be given to anyone by scientific 
discussion and debate. Sovereignty and sultanate can only be taken by use of 
force and coercion. The Ottomans also took them from the Turkish nation by 
force, and they maintained this for six hundred years... Now the Turkish nation 
took back its usurped sovereignty by rebellion.  This is a fact. It is not a matter 
whether we leave the sovereignty to the nation or not. The matter is to express 
the already existing fact by law. This will certainly happen. If those who are 
here, the Assembly and everyone recognize this as natural, all will be good. If 
not, the fact will happen by its appropriate way, but perhaps some heads will 
be cut off.81  
 
 The members were left no alternative, and on the same day the sultanate was 
abolished by a law passed in the Assembly on November 1, 1922. The gradual 
strategy of Atatürk included the separation of the sultanate and Caliphate, and after 
the abolishment of the sultanate, the Caliphate was maintained until 1924. In 1923 
the Republic was declared in the Assembly. A preamble was accepted stating that 
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the form of government in Turkey was a Republic. The above reforms were followed 
by new ones.82 Education was put under the monopoly of the state with a law 
entitled “The Law of the Unification of Education” which was promulgated in 1924. 
By his Law the schools whose owners were religious establishments, especially 
pious foundations, were given to the state. In 1925 hat wearing became compulsory 
for public officials and it was accepted as a new head cover for the Turks. The dress 
was changed, and wearing some uniforms was forbidden in the public sphere. The 
dervish lodges were banned in 1925, which was followed by the adoption of the 
Swiss Civil Code in 1926. The Gregorian calendar was given up in 1925. The call to 
prayer was also translated into Turkish and it became obligatory that it be said in 
Turkish in 1932. The statement in the Constitution declaring that “the religion of the 
Turkish state is Islam” was erased in 1928. Last but not least, the script was changed 
from the Arabic to the Latin in 1928. By the end of the 1920s one could faced a 
completely secular state in Turkey. 
 The ultimate address of the reforms in the social and cultural spheres was the 
creation of a new individual compatible with the modern national state and society. 
The public representation of the republican citizen was imagined centrally, whose 
main formal attributes had to resemble those of their western counterparts. In this 
sense, the problem of Westernization was not only contemplated as a simple search 
for modernization, but as a search for a totally new civilization. Therefore, the 
republican reforms took as its targets what were deeply rooted components in society 
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such as the traditions, manners, style, values, and the like. This was the unique 
characteristics of the republican reformism. As Mardin aptly noted: 
 The Turkish Revolution was not the instrument of a discontented burgeosie, it 
did not ride on a wave of peasant dissatisfaction with the social order, and it 
did not have as target the sweeping away of feudal privileges, but it did take as 
a target the values of the Ottoman ancién regime. In this sense it was a 
revolutionary movement.83 
 
 In the same vein, S. N. Eisenstadt observed that the unique characteristics of 
the Kemalist Revolution:  
[W]as a shift in the bases of political legitimization and the symbols of the 
political community, together with a redefinition of the boundaries of 
collectivity. The redefinition of the political community took place in a unique 
way: the society withdrew from the Islamic framework into that of the newly 
defined Turkish nation. While this process appears similar to the path followed 
by the European nation states, it in fact involved the negation of universal 
framework: Islam. This was not the case in Europe.84  
 
 The negation of Islam and its symbolic universe as a legitimizing formula for 
the state was the most important aspect of the secularism of Atatürk since in doing so 
the scope of secularism was extended beyond the simple separation of the state and 
religion, and as a logical conclusion of such understanding, alternative sources for 
the formation of a new identity and a new ethic were needed. What was substituted 
for Islam was Turkish nationalism made up of the positivistic and solidaristic 
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tenets.85 The above move in itself was a radical one because it redefined the basic 
references by which the society and the individual could define themselves. Needless 
to say, this new conceptual matrix was expressed in a completely secular vocabulary.  
 As has already been noted, the latent and often manifest aim of the 
institutional and cultural reforms was to create a new individual suitable for a 
modern national state. Atatürk thought that creating a nation was only possible if a 
new Turk and a new national identity were created; this new citizen would be armed 
with a mind completely different from the old. It was expected that the socio-cultural 
and institutional reforms would create a fertile ground on which modern minded, 
enlightened and civilized Turks would be flourished. So, what would the place of 
religion be in the life of the new state, society and individual? This question is 
closely related to the way that Atatürk theorized on secularism and religion.  
 
3.4 Religion and Secularism in Atatürk’s Thought 
It has already been pointed out that Atatürk aimed at creating a new symbolic system 
of society different from that of the ancien regime, the Ottoman, whose fabric was 
colored by traditional tints. Although he attacked the existing institutional Islam, he 
did not claim that religion as whole had no place in men’s lives and consciousness. 
In other words, he did not adopt an irreligious outlook, but narrowed the space of 
religion in men’s lives. Religion was a private matter confined only to men’s 
conscience as Atatürk said, 
In the Turkish Republic, anyone can worship God in any ways he/she wishes. 
No one can be mistreated because of his religious beliefs. The Turkish 
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Republic has no official religion. In Turkey it is not possible to find a person 
who wants to impose his ideas upon others by means of force. No permission 
is possible for that action too.86   
 
  Although Atatürk tried to disestablish the institutional religion in a way 
which sometimes included hard measures, he did not try to impose a new creed upon 
society.87 In some occasions, especially when the reactionary revolts were broken 
out in different parts of the country, he delivered statements hard in tone, which was 
showing his opposition against the institutional Islam. The following sayings were 
such ones: “Turkey can never be a society of sheiks, mürids, dervishes and their 
followers,” and “the truest and most genuine tariqat is the tariqat of civilization.”88 
For him, after the establishment of the sultanate tradition in Islam, a tradition in 
which religion was exploited for political purposes.89 Islam was transformed into an 
obscurantist and superstitious belief system which was responsible for backwardness 
and ignorance. In approaching Islam as a rational and modern religion, he was 
showing his affinity to Islam, which was confined to the private sphere of life and 
conscience of individuals.  
 For Atatürk, Islam was a rational, modern and civilized religion. Nothing is 
found in Islam contrary to contemporary civilization. But in history Islam was 
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transformed into an obscurantist and superstitious belief by ignorant religious men to 
promote their petty interests. It was used for political purposes, and today what was 
needed was to put Islam in its true place. He said to a French journalist in an 
interview that there could be  nothing in their policy contrary to Islam. He went on: 
“The Turkish nation must be more pious... I believe this as far as I believe my 
religion and the truth. My religion does not contain anything contrary to reason and 
progress.”90   
 Yet, the place of religion in Atatürk’s conception was the conscience of man. 
In fact, it can be said that Atatürk’s understanding of religion was “to resemble the 
Protestant tradition that placed emphasis on the absolute privacy of individual 
conscience,”91 an understanding that excluded any public appearance of religion by 
its very definition.  Atatürk said: 
 
Religions is a matter of conscience. Everybody is free to follow the orders of 
his conscience. We respect religion. We are not against the thought and 
contemplation. What we are doing is to separate the affairs of religion and the 
those of the state and nation. We are just keeping away from the deliberate 
actions of the reactionaries.92  
 
 The profound accent on the private nature of religion in Atatürk’s conception 
was closely related to his project of new individual; thus, the secularizing reforms 
confined to the cultural sphere need to be considered together with the individual 
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project in question and his expectation to create a new cultural identity. Mardin93 
notes that one of the most important ideological aims of Atatürk was individual 
autonomy, which he saw an indispensable part of creativity. The traditional 
communal life of mahalle, whose legitimacy was derived from religion, not from 
science, was a limiting force for individual autonomy. He considered that without 
divorcing people from this traditional collective control mechanism, individual 
autonomy was not possible. The reforms related to dress, mystical orders, women’s 
rights, and central control of education were aimed at encouraging this anatomy. 
 What was expected as the outcome was a new individual having little or no 
affinity to religion. The ethical void that was created by displacement of religion in 
individual life was expected to be filled with the modern science and technology. It 
seems that the attitudes of Atatürk and early republicans towards this problem 
resembles the attempts of the Third French Republican elites to find out a viable 
instrument in coping with social disorder. As Jack E. S. Hayward noted, “the 
nineteenth century French philosophers sought to bare the principles of social 
reorganization upon a conciliation of “social moralism” and “social scientism”... as 
the only both acceptable and viable foundation for social life.”94 Like the French 
elites, Atatürk together with the secular military-bureaucratic intelligentsia relied on 
science as the true foundation of the new society and the individual. In Karpat’s 
words,  “the new individual whom the Republican regime wanted to bring out was a 
rationalist, anti-traditionalist, anti-clerical person, approaching all matters 
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intellectually and objectively.”95 Consequently, religion, as the foundation of old 
society was excluded from the ingredients constituting the nation, society, individual 
and cultural identity.  
 Yet, the republican conception of the individual autonomy had it limitations. 
It was bounded by the requirements of society. The conciliation of social moralism 
and social scientism influenced the early republican view of society and the 
individual. Drawing from Durkheimian sociology, not unlike the elites of the Third 
French Republic, society was conceptualized as an entity more than the sum total of 
individuals, hence, the individual was subordinated to it. The fragmented nature of 
society, i.e. the concept of society made up of classes and different ethnic groups 
was denied giving way to an understanding of society based on the harmonious 
interdependence of occupational groups.96 In the same vein, in defining citizenship, 
not surprisingly, duties rather than rights were given primary emphasis. For instance, 
Füsün Üstel, on the books on citizenship written and circulated during the 1920’s, 
observed that the concept of citizenship in this period was defined on the bases of  
“being civilized” (medenilik) and patriotism (yurtseverlik).97 The expression of 
particular interests was denied on behalf of presupposed common interests shared by 
the members of the whole community, a belief which found its expression in the 
                                                 
 
95 Karpat, Turkey’s Politics, 53-54. 
 
96 For instance in his Balikesir Speech Atatürk said; “Since the members of 
various occupational groups are dependent upon each other, it is impossible to see 
them as classes. All of them constitute nation [halk].” Atatürk, Atatürk’ün Söylev ve 
Demeçleri, I-III, vol. II, 102. 
 
97 Füsün Üstel, “Cumhuriyet’ten Bu Yana Yurttaşlık Profili” [The Profile of 
Citizenship from the Republic to the Present], Yeni Yüzyıl (Istanbul Daily), 24 April 
1995. 
 142 
principles of Atatürkism as populism. Needless to say, this definition of individual 
was an apolitical, since the role of the individual in defining the rules of the game 
and politics was either narrowly defined or denied.98 
 Apart from the reforms and Atatürk’s view of individual and new cultural 
identity, it is also important to complement Atatürk’s view of religion with his future 
considerations because it enables us to put all his views and reforms under a 
wholistic perspective. This is particularly important to understand the laicist policies 
of the government after the death of Atatürk because as will be explained below,  
although they were implemented on behalf of Atatürkism, in reality they were just 
freezing of the experimental applications of Atatürk. Although Atatürk had a clear 
idea on religion and its role in the life of individual and society, his heritage borne 
some ambiguities stemming from his gradual methodology and the some temporary 
and experimental exercises. It has already been pointed out that Atatürk believed in a 
rational and modern Islam which was also, for him, the genuine Islam, but in the 
course of history some foreign elements infiltrated it. For this purpose he intended to 
initiate some reforms in Islam to purify it. One of his sayings gives important insight 
in this regard. He said,  “We have a religion whose base is firm. Its material is good; 
but the building has been neglected for centuries... Lots of foreign elements, 
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interpretations and superfluous beliefs ill-treated the building.”99 Early in game, in 
1925, a commission was formed under the leadership of M. Fuad Köprülü to discuss 
religious reform and prepare a report about what kind of reform would be possible in 
Islam. The report stated that: 
Religion is a social institution. Like other social institutions, it has to follow 
both the requirements of life and the trajectory of evolution... [Thus] The 
religious life, not unlike the economic and social life, should be reformed 
according to scientific thought and method. It can only under these conditions 
make its proper contribution to other institutions in society.100   
 
 The reform proposal contained recommendations to change the style, 
language and places of worship, which were extremely contrary to its orthodox 
forms. The reforms were not implemented because of their extreme character. Only 
the call to prayer was translated from Arabic into Turkish which was done only for 
experimental purposes according to Celal Bayar, a close friend of Atatürk and his 
last prime minister.101 Later again Atatürk began to be interested in religious 
reforms. For this purpose he started to work with Afet Inan on Islamic history and 
theology. His aim was to reform religion in order to make it compatible with modern 
science and the requirements of modern life. After a long period of investigations, 
                                                 
 
99 Atatürkçülük: Birinci Kitap [Atatürkism: Book One] (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim 
Basımevi, 1988), 459. 
 
100 Gotthard Jaschke, Yeni Turkiye’de İslamlık [Islam in New Turkey], trans. 
H. Örs (Ankara: Bilgi Basımevi, 1972), 40. 
 
101 Celal Bayar’s explanations on “call to pray” quoted in Nazlı Ilıcak, 15 Yıl 
Sonra 27 Mayıs Yargılanıyor [27 May on Trial after Fifteen Years Later] (Istanbul: 
Kervan Yayınları, 1975), 201-202.  
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discussions and disputes, he abandoned his project of religious reform by declaring, 
“I will not be a Luther.”102  
 If one of the reasons behind the termination of these reform efforts was their 
extreme nature; the other reason was Atatürk’s belief in the evolutionary character of 
modernity. Since the republic conceptualized a new individual armed with a 
scientific mentality, modern education was supposed to be the basic instrument to 
bring out such individual and the civilized nation into existence.103  Through 
education, it was expected that people would attain “a higher level of rationality.”104 
It can be argued that Atatürk left this issue to the coming educated generations. 
Thus, it can be said that he left no static or frozen model of secularism and a view on 
the role of religion in society. There was a certain kind of uncertainty, which Atatürk 
expected, would be filled after the effects of reforms became widespread in society. 
Atatürk expected that a tension would be developed between the modernized and 
traditional parts of society, which would work in favor of modernity. Mardin’s 
observation on Atatürk’s attitude towards religion seems valid. After the reforms, 
Mardin noted, “The little man’s religion was thus placed in an ambiguous situation: 
tolerated but not secure. It was this tension which Atatürk hoped would work in 
favor of secularization in the long run.”105 In other words, a kind of interaction 
                                                 
 
102 Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Tek Adam: Mustafa Kemal [Unique Man: 
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between modernity and Islam was proposed by Atatürk which could take place after 
the secularization reforms had reached a certain level. 
 The easy shift to extreme and a solid conception of secularism in the 
succeeding decades was closely related to this ambiguity because the successor state 
elites froze Atatürk’s experimental trial-error method and ascribed a prescriptive 
content to his reforms, from which Atatürkism as an ideology was born. The 
differences in perspectives between Atatürk and his near circle were evident even 
before the death of Atatürk. Ahmet Hamdi Başar noted that within the near circle of 
Atatürk there were people who had the potential to completely misunderstand the 
secularizing reforms of Atatürk, especially in an irreligious fashion.106 In fact, it was 
in the following decades after Atatürk that secularism, along with Atatürkism, was 
transformed into a laicist ideology by the state elites. Thus, the question whether 
Atatürk followed a predetermined and prescriptive program, or whether he had some 
solid guiding principles, becomes crucial to understand the differences in policies 
regarding religion and secularism in Atatürkian and post-Atatürkian periods. It is 
argued here that Atatürk did not have a definite set of ideas which resembled an 
ideology, rather he had a very practical orientation. To be sure, he had a definite aim, 
i.e. to modernize the country through Westernization, but his methodology did not 
contain frozen rules, and even sometimes we face reverse moves in reforms. Thus, 
Heper’s107 argument that in its original form Atatürkism or Kemalism (they can be 
                                                 
 
106 Ahmet Hamdi Başar, Atatürk’le Üç Ay ve 1930’dan Sonra Türkiye [Three 
Months with Atatürk and Turkey after 1930] (Istanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1945),  45-53. 
The point will further be clarified in the Fourth Chapter.  
 
107 See, Heper, “A Weltanschauung-turned-Partial Ideology and Normative 
Ethics: “Atatürkism” in Turkey.” 
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used interchangeably) was a Weltanschauung, but not an ideology seems valid. 
Unlike Weltanschauung which means a soft world view that shows general 
directions to society, ideology offers a closed system of ideas according to which all 
human praxis are regulated.108 In the following parts, both of these conceptions will 
be elaborated along with the transformation from Weltanschauung to ideology, and 
their implication for secularism in Turkey.  
 
3.5 Atatürkism as a Weltanschauung 
The overall project of Atatürk became clearer when he formed a political party to 
use as an apparatus for the adoption further reforms. The establishment of the 
Republican People’s Party was one of the most important steps in the development 
of the Kemalist weltanschauung, since the program of the party became both the best 
expression of the real intentions of Atatürk and the basic text on which new state was 
structured in the following decades.109 It is true that at the beginning, the party 
program did not have a well-defined political philosophy except for a few general 
statements.110 It was in the Third Congress of the Party which was held in 1931 that 
certain principles were laid dawn in the Program, and became unremovable stones of 
                                                 
 
108 For this conception of ideology see, Edward Shils, “The Concept and 
Function of Ideology,” International Encyclopedia of Social Science, vols. 7-8 
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differentiation of Atatürkism as weltanschauung and Atatürkism as Ideology, see, 
Heper, “A Weltanschauung-turned-Partial Ideology and Normative Ethics: 
“Atatürkism” in Turkey,”  83-94. 
 
109 Suna Kili, Kemalism (Istanbul: School of Business Administration and 
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the state. These will be elaborated below; here, it can be illuminating to point out the 
conditions under which the Party emerged.    
 Although Atatürk intended to establish a political party soon after the defeat 
of the Greeks, the project was realized only after a gradual process. In the end, the 
party emerged as a response to opposition carried out against him in the Assembly. 
While Atatürk gradually began to undertake his intended reforms, he aroused 
opposition in the Assembly. This opposition led him to form a group made up of the 
representatives supporting his ideas and proposals. The group which was called the 
“First Group” was  pro-republican, reform oriented and secular in their outlook. The 
conservatives, alternatively, formed another group called the “Second Group,” 
whose members were more traditional and pro-religious. Although these groups did 
not resemble well-structured organizations, and the boundaries between them were 
not clearly delineated, they acted as if they were two different political parties in the 
National Assembly.111  
 The First Group was later transformed by Atatürk into a political party, called 
People’s Party which came out in September, 1923. In the same year new elections 
were held and the members of the Second Group were not elected. This was 
followed by a new opposition originating from some generals who were close 
friends of Atatürk in the War of Independence. They formed another opposition 
party called the Progressive Republican Party in November, 1924. However, the 
Sheikh Said revolt which took place in the Eastern provinces of the country aiming 
                                                                                                                                          
110 Ergun Özbudun, “The Nature of the Kemalist Political Regime,” in Atatürk: 
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at the establishment of an independent and religious Kurdistan in 1925 put an end to 
this party because the party was accused of being involved in the revolt. Although no 
connection was found between the revolt and the Progressive Republican Party, the 
party was closed, and a new law called the “Law for the Maintenance of Order” was 
passed in the Assembly, which gave extraordinary powers to the government. The 
Independence Tribunals, which were revolutionary courts established in 1920 to 
tackle treasonable activities, were reactivated again. This development started a new 
process in the political life of Turkey in which no opposition was allowed.112 The 
Republican People’s Party  remained  in power in Turkey from 1925 to 1945 without 
a genuine opposition except for a short lived Free Party experiment in 1930 which 
was established by the encouragement of Atatürk as being a loyal opposition, and as 
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to supervise the policies of the ruling Republican Party, and to erase the dictatorial 
image of Turkey.113 
 As has already been noted above, if the genealogy of Atatürkist ideology is to 
be analyzed it must, first of all, begin with the program of the Republican People’s 
Party because the program was the main text in which Atatürk firstly formulated his 
intentions systematically, and also Atatürk was both the founder and permanent 
leader of the Party until his death in 1938.  
 Along with the establishment of the Party, two important developments in 
terms of the emergence of Atatürkism as a weltanschauung took place. First, in the 
Second Congress of the Republican People’s Party in 1927 Atatürk delivered an 
important speech (Nutuk)114 which has been one of the most important texts of 
Atatürkism. Second, some basic principles around which the Republican Party 
defined itself were formulated. Together with some new principles added in the 1931 
Congress, these principles began to be known as the principles of Atatürkism. These 
were republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, laicism and reformism. Statism 
and reformism were added as new principles in the 1933 Congress.  
                                                 
 
113 Before the establishment of the Free Party Mustafa Kemal said to Fethi 
[Okyar], the founder of the Free Party, the following; “Today our image is a 
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 These principles were defined in the party program as following: 
Republicanism meant the form of government in which national sovereignty could 
best be guaranteed. Nationalism took the nation as a basic unit of political 
community and placed emphasis on developing the peculiar characteristics of the 
Turkish nation. Populism dwelt upon the assumption that people were the ultimate 
source of sovereignty, but the sociological implications of the Turkish populism was 
more important than its political ones because on the basis of populism society was 
conceptualized as a classless entity based on the interdependence of occupational 
groups. No privileges were accepted. Statism was an economic principle giving the 
state the primary role in the economic life of the nation.115 Reformism or 
revolutionsim (Inkılapçılık) referred to the commitment to the principles which 
emerged  from the Republican reforms.116  
 Secularism is defined in the program as follows:  
The Party accepts as a principle that all laws, orders and procedures in 
governing the state must be formulated and applied according to the principles 
and forms (esas ve şekillere) which were provided by science and technology 
for contemporary civilization, and according to the actual needs of the world. 
Religious thought (telakki) is a matter of conscience, and the party sees the 
separation of religious ideas from the affairs of the state and the world and 
from politics as a necessary requirement of successful progress in line with 
contemporary civilization.117 
 
                                                                                                                                          
114 There are different editions of Nutuk. Here Zeynep Korkmz’s Nutuk is used.  
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 The above six principles were symbolized by six arrows and were accepted 
as the party emblem in the 1931 Congress. These principles were introduced in the 
Constitution in 1937, and later became the indisputable principles defining the 
ideological boundaries of the state.118 These principles, according to those who took 
Atatürkism as a closed system of ideas, constitute the main framework on which all 
other writings and statements of Atatürk could be systematized.       
 Yet, the formulation of these principles did not denote that a prescriptive and 
systematic framework of ideas was put at work by Atatürk. It is evident that the 
overall emphasis of Atatürk on science and technology, and contemporary 
civilization prevented him from transforming his ideas into a hard ideology. Here 
ideology is taken as a comprehensive philosophy with an explicit methodology that 
enables to predetermine all policy issues on indisputable presumptions.119 Özbudun 
points out that the Republican People’s Party lacked any mobilizational ideology, 
which was a characteristic of mobilizational totalitarian party structures. What 
characterized the Party, which also explains the nature of the Kemalist regime, was a 
new mentality based on positive science, but not an ideology.120 Ismet Giritli, one of 
the prominent students of the Kemalist Revolution, makes similar arguments. 
According to Giritli, although Atatürkism is an ideology, it is an pragmatic one since 
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the Kemalist ideology, see Paul Dumont, “The Origins of Kemalist Ideology,” in 
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it is based on reason and science.121 In that sense Ataturkist thought did not include 
substantive norms, but scientific mentality. Heper’s conceptualization of Atatürkism 
is illuminating in this regard. Heper says on Atatürkism: 
It may be surmised that if Atatürkist thought was an ideology at all it was a 
soft ideology at best-an antidote to the hold of religion on society. If it was an 
ideology, it was so only in the sense the idéologues took the ideology- not a 
quality of thought, but a technique for discovering truth and dissolving 
illusions... It did not in the long run intend to fasten on society a closed system 
of thought- certain fundamentals to which everybody needed to conform.122 
 
  Atatürk always remarked that his actions were directed from the practical 
conditions not by ideological prerequisites. He never gave the opportunity to those 
who wanted to develop an ideology for the revolution. For instance, when Yakup 
Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, one of the intellectuals of the time close to Atatürk, asked 
Atatürk why the party had no ideology, Atatürk responded to him without giving an 
implication that ideology was necessary for either the party or the state. A 
conversation between Yakup Kadri and Atatürk took place as follows: “My general, 
this party has no doctrine.... Of course it doesn’t, my child; if we had a doctrine, we 
would freeze the movement.”123 Another evidence denoting the absence of the 
intention to develop a closed system of thought during the lifetime of Atatürk is that, 
although the six arrows were incorporated in the program of RPP in the Congress of 
1931, it is interesting that in the opening speech of the Congress Atatürk did not 
mention them. Instead of the six arrows, Atatürk advised the Party to work hard in 
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order to gain the trust and love of the people. Preston Hughes sees all of the above 
affairs as an evidence of the reluctance of Atatürk to develop Kemalist ideology.124 
The same was also true for the Party Congresses of 1935 and 1936. Despite the fact 
that he had the opportunity to develop Kemalism as an ideology based on the party 
principles, in these congresses Atatürk did not mention these principles.125 All of this 
shows that Atatürk never intended to develop a closed system of ideas to direct and 
predetermine all activities of both the state elites and the people.126 Instead, the 
legitimate source for the practices of the state elites and the nation was science and 
practical necessities.127 It was in the following decades that by attributing some 
                                                                                                                                          
123 Quoted in Özbudun, “The Nature of the Kemalist Political Regime,”  88. 
 
124 Preston Hughes, Atatürkçülük ve Türkiye’nin Demokratikleşme Süreci 
[Atatürkism and Democratization in Turkey] (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1993), 72. 
 
125  Ibid., 72.  
 
126 For an understanding of the six principles in their original form, Udo 
Steinbach notes the following: “The six principle of Kemalism, formulated in 
response to the emerging needs of the modernization process, should be regarded not 
as the articles of a political manifesto but rather as a rationalization of this 
determination to modernize. Kemalism was indeed one of the first modernization 
ideologies of the Third World; however, unlike the modernization ideologies of 
Europe (e.g. Marxism) or the ideological endeavors of Atatürk’s successors in 
various parts of the Third World (e.g. Latin America), Kemalism did not start from 
an analysis of the structure of Turkish society. Modernization in Turkey was 
imposed by order; the principles of Kemalism arose largely from the practical 
requirements of this process.” Udo Steinbach, “The Impact of Atatürk on Turkey’s 
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ed. Jacob M. Landau (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), 78.  Italics are 
added. 
 
127 Even Recep Peker, the then Secretary-General of the RPP, who was one of 
the hard-liners of the party, and was always prone to develop prescriptive guiding 
principles for the party, said the following to the journalists who came to Ankara to 
follow the Fourth Congress of the RPP held in 1935: “We do not behave with some 
formulas and proposals. We follow the requirements of our emotions. Neither the 
party is an order open only to its members, nor  our program is a verse. In terms of 
our actions we are conditioned by the requirements of the time. We don’t know what 
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substantive meanings to Atatürkism, the state elites transformed weltanschauung 
into an official ideology, and they became by themselves the true guardians of it, 
which is the subject matter of the following part. 
 
3.6 From Weltanschauung to Ideology: Atatürkism After Atatürk 
The transformation of Atatürkism or Kemalism from a weltanschauung into a 
political manifesto or an official ideology after Atatürk has produced important 
consequences for subsequent political developments. The most important impact has 
been on the state-religion relationship, because secularism in its maximal form 
became the main definitive component of the novel ideology. The definition and 
application of secularism experienced substantive changes which in turn, resulted in 
some anti-religious features. Within the framework of the previous differentiation of 
secularization, it can be said that Turkish secularization took the form of “maximal 
secularization,” which was the case in France. Even in Turkey it went beyond 
boundaries of this model because the extreme conception of secularization thesis, 
namely, the cost-iron theory of Islam, was put at work by the state elites. Islam was 
considered as an obstacle to the societal development, and the elimination of 
religiosity became the preferred policy choice of the state elites. It may rightly be 
claimed that after Atatürk “maximal secularization” became the founding stone of 
the Kemalist ideology. It also became the central issue of the tug of war between 
intellectual, military-bureaucratic elites and political elites after the transition to 
                                                                                                                                          
will be tomorrow’s requirements” Quoted in Tekinalp, Kemalizm [Kemalism], trans. 
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multi-party politics. Not surprisingly, the military interventions were justified on the 
basis of the claim that the politicians deviated from the basic principles of 
Atatürkism, especially from the principle of secularism. Under what conditions 
Atatürkism was transformed into a political ideology, and how the new 
understanding formulated the state-religion relationship will be the subject matter of 
the following part.  
 The Early attempts to systematize Atatürk’s views and the efforts to develop 
a new ideology for the revolution were already present in Atatürk’s time. The most 
important attempt came from a group of intellectuals that organized around a journal 
called Kadro. The events that developed between Atatürk and the members of Kadro 
movement show not only the existence of a deep drive to transform the ideas of 
Atatürk into an ideology, but also Atatürk’s decisive stand vis-a-visideologies. The 
prominent representatives were Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Ismail Hüsrev Tökin, 
and Şevket Süreyya Aydemir. Their philosophy and aim were best summarized by 
Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, the most prominent adherent of Kadro’s philosophy, in his 
well known book, Tek Adam [Unique Man] as follows:  
As it is known, Atatürk’s attitude towards the doctrines was different from the 
behaviors of the founders and leaders of contemporary regimes. In his time, the 
attempts at doctrine and doctrination were dominant almost everywhere in 
Europe: Revolutionary Socialism in Russia, Fascism in Italy, Nazism in 
Germany, and finally Reformist Socialism in Democratic European countries 
were dominant currents. The patterns of doctrination lie at the very basis of 
these developments. But similar attempts in the Turkish Revolution did not 
become influential values, despite the fact that there was a great demand. In 
summary, it seems that we face a reality of revolution, but not a theory and 
philosophy of revolution.128 
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 The editors of Kadro said that their mission was to develop a systematic 
explanation of the Turkish Revolution. Aydemir noted, “if there is a revolution, there 
must be an explanation of it with regards to its characteristics and its place in 
history.”129 In another well known book, Inkılap ve Kadro [Revolution and Cadre] 
he clearly stated that their aim was “to develop the ideas which represent Revolution 
as an ideology, and to make it the foundation of the Revolution.”130 All in all, what 
they offered was a state centered societal development program in which an elite 
group would play the leading role. Their thesis was statist and centralist with 
important tints of Marxism. Heper conceptualizes them as radical Kemalists trying to 
develop a prescriptive system of thought based on the bureaucratic centered 
economic nationalism.131 Although Atatürk supported their movement in financial 
terms, and the staff of Kadro interpreted this support as Atatürk’s willingness to 
develop an ideology for the revolution, as Hughes aptly noted, there is no evidence 
that Atatürk shared their idea of inventing a Kemalist ideology.132 The way Kadro 
was terminated is important in this regard, because it was done by the personal 
                                                 
 
129 Ibid., 457. 
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intervention of Atatürk. He suddenly appointed Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, one of 
the prominent members of the group, as ambassador to Albania, which was 
Atatürk’s way of closing the journal.133 
 Along with the attempts to develop a systematic explanation of Atatürkism, 
namely, to invent a prescriptive system of thought on behalf of Atatürk, some 
developments after the RPP’s Congress of 1931 took place which encouraged the 
bureaucratization of the state and deepened the reforms in society. The most 
important development was the election of Recep Peker as the secretary-general of 
the party; he was a representative of the so-called Jacobin front of the party. The 
liberal members were replaced by the Jacobins, who preferred to deepen reforms in 
society by means of state power and coercion. Peker’s orientation was on revolution 
rather than reform. He defined revolution as “cutting away from a social structure 
what is bad, harmful, backward and unjust, and to replace all of them with the 
progressive, the right, the new, and the useful things.”134 He declared that “ making a 
revolution generally necessitates coercion”135 which in fact, became the preferred 
strategy of the government after 1931. As observed by Karpat, after 1931 “Mustafa 
Kemal’s own initial method of gradual change, preparing national opinion, as he 
described it, step by step towards the desired goal, had given way to Recep Peker’s 
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philosophy of forceful change.”136 Peker emphasized the unity of the party, the state 
and the nation which resembled the state and party organizations of fascist countries. 
The local representatives of the party became the governors of the provinces. Feroz 
Ahmad points out that Peker’s strategy within the party totally alienated the liberals, 
and paved the way for the radicals, who interpreted the principle of reformism as 
revolutionism.137 Suppressing became a daily phenomenon138 which deepened the 
gap between the state and the people. 
 How Peker succeeded in concentrating power in his hands, despite the fact 
that Atatürk was alive, is an important point because it seems to contradict the claim 
that Peker’s methods were alien to Atatürk’s. A probable answer for this is that 
Atatürk left the daily governmental issues to the government, and began to interest 
himself in general reform issues, especially in language and history after 1930. To 
what extent Atatürk approved of the practices of Peker can be understood by looking 
at Peker’s resignation as Secretary-General of the party. In 1936 Atatürk personally 
intervened in party affairs, and forced Peker to resign. Peker’s resignation reinforces 
the view that Atatürk did not approve of the policies of the government. Walter F. 
                                                                                                                                          
135 Ibid., 8. 
 
136 Karpat, Turkey’s Politics, 72. Karpat observed that Kadro’s philosophy of 
forceful change was accepted by the government after 1931, but he did not claim that 
there was direct connection between the Kadro movement and the government. 
 
137 Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey (London, New York: 
Routledge, 1993),  64. 
 
138 C. H. Dodd, The Crisis of Turkish Democracy (Walkington, England: The 
Eothen Press, 1983), 8. 
 159 
Weiker interprets this move as Atatürk’s response to Peker’s attempts to build “the 
party into a personal organization.”139 
 Although Peker resigned from the party, the process in itself was a further 
step in the development of Atatürkism as an ideology. There was a wider 
indoctrination of the revolution through the People’s Houses (Halkevleri), which 
were created to socialize and mobilize people according to the party principles. As 
observed by Walter F. Weiker, “it is likely that many of the political education and 
indoctrination measures were originated by Peker.”140 Heper sees the developments 
which took place in the Inönü period as important in the development of a 
prescriptive system of thought around Atatürk’s views, because as showed by the 
Kadro movement, there had always been some deliberate efforts of the bureaucratic 
intelligentsia in this direction, despite the fact that due to Atatürk’s restrictions on 
those efforts, they did not go beyond a certain point.141 The last move which showed 
Atatürk’s dissatisfaction with government policies was the forced resignation of 
Inönü as the prime minister, and the appointment of Celal Bayar, who was more 
liberal in outlook.142   
 As far as the military and bureaucratic elites are concerned, it can be said that 
Atatürk was careful in keeping the military out of politics, since he observed the 
drawbacks of the military’s involvement in politics in the Unionist period. After the 
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consolidation of power, Atatürk isolated the army from politics, and promulgated a 
law stating that those who chose politics had to be retired from the military.143 The 
RPP’s Program of 1931 stated that “the Turkish military was above any political 
influence and consideration.”144 In regards to the civil bureaucracy, Atatürk had a 
great distrust of them, because he believed that they were looking for the promotion 
of private interests; thus, they could not be the locus of the new state.145  
 Yet, Heper points out that in Atatürk’s view some roles were given to the 
educated leadership group in helping people to accelerate their progress towards a 
more civilized style of life.146  Heper says “according to Atatürk, the people were 
passing through the necessary stages of progress towards a more civilized pattern of 
life. So the leader, or the leadership  group, was obliged to detect the nature of this 
progress, and accelerate it.”147 The role which was given to the educated elite was 
transient because through education people would acquire a higher level of 
rationality and become real owners of sovereignty. Science was the true and sole 
means of acquiring a higher level of rationality and discovering the true direction 
along which the collective conscience of the people was evolving.148  This transient 
nature of the role of the elites in helping people is the crux in understanding the 
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place of the  subsequent actions of the military-bureaucratic elites within the whole 
heritage of Atatürk. Unlike Atatürk, the state elites did not believe in the capacity of 
the people to develop their potential, and in the absence of the charisma possessed by 
Atatürk, they distorted some basic principles of Atatürkism, and transformed it into a 
political manifesto, denying any plural implications and dynamic approach to policy 
issues. In other words, they generalized their transient role. Heper explains this 
process as follows:  
The only alternative for the bureaucratic intelligentsia, if they were to 
legitimate the influential role they wanted to play in what was formally a 
Rousseauist parliamentary democracy, was to transform the Atatürkist 
Weltanschauung into a political manifesto, and take upon themselves the 
responsibility for carrying it out.149  
 
 After the death of Atatürk in 1938, Inönü was elected to the President of the 
Turkish Republic. Inönü opted to work with Peker, which denoted that the 
government would be in the hands of the hard-liners of the RPP. In fact, the liberals 
were totally alienated from the party, and in the hands of the radicals the state was 
transformed into a machine of oppression. Inönü became the “National Chief,” an 
idea which originated from Recep Peker. Recep Peker had a great symphaty with the 
fascist party organizations of Europe. Peker explains his views on the Chief as 
follows: “In the life of a political party the most important element is the chief. The 
chief of a party represents the main ideas, the will and the force of the party. The 
chief also enlightens his party and environment by his enthusiasm.”150 In the hands 
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of the radicals, authoritarian measures were taken, especially against religion. Unlike 
the time of Atatürk, in this period the state extended into authority to the level of the 
village. Since there was no official religious instruction even at the elementary level 
people were trying to solve this problem by their personal endeavors at the local 
levels.151 These actions were considered deviation from the principle of secularism, 
and the gendarmarie was extensively used to suppress all of these activities. As aptly 
noted by Karpat, during this period secularism acquired “excessive anti-clerical 
positivistic characteristics which were labeled later as an official dogma of 
irreligion.”152 For instance, in 1939, İnönü, in a speech delivered to teachers, said 
that “the education which you give is not religious, but, national. We want national 
education.”153 The interpretation of nationalism also underwent substantive changes 
moving towards a more racist understanding. For instance, the then prime minister 
Şükrü Saraçoğlu stated that “we are Turkist, and we always will remain Turkist. For 
us, Turkism is a matter of conscience and culture as much as it is a matter of 
blood.”154 All of these efforts towards the transformation of Atatürkism into an 
ideology were reinforced by the bureaucratization of the state, which was a result of 
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İnönü’s desire to have a strong state. As Heper155 observed, İnönü always underlined 
the necessity of a strong state which exercises power whenever required. The 
bureaucratization of the state was also accompanied by the improvement of the life 
conditions of the bureaucrats, which led them to identify themselves with Atatürkism 
to which they ascribed some substantive meanings.156 Consequently, a substantive 
differentiation occurred in the interpretation of Atatürkism in the post-Atatürkian 
period on the part of the state elite.  
As to the military, it can be said that the military was loyal to İsmet İnönü, 
since he was a close friend of Atatürk, and one of the heroes of the Independence 
War. However, a suspicious attitude emerged among the military when Inönü 
decided to open the political system to competitive politics, because İnönü began to 
liberalize previous strict secularist policies, and  took some steps in this direction. It 
was after this move that in the military a suspicious attitude towards the RPP 
developed, and some secret organizations around the idea of protecting the principles 
of Atatürk began to emerge.157 After the transition to multi-party politics, they 
widened their organizational networks. In the face of the concession from the 
secularism given by the RPP and later DP governments, they began to see 
themselves as the true guardians of the national interest which was also an 
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expression of the legacy of Atatürk.158 Although the military maintained limited 
loyalty to the RPP, a gap was created between the military and politics after the 
transition to competitive politics, which was the result of the legacy of the elitist 
tradition of Turkish polity. The transition to competitive politics opened a new 
chapter not only in the political history of Turkey, but also in the state-Islam 
relationship, and in the relationship between the state elites and newly emerging 
political elites.  
  
3.7 Transition to Multi-Party Politics and Limited Liberalization of Secularism 
Liberalization of the maximal secularism started by the end of the one-party era. As 
has already been pointed out, when İnönü decided to open the political system 
competitive politics in 1945, he developed a more liberal outlook toward Islam in 
comparison to the previous anti-religious policies of the RPP. In 1946 a new party 
was formed by members who were former deputies of the RPP, due to the 
controversy among the members of the RPP. The controversy that resulted in the 
resignation of these members from the governing party developed as a reaction to the 
RPP’s projects on land reform and authoritarian policies. The members who gave a 
proposal to the RPP explaining their political demands in 1945 were Celal Bayar, the 
last prime minister of Atatürk, Adnan Menderes, Fuad Köprülü, and Refik 
Koraltan.159 On the rejection of their proposal by the RPP, they resigned from the 
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party and became independent deputies in the parliament. After the transition to 
multi-party politics, they formed the Democrat Party under the leadership of Celal 
Bayar in 1946. The response of the ruling party to these developments was a sudden 
decision to hold elections which were held on spurious grounds.160 
 In this questionable election, the Democrat Party won only 63 seats out of 
500 in the Parliament.161 After the election, the Democrats widened their propaganda 
and opposition against the Republicans; in particular they criticized the RPP’s strict 
secularist policies. But the Democrat Party’s opposition on secularist policies 
activated a new debate within the RPP itself. The debate developed around religious 
education, an idea originating from some members of the RPP demanding the state’s 
active involvement in religious education partly because of the ethical erosion of the 
youth which intensified the threat of communism, and partly as a response to the 
propaganda of the Democrat Party. A proposal demanding religious education was 
rejected by the government led by Recep Peker.162 İnönü was decisive in softening 
those strict policies. He overthrew Peker by means of his influence within the RPP in 
1947. Ali Gevgilili interprets the fall of Peker as the fall of official ideology since he 
was a symbol of it.163 
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 In the following two years, the government took some new measures aiming 
at promoting religious activities. The government provided the exchange for the 
pilgrims to Mecca. In May 1948, elective religious courses were initiated in the 
schools. The government opened new schools to educate the imams. A faculty of 
theology was opened at Ankara University. The RPP decided to enter into elections 
in 1950 under the leadership of Şemsettin Günaltay, who was a religious scholar.164  
  The elections of 1950 resulted in the victory of the Democrat Party and 
produced far-reaching consequences. The government changed for the first time in 
republican history as a result of free competitive elections. The new government was 
formed under the leadership of Menderes, and Celal Bayar became the President of 
the Republic. The victory of the Democrat Party was both an expression of the 
dissent of the people to the RPP’s secularist policies, and the periphery’s challenge 
to the center which had been the most enduring cleavage of the Ottoman-Turkish 
polity.  
 Unsurprisingly, the Democrats initial movements were related to the 
liberalization of secularism. Their first action was to change the “call to prayer” from 
Turkish into Arabic. As has already been noted, it was changed in Atatürk’s time 
from Arabic into Turkish as part of the secularization program of the Republic. It 
produced great unrest among the common people. The law that passed this change 
did not deny performing the Turkish version of the “call to pray;” however, it 
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allowed its Arabic form along with the Turkish one.165 In addition to the change of 
the “call to prayer” from Turkish into Arabic, the Democrat Party changed the 
religious education in the schools. The religious education became permanent in 
primary schools unless the parents expressed the opposite.166 They also supported 
religious publications through providing some economic incentives. A notable policy 
of the Democrat Party government was about the language of the Constitution. In the 
period of İnönü, the language of the Constitution was Turkified excluding old Arabic 
and Persian words as a part of the pure Turkification program of the language. The 
Democrats returned to the old text of the Constitution written in 1924.167 
 The relative liberalization of secularization was accompanied by an increase 
in the activities of the old tarikats and various religious groups. The DP was careful 
in not deviating from secularism, and they were careful not to encourage the 
obscurantist policies.168 When some members of an order called Ticanis destroyed 
Atatürk’s statue, the government quickly arrested them. Moreover, the DP 
government passed a law to punish any action against Atatürk.169 The government 
also closed the National Party (Millet Partisi), which was a religious-oriented 
political party. The party was accused of being involved in activities against the 
principle of secularism.  
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 Along with the activities of the religious groups, considerable development 
was related to the religious press. During the period in question, different journals 
with religious content were published. Some were clerical, like Büyük Doğu, under 
the leadership of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, a well-known religious poet, and some 
journals included issues related to simple piety.170  
 Although the DP government seemed more willing to liberalize the previous 
strict secularist policies than the RP, generally speaking, there were no great 
ideological differences between the DP and the RPP. The RPP was more statist and 
centralist, and had an elitist tutelary conception of participation, but the DP 
emphasized local initiative.171 Over time there developed a tension between the RPP 
and the DP, which in turn, led to deterioration in the relationship between the two 
parties. Especially after the 1957 elections, the RPP increased its opposition claiming 
that the DP had weakened the basic principles of the state, namely, secularism. The 
RPP found great support from the bureaucracy and the press. The DP’s response to 
the RPP and the press was adoption of authoritarian methods.172 A commission of 
investigation was formed in the parliament “to look into the subversive activities of 
the opposition parties”173 along with some other measures taken to combat the 
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activities of the press. As has been noted, the members of the DP came from the old 
RPP. Thus, to a certain extent the growing authoritarianism of the DP was a legacy 
of the one party period. As noted by Ilter Turan: 
In analyzing the actions of the DP which in the long run contributed much to 
the failure of the first Turkish experiment with democracy, it has to be 
recognized that both the leaders and the members of the DP had developed 
their familiarity with politics during the single party period. Expressed 
differently, they had been socialized into politics under the RPP rule; and held 
attitudes, beliefs, norms, and orientations which were in harmony with a single 
party than with a competitive party system.174 
 
 Fueled by an increase in inflation, the policies of the DP produced a great 
unrest especially within the state machinery, namely, within the state elites, the 
press, and among the population of the great city centers. As pointed out by Ahmad, 
“by the beginning of 1958 the government had became totally isolated from virtually 
all the institutions of the state. First, it had been the press and the judiciary, followed 
by civil bureaucracy in the 1957 elections, and finally the army and the 
universities.”175 Some demonstrations were organized by the university students, 
which were followed by the declaration of martial law in some cities. This was 
followed by the march of the War College students in 1960. A coalition was at work 
by the end of the 1959 between the press, the University, the military and the RPP. 
The result was the military intervention on May 27, 1960 on behalf of the 
Atatürkism. 
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 It has already been pointed out above that secret organizations within the 
military had begun as early as the RPP period. But by the mid-1950’s there 
developed new groups around the idea of protecting the principles of Atatürkism. 
For instance, in the Istanbul War Academy some officers formed a group which 
included Orhan Erkanlı, one of the influential figures of the military coup of 1960, 
and the group took “Atatürkist Society” as its name because of their opposition to 
the DP’s anti-Atatürkist policies. In Ankara, Talat Aydemir formed another group 
whose mission was defined as guarding the principles of Atatürk, the Republic and 
democracy.176  The military’s dissent was especially on secularism, and the use of 
religion for political purposes.177 Özbudun quotes some interviews with some of the 
military leaders of the Intervention of 1960:  
General Gürsel: “I am convinced that the reforms retrogressed during the 
period now behind us. In fact, this was the greatest evil.” Colonel Türkeş: “The 
Atatürk reforms did not mark the time, they retrogressed. They retrogressed in 
the field of religion, of dress and, most importantly, of mentality.”178 
 
 The leader of the coup formed a committee to take over the function of the 
government called the National Unity Committee, and appointed a commission made 
up of university professors to prepare a report on the situation. The report stated that 
the coup was legal since it was executed against a government which had fallen out 
of law. The report did not see the Grand National Assembly as a true legislative 
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organ.179 In general, after the coup the military bureaucratic elites aimed at creating 
some mechanisms to institutionalize their influential position in the political system. 
For that purpose, they narrowed the space of the political elites in the new set up of 
the state. The new Constitution put some checks on the will of the Parliament. As 
observed by Heper: 
[T]he 1961 Constitution did not allow sole emphasis to be placed on ‘national 
will.’ Not unlike the ‘republican synthesis’ of the French Third Republic, of 
the “constitutional dualism” of the Bismarckian Reich, this Montesquieuist 
“mixed constitution” legitimized the de facto political influence of the 
bureaucratic intelligentsia. Article 4 stipulated that ‘the nation shall exercise its 
sovereignty through the authorized agencies as prescribed by the principles 
laid down in the Constitution.180 
 
 Consequently, a council called the National Security Council made up of the 
military and civilians was created whose mission was defined as informing 
government in security issues, but in practice, it became a mechanism of imposing 
the policy preferences of the military upon the civilians. Another institution limiting 
the power of the parliament was the creation of the Constitutional Court. The 
Constitution also defined the nature of the state. The state was not only republican, 
but was also “national, democratic, secular, and social state”181 and the Atatürkist 
principles were accentuated as the fundamental principles. 
 The Constitution explained the freedom of religion and conscience in the 
Article 19. It stated that the worship and religious rituals were free, unless they were 
contrary to public order and common moral values. The article prohibited to exploit 
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and misuse religion, religious sentiments and the religiously sacred things for the 
political and private purposes and for the purpose to change the social, economic, 
political and legal structure of society according to religious rules. It was also 
mentioned that the parties that broke the law would be closed by the Constitutional 
Court.182  
 After the 1960 military coup, the state elites strengthened their position 
within the state through some legal arrangements. Atatürkism became the 
untouchable prescriptions in the hands of the state elites, and the military took upon 
itself the responsibility of guarding them. Secularism in its maximal understanding 
occupied the top position within the official ideology of Atatürkism. Even the Coup 
of 1960 further accentuated Atatürkism not only in legal-constitutional terms but 
also in the formulation of policies regarding the socio-economic development of the 
country.  As pointed out by Suna Kili: 
The 1961 Constitution, by encompassing the basic principles and by 
embracing the Reform Law, has retained the silent features of Kemalist 
ideology. But it has done more. It has helped to develop the ideology by 
placing it within the context of a very progressive and comprehensive 
philosophy of state as established by the 1961 Constitution, while at the same 
time showing the compatibility of Kemalist principles with the new Turkish 
political, constitutional, and socio-economic developments.183 
 
 Muhsin Batur, a general from the group that gave the 1971 Memorandum to 
the government, properly descried the role that the military began to play and the 
position they sought to legalize within the state machinery after the 1960 Coup, and 
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pointed out how the issue of secularism occupied central position in military’s 
outlook was as following: 
In Turkey there are some issues on which the armed forces are sensitive. We 
can order the most important of them as safeguarding the principles of Atatürk-
especially secularism should not be degenerated and reaction should not be 
awakened- separatism and communism. If the above threats begin to appear 
and the politicians do not take measures to cope with them, the armed forces 
take the task upon itself.184  
 
 The period between 1960 and 1965, which was characterized by various 
coalition governments, was relatively silent regarding the issue of secularism due to 
the military’s strict control over politics and its strong commitment to “a strict 
version of Kemalist secularism.”185 Soon after the transition to competitive politics 
by the mid-1960s the Justice Party, which was the successor of the DP, gained 
majority and began to adopt similar attitudes like the DP towards religion, but  they 
were seriously criticized by Cemal Gürsel, the then president and the head of the 
junta.186 Yet, in this period Demirel maintained its the connections with Nurcus, who 
were religious groups following the ideas of a religious leader, Said Nursi.187  
 Yet, the notable developments in this period took place within the political 
arena, which brought new polarization and new groups including the religious ones 
to the scene. Various leftist groups emerged among the university students and some 
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parts of the laborers, which was followed by the rightists and religious groups. Apart 
from different organizational networks, these groups had political parties. The 
leftists were represented by the Turkish Labor Party (Türkiye İşçi Partisi) under the 
leadership of Mehmet Ali Aybar. The nationalist right organized under the 
Republican Peasants National Party (Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi), later the 
Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi) led by colonel Alparslan 
Türkeş, an influential figure of the 1960 Coup. Finally the religious conservative 
groups formed the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi) under the leadership of 
Necmettin Erbakan.188 When the polarization took the form terror and the street 
violence became widespread among the extreme leftist and the rightist groups the 
military intervened in 1971.  
The rationale behind the Memorandum of 1971 was not different from that of 
the 1960 Coup. The text which was sent to the National Assembly claimed that the 
parliament and the government put the country into chaos, and did not realize the 
reforms proposed by the Constitution. The military saw the formation of a 
government as urgent to stop anarchy, and to enact the reforms proposed by the 
Constitution with an Atatürkian outlook. The government had also to apply the Laws 
of Revolution. Unless these were done, the military would take power directly.189 
After the Memorandum the political role of the military within the system was 
extended. The status of the National Security Council had changed in such a way 
that “the language of the paragraph concerning the council’s powers was 
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strengthened by substituting recommends for submits and dropping the words to 
assist.”190 The National Order Party of Necmettin Erbakan was closed by the 
Constitutional Court in 1972 under the conditions created by the military 
Memorandum.191  
 All in all, the post-1970 presents us a different picture from previous decades, 
because along with the RPP and the Justice Party, which was formed by the old 
Democrats, new parties emerged from the extreme left and extreme right, including a 
religious-oriented one, the National Salvation Party established by Erbakan after the 
National Order Party had been closed down. Moreover, there were different 
outlawed organizations from the extreme right and the extreme left which were 
involved in terrorist activities. The situation in Turkey resembled civil-war leading 
to five thousand murders by the end of 1980. The coalition governments formed 
after the election of 1973 did not manage to solve the crises intensified by economic 
shortcomings.192 Parties were polarized along ideological lines although there was no 
evidence that the electorate was so.193 In a sense, Turkey faced what Frederick W. 
Frey described as the exhaustion of Atatürkism: “One might argue that part of the 
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Consolidation (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 108. Italics are 
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voters are conservative. Üstün Ergüder, “Post-1980 Parties and Politics in Turkey,” 
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current malaise in Turkish political culture is due to the fact that the Kemalist 
paradigm is exhausted, that this is obscurely recognized, and that no successor has 
been accepted.”194 It was under these conditions that the military intervened again in 
the Turkish politics asserting to restore public order and state power, and to 
revitalize Atatürkism. Yet, this time the attitude of the military leaders towards 
religion and Atatürkism underwent significant changes, because the military elites 
were pursuing a new social morality that would function as an antidote for the 
extreme ideologies, which were considered as the outcomes of the erosion of the 
indigenous social and historical values. By incorporating the indigenous social and 
historical values including Islam in the new set up of the social order, the military 
leaders redefined the fundamental concepts which shaped the foundational 
philosophy of the state up to 1980. Unlike the previous elites who conceived of 
modernity as a totality in itself and equated it with Westernization, the military 
leaders of the 1980 Military Intervention tried to reach a new synthesis between the 
local and cosmopolitan values, and emphasized that the indigenous social and 
historical values were indispensable component in attaining modernity. By 
approving the social significance of religion, they gave up the cost-iron theory of 
Islam, or the “secularization thesis,” which conceptualized a reverse relationship 
between modernity and religion. In doing so, they took an important step from 
“maximal secularity” to “mere secularity.” The following chapter analyses the ways 
in which that the military leaders of the 1980 Intervention re-articulated modernity 
and Turkish cultural and historical values including religion.  
                                                 
 
194 Frederick W. Frey, “Patterns of Elite Politics in Turkey,” in Political Elites 
in the Middle East, ed. George Lenczowski (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975), 70. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
THE MILITARY AND ISLAM AFTER THE 1980 MILITARY 
INTERVENTION 
 
 
4.1 The Road to the 1980 Military Intervention and Restructuring the State 
Around Atatürkism 
The principal aim of this chapter is to analyze the way the leaders of the 1980 
Intervention formulated the state-Islam relationship. To put it differently, this 
chapter will focus on the question of what was different in their understanding of the 
role of religion in society from that of the previous military-bureaucratic elites. 
Related to the above question, the chapter also seeks to answer the question why the 
leaders of the 1980 military coup, while placing exceptional emphasis on 
Atatürkism, reformulated the state-Islam relationship granting a greater role to Islam 
in society. In the previous chapter, it was stated that under the chaotic conditions of 
the 1970s, the military leaders reached a conclusion that the Atatürkist ideology, 
which was abstracted from the local and indigenous values, did not perform well 
both in holding society together and in providing the nation with appropriate goals. 
Therefore, while strengthening the legacy of Atatürkism as the best ideology for 
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Turkish society, they tried to enrich its cultural basis by injecting a new morality in 
which the indigenous values and Islamic tenets were validated. Yet this does not 
mean that the state’s dealing with the political side of Islam was softened. Contrary 
to the military leaders’ approach to the social and cultural side of Islam, the state’s 
hold on its political side remained intact; even strengthened. The military’s action in 
this direction was, to a large extent, conditioned by the developments in the 1970s; 
thus, in order to understand the practices of the military leaders at that time, one 
needs to look at the period in question more carefully and at the background of the 
intervention.  
 The developments during the 1970s, as conceived by the military leaders, 
were employed not only as a justification ground for the intervention, but it was also 
these developments that extensively determined the philosophy of intervention, the 
policy formation and application of policy and the whole ground on which the new 
structure of the state was based. Therefore, attention should be paid to the period in 
question in order to understand the post-1980 developments. 
 The most prominent development in the 1970’s was the emergence of rival 
political forces fighting with each other by using para-political means, i.e., terror and 
violence due to the fragmentation of the political system which resulted in the 
erosion of state authority. The roots of these incidents can be traced back to the 
political developments which took place after the mid-1960s. Therefore, the main 
hallmarks of the period in which genuine political differentiation in the Turkish 
political system emerged should be elaborated in detail. 
 After the transition to multi-party politics, new parties were established 
which originated chiefly because of the intra-elite conflicts. For this reason, as far as 
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the basic philosophy of the state was concerned there were no great ideological 
differences. This is especially true when the RPP and the DP are taken into account. 
The differences between these two parties were mainly on non-ideological matters, 
particularly matters related to the role of the state in society, and the place of the 
local forces in the body politic. Generally, the RPP was more centralist in its 
orientation while the DP stressed local initiatives.1 Meanwhile, there was a notable 
difference between the two parties on the interpretation of secularism despite the fact 
that they both shared its main tenets. Since the power of the DP relied heavily on the 
periphery, their understanding of secularism differed from the centralist RPP in such 
a way that the DP adopted a somewhat more liberal outlook, but never aimed at the 
eradication of its basic tenets.2 In short, both parties were nationalist, republican and 
secular.3  
                                                 
1 For an evaluation of the ideological differences and the deterioration of the 
relationships between the RPP and DP, see Ergun Özbudun, “Development of 
Democratic Government in Turkey: Crises, Interruptions, and Reequilibrations,” in 
Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey, ed. Ergun Özbudun (Ankara: Turkish 
Political Science Association, 1998), 16-18. 
 
2 Gencay Şaylan, Türkiye’de Islamcı Siyaset [Islamist Politics in Turkey] 
(Ankara: Verso Yayınları, 1992), 89; C. H. Dodd, The Crisis of Turkish Democracy 
(Walkington, England: The Eothen Press, 1983), 8; Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish 
Experiment in Democracy (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977), 13. 
 
3  As pointed out in the previous chapter, the prominent criticism of the RPP 
against the DP was centered on the claim of the DP’s deviation from Atatürkism, 
especially from the principle of secularism. Ahmad explains the RPP’s accusing the 
DP of being anti-Kemalist with the DP’s counter attacks and the position of the 
Democrats vis-a-vis Atatürkism as follows: “The DP leadership was embarrassed by 
the accusation of anti-Kemalism which was leveled against the party, but knew of no 
way to deal with it adequately since the accusation could never be satisfactorily 
defined. Many Democrats, especially men like Bayar, were able to make as good a 
claim to Kemalism as any Republican. In fact, they claimed that their aim was to 
make Kemalism a living ideology, as it had been before Atatürk died in 1938.” 
Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment, 42; Şaylan, also, makes similar points. For him, 
the difference between the DP and the RPP centered not on their understanding of 
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 Like the RPP, the founders of the DP were also close associates of Atatürk, 
including his last prime minister, Celal Bayar. Due to the specific nature of the 
Turkish political culture as explained in previous chapters, in particular, the 
exclusion of the periphery from the central power block, these little differences had 
been capable of creating deep polarization within society. The RPP generally found 
its supporters among the central bureaucracy, local notables, and the intelligentsia, 
while the social sections which were out of power for decades gave their support to 
the DP. But in general, the genuine ideological differences did not emerge till Bülent 
Ecevit redefined the place of the RPP within the spectrum of Turkish politics as left 
of center by the mid-1960s. By the mid-1960’s Ecevit as the secretary-general of the 
party adopted a left of center position with İnönü, and after the election of Ecevit as 
the leader of the party in the beginning of the 1970s, the RPP became more left 
oriented. Their slogan was “land to tiller and water to the user.”4 By accepting a new 
place for the RPP, the center left and center right of Turkish politics were 
differentiated, and correspondingly, the society was divided along the same lines. 
Another notable development was the emergence of the radical groups from both 
sides of the political spectrum by the end of 1960s. Early in game, namely, at the 
beginning of the 1970s, the relationships between these groups gave dangerous 
signals which also anticipated subsequent developments. One of the claims of the 
                                                                                                                                          
secularism, but on the basis of electorate. The RPP was a party of the central state 
elites while the DP’s social base was made up of the local elements which were 
conservative in their political outlook which was also one of the basic reasons of the 
DP’ liberal attitude toward secularism. Şaylan, Türkiye’de İslamcı Siyaset [Islamist 
Politics in Turkey], 94. 
 
4 Ahmad, The Turkish  Experiment,  255.  
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military leaders of the 1971 Interregnum was to prevent the spilling of the blood of 
brothers.5   
 The socialist leftist movements began by the early 1960s, and with the 
establishment of the Worker’s Party of Turkey on 13 February 1961 by Mehmet Ali 
Aybar; they acquired an official organization. In the same year a new journal called 
Yön, with a philosophy resembling that of the Kadro mentioned in the Third Chapter 
of the present work was begun by some of socialist intellectuals whose prominent 
figure was Doğan Avcıoğlu. Like Kadro, a state-centered developmental program 
aiming at radical reforms in society under the leadership of the leading intelligentsia 
composed of the military, the bureaucracy and free intellectuals marked their basic 
philosophy. These organizations initiated and accelerated the leftist movements in 
Turkey. Correspondingly, similar developments took place in the rightist front. In 
1963, they formed some associations to combat communism under the name of 
Association to Combat Communism (Kömünizimle Mücadele Derneği).6  
 At the beginning, these organizations were legal; they never aimed to impose 
their ideas upon society through the use of violence. However, some new leftist 
organizations with more radical outlooks emerged especially among the university 
students, and gradually the relationships between these two fronts became 
                                                 
 
5 The first article of the letter which was sent to the President of the Republic 
and the Parliament stated that “the Parliament and the government with their views, 
attitudes and policies brought our country into anarchy and war of brothers, and into 
social and economic problems. The prospect to reach the target stated by Atatürk as 
reaching the contemporary civilization was lost in the public, and the reforms 
proposed by the Constitution were not realized. All these developments led the 
future of the Republic of Turkey to face the serious dangers.” Muhsin Batur, Anılar 
ve Görüşler: Üç Dönemin Perde Arkası [Memoirs and Views: The Hiddenground of 
Three Periods] (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1985), 300.       
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antagonized, and took the form of a physical struggle. The rightist groups were 
organized around the Idealist Houses (Ülkü Ocakları) which had unofficial contacts 
with the National Action Party, a party which was founded by Alparslan Türkeş, one 
of the influential figures of the 1960 military intervention and the leader of the 
nationalist groups in Turkey. The polarization of society was accompanied by the 
polarization of the state, namely, the bureaucracy including such strategic 
institutions as the police and the educational institutions. The coalition governments 
which were established after the elections of 1973 were not able to prevent these 
chaotic developments because the relationship between the major parties, i.e., the 
Justice Party of Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit’s Republican People’s Party, 
had deteriorated due to the pressure of this extremist members as well as the 
personal rivalry between Demirel and Ecevit. Not unlike society, Parliament was 
also polarized, and it lost its ability to cope with developments, despite its potential 
to resolve the conflicts. No consensus was possible even on the most fundamental 
issues concerning the vital interests of the country. Each party accused the others of 
being involved in outlawed activities and of supporting extremist groups. These 
accusations may have been partially true, for it was possible that some local units of 
political parties could have been involved in such activities.7 The situation by the 
end of the 1970’s reached very closely the point that Huntington described as a 
praetorian society. For Huntington these societies are characterized by the following 
traits: 
                                                                                                                                          
6 Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment, 218-219. 
 
7 For details of the polarization of the Turkish political system and its principal 
consequences, see Özbudun, “Development of Democratic Government in Turkey,” 
20-25; Dodd, The Crisis of Turkish Democracy. Especially Chapter II. 
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All sorts of social forces and groups become directly engaged in general 
politics. Countries which have political armies also have political clergies, 
political universities, political bureaucracies, political labor unions, and 
political corporations. Society as a whole is out-of-joint, not just the military. 
All these specialized groups tend to became involved in politics dealing with 
general political issues: not just issues which affect their own particular 
interest of groups, but issues which affect society as a whole.8 
 
 Political assassinations became a daily routine phenomenon reaching 
approximately 15 people a day by the end of 1980 including well known journalists, 
university professors, and one of the former prime ministers, Nihat Erim. As noted 
by Feroz Ahmad “by 1980, the political climate in Turkey had deteriorated to such a 
point that people were actually grateful to the generals when they took over.”9 
 It has already been pointed out that the most prominent result of these 
developments was the erosion of state authority, which was also conceived by the 
generals of the military coup as the most dangerous development. This point was 
stated not only in the first statement of the Intervention but also in the Warning 
Letter of the Turkish Armed Forces which was given to the President in December 
1979.10 The second paragraph of the First Statement of Kenan Evren made on 
September 12, 1980 as a declaration of the Intervention announced:  
The state with its prominent organs was put in a position that was unable to 
function. The Constitutional institutions were either in inconsistent position or 
silent. The political parties neither provided the unity and cooperation nor took 
necessary measures to save the state from existing situation due to their petty 
                                                 
 
8 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, 
London: Yale University Press, 1968), 194.  
 
9 Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey (London, New York: 
Routledge, 1993), 13.  
 
10 For the Warning Letter of the Turkish Armed Forces see, Kenan Evren, 
Kenan Evren’in Anıları [Memoirs of Kenan Evren], vol. I (Istanbul: Milliyet 
Yayınları, 1990), 331-332.  
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struggles and uncompromising attitudes. So, the separatist and violent groups 
intensified their activities as much as they could, and the life of citizens fell 
into danger.11  
 
 Another notable consequence of the period in question was the intensification 
of the fears of the military elites that the unity and integrity of the nation had fallen 
in danger. As has been elaborated in the previous chapter, the unity and integrity of 
the nation was the most significant notions rooted in the deep subconscious of the 
Turkish state elites. It is well known that the Republic was established after a great 
war which resulted in losing a great empire. It seems that this experience shaped, to a 
great extent, the mentality of the state elites. As noted by Şerif Mardin: 
Between 1920 and 1923, the fear that Anatolia would be split on primordial 
group lines ran as a strong undercurrent among the architects of Kemalism 
trying to establish their own center, and it remained as a fundamental-although 
often latent-issue of Kemalist Policy to the end of one party rule in 1950.12 
 
 The fear did not cease by the transition to multi-party politics, at least at level 
of the state elites, and remained a sensitive issue directing the military’s concern 
with politics. As pointed out in the preceding chapter, the Republican elites, relying 
on the solidarist notion of the populist principle, conceptualized society as a classless 
entity based on interdependence of the occupational groups, and this understanding 
of society became one of the principles of Atatürk-halkçılık.13 The conceptualization 
                                                 
 
11 Kenan Evren, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Başkanı Orgeneral Kenan 
Evren’in Söylev ve Demeçleri: 12 Eylül 1980-12 Eylül 1981 [The Speeches and 
Statements of the President of the Turkish Republic Kenan Evren: 12 September 
1980-12 September 1981] (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1981), 17. 
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of society as an harmonious entity was regarded by the military as the ideal form, 
and they have has always been suspicious of any kind of division of this social 
fabric.14 But, what was happening in the 1970s was contrary to the ideals of the 
military, because the divisions within society went beyond the tolerable point that 
the military conceived, i.e., beyond the functional cleavage based on the clashing 
interests of different social sections. During the 1980s sectarian, ethnic and separatist 
movements were dominating the agenda of Turkey. The sectarian conflicts turned 
into bloody fights in the provinces of Maraş, Çorum and Sivas, which were sensitive 
provinces in terms of sectarian differences, through the agitation of distinct sects by 
the leftist and the rightist groups by the second half of the 1970s.  
 All of these developments largely influenced, or in more assertive terms 
determined, the philosophy and the policies of the Intervention. The military elites 
placed the whole responsibility upon the relatively liberal constitution of 1961 which 
according to the generals of the coup, defined the rights of individuals but not those 
of the state.  
Consequently, the military leaders took as their primary target to reinstall the 
authority of the state, and a new ethics by which the Turkish youth would be 
provided with new norms and values preventing them from the traps of the so-called 
deviant ideologies. A new cultural policy was adopted by the military elites after the 
intervention which aimed at the fulfillment of the above ends. In this new approach, 
                                                                                                                                          
13 For a detailed elaboration of populism (halkçılık) in Kemalist 
weltanschauung and its critics see, Levent Köker, Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve 
Demokrasi [Modernization, Kemalism and Democracy] (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 
1993), 136-177. 
 
14 Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey (Walkington, England: The 
Eothen Press, 1985), 149. 
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the understanding of some fundamental concepts and issues defining the parameters 
of the state and the whole policy orientation of the nation, such as modernity, 
Westernization, statism, and secularism underwent significant changes, and the role 
of religion in society was redefined in a way which started a new chapter in the state-
religion relationship in Turkish history. If all the policies of the generals are taken 
into consideration, it becomes clear that the military elites recognized the weakness 
of the ethical bases of Atatürkism as it was operating after the death of Atatürk, and 
they tried to inject a new morality based on the attempt of the mutual legitimation of 
both the societal role of religion and the secular state. On the one hand, religion was 
given a notable role in defining the new values of the nation and was taken as one of 
the components of national identity; on the other, the belief in the old understanding 
of the secular state was maintained. The secular state was regarded as the best and 
most appropriate solution. It must be noted that such an understanding of religion 
can not be explained by relying on the claim of some secular leftist intellectuals that 
the military leaders of the 1980 intervention were enemies of secularism, and are 
responsible for the revival of Islamic movements in Turkey.15 Nor can their attitude 
towards religion totally be explained by their pragmatism and instrumentalism, 
namely, by the claim that the adopted policies originated from the practical 
considerations of the generals to find a viable source of values for the problem of 
national unity and integration. Undoubtedly, this was one of the principal 
considerations of the military elites, but it can not be taken as simple pragmatism and 
instrumentalism. The whole picture can be seen when the military’s move in this 
                                                 
15 See, for instance, Çetin Yetkin, 12 Eylül’de Irtica Niçin ve Nasıl Gelişti 
[How and Why did Reaction Develop After 12 September] (Ankara: Ümit 
Yayıncılık, 1994) 
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direction is considered as an endeavor of not only taking worthy aspects of religion, 
but also finding out a durable source of a social morality which in turn resulted in 
official recognition of religious values. In other words, whatever drives were behind 
the adopted policy, their consequences turned out to be important regarding state-
Islam relationship in Turkey. The old theory, namely, the cast-iron theory of Islam 
was partially abandoned, and the role of religion in the life of society and the 
individual was accepted. The old understanding of religion which was 
conceptualized as an extremely private matter pave the way to a new one accepting 
the public role and function of religion.  
 The legitimization of religion at the state level was done through various 
means. Firstly, it was done at the discursive level of the statesman. A new rhetoric 
was adopted by the leaders of the Intervention articulating religious notions to the 
public in political language and discussing issues through the discourse of “our 
religion.” As noted by Ilter Turan, the statesmen’s talk about “our religion” is a tacit 
way of the identifying the Islamic dimension of political community,16 and it has 
been one of the indicators of the decrease in the gap between the state and Islam in 
Turkey. Besides, the official ideology was legitimized through religious means. This 
included the strategies of the military leaders which were designed to decrease the 
gap between Islam and Atatürkism, the official ideology, and Atatürk himself as well 
by means of religious arguments. Sometimes it took the form of showing how 
Mustafa Kemal was a religiously devoted man, and sometimes religion was used to 
justify secularism by giving examples from the verses of the Quran and events from 
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history demonstrating that Islam and secularism did not necessarily contradict each 
other.   
 Secondly, at the cultural policy level religion was given some cultural 
functions. The public policy preferences of the military leaders in education included 
introducing compulsory religious courses in primary and secondary schools. 
Moreover, the accentuation of the religious aspects of the republican leaders was 
also a way of the legitimation of the official ideology through the religious means.  
  Thirdly, the official ideology was further legitimized by emphasizing the 
religious aspects of the republican leaders.  
 
4.2 The Articulation of Religious Rhetoric to the Official Political Discourse 
As has already been pointed out, one of the most important compromises between 
Islam and the state was the incorporation of religious discourse into the official 
language. Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu observed that in a political environment in which 
the state-Islam relationship underwent radical changes, “official discourse articulated 
and tolerated Islamic elements in the public-political realm that had, until that point, 
been under the monopoly of secular standards and criteria.”17 At the discursive level, 
this articulation appeared in the speeches given by the leader of the National Security 
Council established after the intervention. The Council whose members included the 
Chief of the General Staff, the head of Land, Air, and Navy forces and the 
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Gendarmarie enjoyed strong executive powers. In general, the head of the Council, 
Kenan Evren, who was also the Chief of the General Staff, acted as a spokesman of 
the intervention and the military, and delivered many speeches to inform the people 
about the reasons and philosophy of the intervention. Early in the game, on 
September 30, 1980 Evren delivered a speech in Van which was also his first speech 
given directly to a live audience. In this speech, he explained the reasons for the 
Intervention in which some clarifications on secularism were included. A long 
passage taken below gives us an insightful picture of the views of the military 
leaders on politics and secularism in Turkey. For Evren, the military intervened 
because: 
We [the Turkish nation] misunderstood democracy and the political parties 
which are the indispensable establishments according to our Constitution. As 
being member of a certain party, we began to see the members of other parties 
as enemies. The sons of this country were divided into different numbers of 
existing parties. No group was sharing the places (kahve) of others. Marriage 
between them was ceased. Even the fathers and sons of the same family began 
to see themselves as enemies, and became offended.  
Democracy is not this. Naturally, the external forces found the opportunity, 
and washed the brains of our sons, and gave guns to them. They began to kill 
each other. In every day twenty or thirty men were losing their lives in vain.... 
After this, they [the politicians] began to exploit religion. They began to 
misrepresent secularism. They announced that secularism was irreligion. They 
indoctrinated this idea into the citizens. My dear citizens, secularism is not 
irreligion. Up to now, who intervened into the beliefs of a citizen? Whose 
worship was interrupted? Which mosque’s building was prohibited? But, they 
exploited all of these issues in order to get just a few more votes. They said 
that religion was lost [din elden gidiyor]. No one can be a genuine Muslim 
only by praying, fasting and going on a pilgrimage to Mecca in a deceptive 
manner. Let your heart be pure. What the essential is is the purity of heart. 
I am a son of a hodja. I know well what religion is all about. Look, my dear 
citizens. They were those, on the one side, who put the people into tug-of-war 
between each other, and on the other side, who exploited religion for the 
political purposes, that brought the country into this situation.18  
                                                 
18 Kenan Evren, Kenan Evren’in Anıları [Memoirs of Kenan Evren], vol. II 
(Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1991), 84-85.  
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 On the same day, Evren went to Kars and made a similar speech. He added 
that the military were not against religion, but they were against its political use and 
obscurantism. In the military any kind of worship was free, and suitable conditions 
were provided for those who wanted to worship.19 
 Evren’s religious rhetoric does not seem to be an arbitrary tactic, rather it was 
a carefully chosen strategy to incorporate religion into the new design of the state 
and politics. It was this rhetoric which anticipated the military’s subsequent attitudes 
towards religion. Therefore, Evren did not restrict his resort to religious discourse to 
just one subject, i.e. to show that secularism was not irreligion. He used religious 
arguments extensively on different issues ranging from dress and birth control to the 
emergence of the religious sects in Islamic history. Some arguments were used to 
justify the ongoing policies of the state. For instance, on the veiling issue, which is 
still a hot issue in Turkish society, Evren quoted some verses from the Quran, and 
interpreted them in such a way that the veil is not an order of God, but just an advice 
for women.20  
 Since Evren was the spokesman of both the military and the military 
government, his understanding of religion and his interpretation of Atatürkism 
should be considered within the general framework of the military rule. It has 
                                                 
 
19Ibid.,  89. 
 
20 Evren quoted the Quranic verses mostly in his speeches given in different 
cities. For instance, for the Latin Script and the Turkish translation of the Holy 
Quran see, Kenan Evren, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Başkanı Orgeneral Kenan 
Evren’in Söylev ve Demeçleri: 9 Kasım 198 -9 Kasım 1985 [The Speeches and 
Statements of the President of the Turkish Republic Kenan Evren: 9 November 198-
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already been pointed out that due to the developments prior to September 12, 1980, 
the military government had decided to develop a new social ethics, and impose it 
upon society. As will be elaborated below in detail, in this project, two critical 
components of Turkish society, namely Atatürkism and Islam, were redefined, and 
to a certain extent, they were conglomerated. The content of Atatürkism, the official 
ideology, was filled with a new meaning whose basic premises were derived from 
modern science and technology. In other words, as in its original form, which was a 
positivistic outlook, or weltanschauung based on reason and modern science, 
Atatürkism was redefined on the basis of modern science and technology. These two 
concepts became the central references of new ideology; in other words, the 
foundation stones of the new weltanschauung. Accordingly, the post-Atatürkian 
conception of Atatürkism as “western orientation of everything” was turned into a 
new conception as “the rational and scientific orientation of everything.” This new 
conception paved the way to a new understanding of morality which infiltrated 
native social and historical values. Thus, as a spokesman of the military and military 
government, the way Evren viewed Islam and secularism could be better understood 
if it is considered together with the general project of the military government.  
 If the whole of Evren’s opinions are taken into account, it becomes clear that 
in political terms Evren maintained the classical view of secularism which had also 
been adopted by the state elites in the republican era; Furthermore, he regarded Islam 
as a necessary and useful component in regulating the moral sphere of the individual 
and society, a view which was radically different from that of the previous state 
elites. This is the most important point to understand both the policies of the military 
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government established after the Intervention of 1980 and the changes in the state-
Islam relationship. As has already been noted, there was a marked shift in the state’s 
approach to Islam. In the classical view, secularism meant the separation of religion 
from state affairs, and the state’s involvement in regulating religion. As has already 
been explained in the Third Chapter, this view of secularism treats religion as an 
extremely personal phenomenon, and denies any of its public expression and 
political connotation. By sharing the view of strict separation of religion and the 
state, Evren saw in this view nothing contradicting true Islam because for him, Islam 
does not deny adapting to the conditions in which man lives and assimilating 
novelty. In other words, what he was against was not the cultural proliferation of 
Islam, but the politicization of Islam, or the so-called “political Islam”. Thus, many 
times, he criticized different religious communities for being involved in harmful 
activities to the harmonious unity of the Turkish nation and for the political use of 
religion, for it was not only against the Constitution, but also aroused the passions of 
the repressed reactionary groups looking for an opportunity to come to the surface. 
In the past, this kind of political use of religion had gained some concessions from 
the legacy of Atatürk which had proved dangerous for Turkey.21  
 Evren’s view on religion can fully be grasped if his answer to the classical 
problem that the state elites had faced since the establishment of republic is carefully 
elaborated. In simple terms, the problem can be stated as follows. The primary task 
of the state is to keep Islam out of politics. How can this task be accomplished in 
such a way that religion is partially recognized? If there is a need for partial 
                                                                                                                                          
of the women’s veil see, Evren, Anılar [Memoirs], vol. II, 483-484. 
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recognition of Islam, either cultural or social, how could its political effects be 
avoided? A large part of Evren’s understanding of Islam and secularism consists of 
his endeavor to overcome the above problems. In fact, on the surface, it may seem 
that Evren’s approach to Islam is contradictory. On the one hand, he was alarming 
people about the perils of politically activated Islam, while he was also emphasizing 
its ethical importance. The center of this problem was that no appropriate answer had 
been given to the question of “to what extent ethics and politics are independent 
from each other.” The same contradictions can also be seen into the attitudes of the 
military rule, in general, established after the intervention. But a careful elaboration 
of the matter reveals that these contradictions are neither divergent nor independent 
from those of the early republican elites.  
It can be argued that the origins of this problem could be found in one of the 
fundamental assumptions of the republican philosophy. According to this 
assumption, politics and religion constitute two different domains, and have no 
relations with each other. The Western model of state-church separation was 
generalized to religion-politics separation in Turkey which in turn produced some 
unresolved tensions between politics and Islam. Implicitly, this assumption also 
presupposes the separation of politics and ethics in their philosophical senses. On the 
basis of the above assumption, no direct political expression of religion was 
permitted even at the interest level. As a result, the early republican synthesis of the 
state and Islam, or politics and Islam in general, was marked by the state’s policies 
of narrowing the domain occupied by Islam both in society and in the consciousness 
of men in order to open a space for modernizing reforms. As explained in the Third 
                                                                                                                                          
21 Kenan Evren, Kenan Evren’in Anıları [Memoirs of Kenan Evren], vol. I 
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Chapter, this was the prominent reason behind the fact that the establishment of the 
republic was followed by a series of reforms which resulted in the complete 
disestablishment of Islam from the institutional and political domains. To the extent 
that the legitimacy of the public representation of Islam was recognized, it could be 
subjected to reform according to Atatürk’s conceptualization of Islam whose 
characteristics involve both being “rational” and “modern”. Yet, the initiated reforms 
were not terminated, for Atatürk noticed the potential implications of reform in 
religion, and it would have produced undesired consequences.22 He said that he did 
not want to be a Luther. Consequently, the issue in a certain way remained 
ambiguous.23   
                                                                                                                                          
(Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1990),  89. 
 
22 Celal Bayar, who one of the founders of the Democrat Party and who was 
also a close friend of Atatürk and his last prime minister, explained the reasons of 
their permission for the Turkish call to prayer by relating it to Atatürk’s aim. His 
explanation also gives us important clues to understand Atatürk’s way of tackling the 
issues. He said, “Atatürk was a careful man and a man of principles. He was a man 
who would pass into law at the expense of any costs those issues on which he had 
reached certain conclusions, and never gave up pursuing them until they were 
succeeded. On the other hand, he sometimes used to make some experiments for his 
uncertain ideas. His works on history and language and the change of the call to 
prayer to Turkish were made for experimental purposes... The change of the call to 
prayer was a part of Atatürk’s general project of religious reform... But, Atatürk 
abandoned to realize his intention, because he did not reconcile his view of the 
secular state and his intention to reform Islam. The inclusion of the Arabic call to 
prayer to the Penal Code was an action of government, not the action of Atatürk.” 
Quoted in Nazlı Ilıcak, Onbeş Yıl Sonra 27 Mayıs Yargılanıyor [27 May on Trial 
after Fifteen Years Later], vol. I (Istanbul: Kervan Yayınları, 1975), 201-202.  
 
 
23 Ahmet Hamdi Başar narrated an anecdote about Atatürk’s visits to various 
provinces of Turkey which took place in 1930 after the closing of the Free Party. 
The aim of these visits was to detect the reasons of discontent against the RPP. 
During these visits, Atatürk mentioned the necessity to develop some principles as 
the basis of the RPP program. As a result, the famous six principles were developed. 
But Başar had some doubts whether the top leaders of the RPP understood these 
principles as they were understood by Atatürk. The first principle was republicanism, 
 195 
 By taking only the reformist aspect of Atatürk as their guide in policy 
formation and implementation, the radical secularist post-Atatürkian state elites 
expected to solve the contradictions by resorting to suppression policies against 
Islam on both sides. The multi-party period witnessed a tug of war between political 
elites who tried partially to incorporate religious tenets into the polity, on the one 
hand, and the state elites, on the other, who were proponents of the ongoing situation 
and in a position to impose their preferences upon the Turkish polity. In all cases the 
problem remained unresolved because it was considered that any recognition of 
Islam, whether it be cultural, public or political, meant a qualified concession from 
the legacy of Atatürk, and the principles of Atatürkism. Briefly, no satisfactory 
answer was given at the state level to the question of what kind of political costs or 
risks were involved in cultural recognition of Islam with regards to the official 
ideology and the state. 
                                                                                                                                          
and it was clear enough since the sovereignty was taken from the hands of the sultan 
and it was delegated to the nation. Populism was democracy and needed no 
explanation. The principle of nationalism was also clear because the nation was 
considered as the sole constitutive element of political community. Başar notes that 
two principles were hotly debated. These were statism and laicism or secularism. On 
the principle of secularism, the most emphasized view was that secularism could not 
be interpreted as irreligiousity. But Başar says that he made a speech which had 
made a distinction between Christianity and Islam in regards to secularism, and 
stated that in Islam it was not possible to separate the world and religion, since it 
would cause irreligiousity. What had to be done was to liberate worldly affairs from 
the hold the religious clergy which had been developed due to deterioration of true 
Islam. Some members raised strong criticism against Başar. When the discussion 
shifted to the problem whether it was possible to separate religion and the state in 
Islam since they were closely interrelated, Başar said that, Atatürk intervened at the 
crux and cut the discussion saying that, “the issue was clarified enough. Let’s discuss 
another subject.” He also points out how the issue was put into an ambiguous 
situation, and bore with it a potential to be developed into irreligiousity. Ahmet 
Hamdi Başar, Atatürk’le Üç Ay ve 1930’dan Sonra Türkiye [Three Months with 
Atatürk and Turkey after 1930] (Istanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1945), 45-53.  
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 The most prominent result of the above formulation in terms of the state-
Islam relationship has been that recognition of Islam, with any of its aspects, might 
produce high political costs regarding the secular nature of the state. If the decisive 
attitude of Evren and the military leaders towards Islam is taken into account, it 
becomes meaningful here to ask, against this background, how Evren and his 
collaborators tried to overcome the above problem. It seems that Evren’s positive 
attitude towards Islam in cultural terms stemmed from two important factors. The 
first one was his strong belief in that, after a long period, Atatürk’s reforms were so 
deeply rooted in society that no group would be successful in removing them from 
the life of the nation. The people would not permit the removal of the established 
order and the setting up of a new one. His strong belief in the firmly established 
character of Atatürkism in particular and the existing order in general caused Evren 
not only to adopt an affirmative attitude towards religion, but also to evaluate the 
religious revival in Turkey differently. Unlike the advocates of extreme secularism 
who are prone to see the legacy of Atatürkism as involved in a continuous challenge 
stemming from various religious groups, Evren perceives the religious revival in 
Turkey as having no serious threat to either the secular nature of the state or 
Atatürkism. According to Evren, since the period of Atatürk, although there had 
always been a religiously oriented group who could not internalize secularism, they 
were just a minority, and the evolution of Turkish political life had reached the point 
that people would permit no compromise on any of the principles of Atatürk. A firm 
evidence of this fact is that the political parties previously established on a religious 
basis in Turkey faced little approval by the people, rather various frustrations.24 
                                                 
 
 197 
 The second factor in adopting a more positive approach to Islam was the way 
that Evren had conceptualized it. Following Atatürk’s understanding, Evren 
emphasized the “rational” and “modern” features of Islam, and in these features he 
saw the potential to adapt to modern conditions. Evren’s insistence on the priority of 
human practice over religious prescriptions led him to develop what could be called 
a “historicist approach” towards religion. As a religious intellectual trend in 
contemporary Islam, the historicist view was grounded on the assumption that the 
rules of the religious jurisdiction are contingent, namely, the product of some 
specific socio-historical conditions, and needed to be revised on the basis of new 
conditions. In other words, a change in any of these conditions necessitates new 
interpretation of the sources of the jurisdiction. In this understanding, the 
methodology of the interpretation of religious laws undergoes a substantial change 
on the basis of the actual conditions of human experience. The old religious 
judgments are subject to amelioration according to the actual conditions of life. 
Although this view has not been alien to the orthodox view of religious jurisdiction, 
it is radical in its treatment of tradition. The tradition is subjected to an intensive 
                                                                                                                                          
24 Evren made these points in an answer given for an Indian journal. Evren said 
the following; “first of all it must be said that one of the principles which guide 
Turkey is secularism. As a principle set by Atatürk, secularism was accepted by the 
Turkish nation, and it is an indispensable foundation of Turkish law and social 
system... But, in Turkey there has always been a minor group since the period of 
Atatürk who could not internalize secularism.... The acts against the state system 
defined in the constitution and secularism are forbidden. But the essential obstacle to 
such religious fundamentalist currents is the commitment of Turkish people to 
Atatürk’s main philosophy and secularism. These “uncontemporary” (çağdışı) 
currents are being defeated by various means. The frustration of the religiously 
oriented parties in previously held elections is the best indicator of the above fact.” 
Kenan Evren, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Başkanı Orgeneral Kenan Evren’in 
Söylev ve Demeçleri: 1988-1989 [The Speeches and Statements of the President of 
the Turkish Republic Kenan Evren: 1988-1989] (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 
1989), 38.       
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criticism which leads to a total denial of the validity of the accumulated historical 
precepts. This is a novel element. In this approach a substantial autonomy is given to 
reason in interpreting the religious precepts and directing worldly affairs. The 
existing orthodoxy does not represent the true Islam, and the historical knowledge 
feeding this orthodoxy is temporal. There is only one ahistorical source of valid 
knowledge and it is the Holy Quran. The rational individual has the capacity to 
interpret the Holy Book.25  
 Conceptualizing Evren’s religious view as historicist is not to say that Evren 
had a definite philosophical ground to base his understanding of religion. Nor, does 
it mean that he had an intention to find an ultimate solution to the problem of the 
state-Islam relationship in Turkey. What should be understood from the above 
explanations is that Evren shared some important tenets with regards to religion 
which could be conceptualized as historicist, and gave us important clues to 
understand changing policies of the state towards religion. 
 Evren’s historicist approach appears most openly in his evaluation of the veil 
in Islam. He was against the veil in state institutions. When Hasan Sağlam, the then 
Minister of Education, asked Evren what he should do for the head cover in Imam-
hatip schools, Evren replied that nothing could be said in the Quran lessons, but, in 
other lessons and in the schools no permission for head cover was possible.26 
                                                                                                                                          
 
25 The most prominent figure of the historicist approach in Islam is Fazlur 
Rahman (1919-1988) who is popular among the Faculty of Divinity of Ankara 
University circles. The historicist approach which includes important modernist 
themes, finds its clearest expression in Rahman’s writings. For the historicist 
approach and Fazlur Rahman see, İslami Araştırmalar Fazlur Rahman Özel Sayısı 
[Journal of Islamic Research: Special Issue on Fazlur Rahman], 4 (1990): 
 
26 Evren, Anılar [Memoirs], vol. II, 479. 
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Although in various occasions Evren remarked that the head cover was banned 
because there was a law prohibiting it together with some other dress like short 
skirts, his endeavor to present the issue as a matter originating not from the true 
Islamic creed, but from the wrong interpretation of verses shows that he had a 
special interest in it. In the clarification of the matter, Evren pointed out that there 
was no clear order in the Holy Book to cover the head, but only some 
recommendations of God. He added that the origins of the veil went back to the early 
period of Islam. In the early years of Islam, unbelievers were disturbing Muslim 
women, and wearing the veil was begun as an instrument to prevent them from the 
undesired harassment of the unbelievers. Today, in a civilized world, it was 
unnecessary since there was not such a need. The transformation of this 
recommendation into God’s orders took place after the Prophet in the hands of the 
different religious sects who misinterpreted the verses. If the time dimension was not 
taken into account, it was possible that we would deduce some wrong conclusions 
from the verses. For example, in various verses, we find some encouragement to 
emancipate slaves. If these verses were taken as God’s orders, everybody needed to 
have slaves. Today this was not possible because the conditions were different.27  
 The accent on the “rational” nature of Islam is the complementary part of 
Evren’s general view of religion. Evren claims; 
Our religion is the last religion. Since it is the last religion, it is the most 
rational religion. It is a religion that esteems knowledge and science. But, we 
see that in the past some religious groups squeezed us into solid rules of 
religion, and taught us nothing. That’s why we remained backward in some 
areas. Our religion never restricts reading and writing. On the contrary, it asks 
that how can a learned and an ignorant be equal?28  
                                                 
 
27 Evren, Anılar [ Memoirs], vol. V, 482-485. 
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 The emphasis on the rational character of Islam is also an appropriate tool for 
the purpose of employing Islam in regulating the socio-cultural realm. Relying on 
this assumption, Evren, in particular, and the military rule, in general, hoped that the 
unacceptable religious views and visibility of Islam posed by different religious 
communities, such as the head cover, the role of women in society and the demands 
for the institutionalization of religious laws, could be rejected as the leftovers of a 
“corrupt tradition.” Since modernity was redefined on the basis of modern science 
and technology, no opposition would appear between Islam and modernity, which 
will be further clarified below..  
 If Evren’s actions are taken into account as a whole, it becomes clear that 
Evren was acting in a radically different way from that of the previous state elites in 
regards to secularism and Islam. The state elites of the post-Atatürkian period, as 
was stated before, adopted the cast iron theory of Islam which was based on the 
assumption that there was a built in contradiction between Islam and modernity. 
Consequently, they imagined a political community whose symbolic universe was 
made up of secular elements, and none of the religiously-inspired component was 
accepted as a legitimate ingredient for this community. The reforms of Atatürk were 
radicalized to an extent that even an “enlightened religion”, which seemed to be an 
ideal of Atatürk, would have not been accepted as a constituent element of the 
nation. However, by the military intervention of 1980, Islam was begun to be taken 
as a legitimate source of Turkish historical and cultural values, and an indispensable 
                                                                                                                                          
28 Evren, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Başkanı Orgeneral Kenan Evren’in 
Söylev ve Demeçleri: 1985-1986 [The Speeches and Statements of the President of 
the Turkish Republic Kenan Evren: 1985-1986] (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 
1986), 221. 
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part of the national identity. It was the departure of the military rule from the 
previous tradition that caused extensive criticism originating from circles of the 
radical Atatürkists. Considerable criticism was directed to Evren and the military 
rule accusing them of departing from Atatürkism. The intensity of the criticism also 
demonstrated that under the military rule the interpretation of Atatürkism underwent 
significant changes in comparison to the pre-1980 official and secularists’ 
understandings. In fact, no move could be possible without reinterpretation of 
Atatürkism in a different vein because in the established tradition, Islam and 
Atatürkism were mutually exclusive. The military posed a new Atatürkism by 
resorting to its primordial understanding, i.e., Atatürkism which was at work in the 
time of Atatürk was a modernizing framework based on reason and modern science 
and a unifying cement and an antidote to other hard ideologies from right and the 
left. The radical westernizing content of Atatürkism, namely, Atatürkism which 
takes what is Western as ideal was modified, and technological and scientific aspects 
of Westernization became definite references of the new project of modernity 
divorcing the concept from its earlier normative aspects.29 In this re-elaboration the 
relationship between Atatürkism and Islam were reinstalled, and to a certain extent 
they were conglomerated.30 Therefore, it is very important for this study to analyze 
                                                 
 
29 Kemal Karpat, “Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey 
Before and After 1980,” in State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s, 
ed. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 156.  
 
30 Although it will further be clarified below, here it is necessary to mention 
the attempts of the military leaders of the 1980 Intervention at clarifying what was 
meant by Atatürkism. Among other endeavors in this regard, the most important one 
was publishing three books on Atatürkism under the same name, Atatürkçülük. 
These are the first hand sources on the official understanding of Atatürkism. 
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how the military leaders defined Atatürkism and what place was given to Islam in 
this new definition. 
 
4.3 Atatürkism and Islam: Toward a Conglomeration 
In the preceding chapter the evolution of Atatürkism was analyzed in detail with the 
changes in its meaning at different periods. It was pointed out that after Atatürk, 
Atatürkism was filled with some prescriptive meanings and was transformed into an 
official ideology closely setting the parameters of all policy issues. By the multi-
party period the military bureaucratic elites moved to a position of defending this 
ideology vis-a-visthe political elites, and the subsequent military interventions aimed 
at reinstalling Atatürkism in the way that they defined it. By radicalizing the 
reformist legacy of Atatürk, the post-Atatürkian state elites attributed to Atatürkism 
a radical secularizing and westernizing mission which in turn, resulted in a kind of 
radical modernization project, whose conception of modernity necessitated a total 
divorce from what was “old” and indigenous for “the contemporary civilization.” 
Instead of science and reason, which were Atatürk’s ideals to be used in the life of 
the nation, the bureaucratized version of Atatürkism became the self-referential 
normative doctrine and the sole legitimate ground of policy formation and 
implementation. Unlike the scientific methodology based on “trial and error” 
approach in problem solving, which also sometimes includes backward moves from 
an action, they turned official interpretation of Atatürkism into an end-in-itself. A 
solid and extremely occidentally inspired framework of the “requirements of the 
contemporary civilization” was substituted for a pragmatic and rationalistic 
conception of Atatürkism. The principle of reformism, which meant further 
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improving the republican reforms along the line of science and technology, was 
transformed into revolutionism whose main tenet was to destroy more what was 
traditional and religious on behalf of Westernization. It became the only normative 
framework from which any legitimate action had to be derived. Furthermore, the 
military and bureaucratic elites justified their actions on behalf of Atatürkism, and no 
policy inspired from a different source was accepted as legitimate. When the concept 
of religion was concerned, their motto was that “science was the true guide in life” 
and there remained no room for religion in society. For instance, the belief that 
“becoming the true and the sole guide in life for science is only possible in a secular 
condition”31 reflects this understanding.  Religion was specifically a “non-modern” 
phenomenon best to be excluded from society. The only acceptable point for religion 
on the part of the post-Atatürkian state elites was at the private level. It was accepted 
as private devotion. But, by the 12 September, one came across a substantive change 
in the state’s approach to Atatürkism and religion. The most radical change was the 
social acceptance of religion. The military leaders perceived the significance of 
religion in society, and changed the old maxim of the previous elites stating that 
“religion was specifically a non-modern phenomenon” into a new one announcing 
that “religion was a necessary institution.”32 The military leaders of 12 September 
                                                 
 
31 Özer Özankaya, Toplumbilimine Giriş [Introduction to Sociology] (Ankara: 
S Basımevi, 1984), 428. Özer Özankaya presens Atatürkism as a systematic 
ideology, and understands religion through an evolutionary perspective. For him, 
science and religion are exclusive phenomena and an increase in one necessarily 
results in decrease in the other. See, idem., 359-369.  
 
32 It has been pointed out that like the previous military interventions, one of 
the chief aims of the military intervention of 1980 was to reinstall the state on the 
principles of Atatürkism. In fact, the accent on Atatürkism was greater than the 
previous interventions. It was also intensified by activities held for the centennial of 
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declared that religion was a social reality and a necessary institution. This is the 
demarcation line of the conception of religion of the 12th of September’s military 
leaders and that of their previous counterparts. The leaders of the military 
intervention of 1980 realized that neither science nor an abstract concept of 
“Westernization” could become a good substitute for Islam in terms of social ethics. 
So far, for the military leaders, what was produced by the adopted policies had not 
been a set of norms and values suitable for the institutionalization of social 
solidarity, but a social condition in which no appropriate ideals were provided for the 
Turkish youth. As a result the youth were inclined towards hard ideologies, and 
began to see such ideologies as the true way to salvation. 
                                                                                                                                          
the birth of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1981. But, the existence of significant 
differences between the military leaders of 1980 and their previous counterparts led 
the military leaders of the 1980 Intervention to explain what they understood by 
Atatürkism. For this purpose, the military leaders published three books entitled 
Atatürkism. These books are crucial in understanding the military’s approach to 
Atatürkism. They are first hand official sources on the subject. The first book, 
Atatürkçülük: Birinci Kitap, Atatürk’ün Görüş ve Direktifleri [Atatürkism: Book 
One, Atatürk’s Views and Orders], includes Atatürk’s statements on various issues, 
like the state, intellectual life, economic life, and religion. All statements are taken 
from Mustafa Kemal given both in old Turkish and in today’s Turkish. The second 
book, Atatürkçülük: İkinci Kitap, Atatürk ve Atatürkçülüğe İlişkin Makaleler 
[Atatürkism: Book Two, Articles on Atatürk and Atatürkism], contains articles 
written by some academicians and militarymen on State and Thought, Economy and 
Religion in Atatürkism. The third book, Atatürkçülük: Üçüncü Kitap, Atatürkçü 
Düşünce Sistemi [Atatürkism: Book Three, Atatürkist System of Thought], is the 
most important one because this book is a direct interpretation of Atatürkism by the 
military. This book reflects the military’s understanding of the Atatürkist view of the 
state, intellectual life, economy and religion. Unlike Birinci Kitap [Book One] which 
is made up of only Atatürk’s statements, Üçüncü Kitap [Book Three] includes the 
explanations of the writer(s) with extensive quotations from Atatürk. These books 
were first published by the Chief of the General Staff and circulated within the 
military, but later the military advised the Ministry of Education to publish these 
books to be used as the supplementary books for the lessons of “The History of 
Turkish Revolution.” In the present study, the books which were published by the 
Ministry of Education are used. 
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 The problem that instead of commitment to Atatürkism, the youth in Turkey 
showed a tendency towards hard ideologies led the military to search for its principal 
causes. It seems that although they thought that this problem stemmed from the lack 
of Atatürkist education in the schools, they also accepted that Atatürkism which was 
at work before was not able to fulfill the desired aim, because it lacked specific 
targets and a suitable morality. Thus, the military leaders tried to enrich Atatürkism 
by injecting new tenets into it. Additionally, they narrowed the existing gap between 
Atatürkism and the traditional elements, which had been the phenomena that ought 
to have been transcended on behalf of Westernization, like the historical and national 
moral values and religion. In the new interpretation of Atatürkism, the historical-
national moral values and religion were emphasized as the indispensable 
components of society. Thus, needless to say, a compromise was reached between 
Atatürkism and Islam. 
 
4.4 Atatürkism as an Ideology Based on Science and Technology 
The incorporation of the above elements into Atatürkism necessitated a new 
articulation of the main ideas of Atatürk since the existing interpretation had closed, 
prescriptive elements making unable any compromise in the relationship between 
Islam and Atatürkism to cope with the existing identity problems. In this respect, the 
military took important steps.  One of the most important steps was to turn back to 
the primordial Atatürkism which was a weltanschauung based on the ultimate 
guidance of science and technology in life. Despite the fact that the military 
authorities of 12 September placed exceptional emphasis on injecting Atatürkist 
ideology into society, their zeal to reformulate Atatürkism on the basis of reason and 
 206 
science shows that the military had recognized the autonomy of “social praxis” in 
such a way that it was not possible to overcome the problems by some prescriptive, 
solid formulas. Thus, while extending the scope of influence of Atatürkism in 
society as an antidote for other ideologies, the military rule narrowed its prescriptive 
ideological domain. A pragmatic standpoint was developed.  
 The military authorities of the 1980’s declared: 
The most important feature of Atatürkism is that it reflects a rationalist and 
scientific mentality and behavior. What is meant by this is that all problems 
have to be elaborated not with a dogmatic and emotional perspective, and by 
presumed and solid judgments, but with a rationalist, scientific and pragmatic 
approach. Generally speaking, in this approach, all problems faced by the 
humankind are evaluated by looking at the situations and conditions through 
any means. After debates and discussions originating from genuine needs and 
realities, a conclusion is reached, and at the end, it is implemented. The 
guiding components here are reason and science.33 
 
 The chief characteristic of the post-1980 Atatürkism is an accent on its 
pragmatic and empirical foundations. In other words, in the new interpretation, 
Atatürkism was taken as a pragmatic ideology emphasizing the use of science and 
technology in order to attain the conditions of contemporary civilization. As 
indicated in the above passage, the situations and conditions, genuine needs, realities 
of human life, rationalist scientific debates, science and reason, pragmatism and the 
rejection of dogmatism are all not only the parameters denoting that the post-1980 
Atatürkism is a soft ideology based on a scientific mentality, but also constitutes a 
matrix on which the post-1980 Atatürkism dwells. The radical prescriptive 
components of previous interpretations were given up. In Atatürkçülük: Üçüncü 
Kitap [Atatürkism: Book Three] a definition of Atatürkism was given in which we 
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see two important concepts which are the constitutive ones of post-1980 Atatürkism: 
the guidance of modern science and reason. For the military Atatürkism is,  
The realist ideas and principles whose basic tenets were set by Atatürk for the 
state, the intellectual life, the economic life, and for the fundamental 
institutions of society, all aiming at maintaining the national independence for 
now and forever, providing prosperity and welfare for the people, advancing 
the Turkish culture to the level of contemporary civilization and even 
surpassing it under the guide of reason and modern science, and basing the 
state on the national sovereignty.34  
 
 The realist outlook, and the stress on science and reason in the new program 
of Atatürkism necessitates well-specified and realizable formulations. An essay 
written by General Necdet Öztorun in Atatürkçülük: İkinci Kitap [Atatürkism: Book 
Two] gives us important insights to understand the realism and also the military’s 
approach to Atatürkism in the 1980s. The phase “the dynamic ideal of the state,” 
which is also included in the title of the essay “The Dynamic Ideal of the State in 
Atatürkism,”35 is the dominant theme of Atatürkism posed by the military in the 
1980s. It specifies both the place of Atatürkism in the new set up of the state, and the 
role of the state in the formation of general national targets and specific policies. The 
dynamic ideal of the state was taken from a statement of Atatürk. Atatürk stated that 
“Our great target is to progress in the world as the most civilized and most 
prosperous nation. This is the “dynamic ideal” of the great Turkish nation which 
                                                                                                                                          
33 Atatürkçülük: Book Three, Atatürk’çü Düşünce Sistemi [Atatürkism: Book 
Three, Atatürkist System of Thought] (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1984), 107. 
 
34 Ibid., 7. 
 
35 Necdet Öztorun, “Atatürkçülük’te Devletin Dinamik İdeali” [The Ideal 
Dynamic of the State in Atatürkism], in Atatürkçülük: İkinci Kitap, Atatürk ve 
Atatürkçülüğe İlişkin Makaleler [Atatürkism: Book Two, Articles on Atatürk and 
Atatürkism] (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1988), 347-368. 
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accomplished a deep revolution not only in institutions, but also in their way of 
thinking.”36   
 Material aspects of the progress are given more emphasis in defining the 
“dynamic ideal” without complete rejection of morality. The realization of this ideal 
requires specific policies which should have the following features: a national 
orientation of issues, realism which means that the targets should be attainable, the 
use of modern science and technology in realizing the ideals, and educating the 
youth according to this ideal. These ideals are realizable only with a strong state. 37 
 The dynamic ideal in Atatürkism gives tools to regulate three important 
domains of society. These domains are the state, the intellectual life (fikir hayatı), 
and the economic life.38 In Book Three, religion was added as a new component, 
albeit it was evaluated separately from the other subjects. The significance of these 
domains in understanding the post-1980 Atatürkism stems from the fact that they 
constitute the bases on which Atatürkism was systematized. According to the 
military leaders, these domains are “the basic institutions that after the death of 
Atatürk, we have faced as the sources of the external and internal problems, and, 
                                                 
 
36 Ibid., 348. 
 
37 Ibid., 348-352. 
 
38 It seems that these three domains are very functional in the military’s 
conceptualization of society. In Öztorun’s division religion is absent, but the other 
two books are divided into four chapters which includes religion along with the 
above three domains. Thus, when society and Atatürkism are concerned these four 
levels are the operational components on which the Atatürkist program was 
specified.    
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also, the main subjects through which we can attain national power which is 
necessary to bring the state to the dynamic ideal.”39  
 Since these three domains also corresponded to a particular kind of 
conceptualization of society, they were also taken as the basis on which specific 
operationalization of Atatürkism could be made. Thus, in a sense, the way that these 
concepts were examined corresponds both to the concrete meaning of Atatürkism 
and a tangible Atatürkist program. Its concrete content prevents Atatürkism from 
developing into a closed and totalistic ideology whose presumptions constitute 
ultimate norms and the structural boundaries for all human actions. 
 The underlying guides in the actualization of the “dynamic ideal” which has 
been the ultimate aim of the post-1980 Atatürkism are “reason” and “modern 
science.” The emphasis on the use of reason and science in realizing the social 
“dynamic ideal” is the differentiating mark of Atatürkism of the 1980’s. The central 
position of pragmatism founded upon practical and scientific bases was explained in 
Book Two. In Book Two İsmet Giritli mentions the prominent features of Atatürkian 
ideology as “national sovereignty, nationalism, secularism, and pragmatic 
rationalism.”40 According to Giritli, the pragmatic outlook in tackling problems was 
not only apparent in Atatürk’s life, but also in various occasions he said that his 
guide in life was science. He also took inspirations not from abstract dogmas, but 
from the practical needs and realities of life, and science. For Giritli, the invitation of 
                                                 
 
39 Atatürkçülük: Üçüncü Kitap, Atatürkçü Düşünce Sistemi [Atatürkism: Book 
Three, Atatürkist System of Thought] (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1984), 2. 
 
40 İsmet Giritli, “Kemalizm İdeolojisi,” [Kemalist Ideology] in Atatürkçülük: 
İkinci Kitap, Atatürk ve Atatürkçülüğe İlişkin Makaleler [Atatürkism: Book Two, 
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John Dewey, one of the philosophers systematizing the pragmatic philosophy, to 
Turkey in order to prepare some proposals for educational reforms was not an 
arbitrary choice, but a conscious enterprise which exhibited Atatürk’s genuine 
interest in pragmatism.41  
 The scope of rationalism and science in the post-Atatürkism occupies all 
domains of society. For instance, the chapter on the “Intellectual Life” whose first 
subheading is “Rationalism” begins with a statement of Atatürk saying that “there is 
no problem in the world which could not be solved by reason and logic.”42 The 
intellectual life is no exception. In fact, for the military leaders, “the aim of 
Atatürkism is to base the people’s way of thinking on modern science and 
technology.”43 The genuine ideas are those which derived from science and reason. 
The ideological ideas which contradict science are superstitious and harmful to 
society. The following passages indicate how science was given the central role in 
the social life and in the interpretation of Atatürkism. The military leaders said: 
Atatürkism presupposes that social life could be governed by science. By 
regarding meaningless, illogical and superstitious ideas as the symptoms of 
illnesses, Atatürk says that the societies having harmful and non-sense beliefs 
and traditions incompatible with science and logic could not overcome their 
essential social problems... 
In order to prevent the ideas from being filled with non-sense and useless 
statements, and the social life from irrational, and illogical beliefs and 
traditions, it is necessary to multiply the sources of social powers which are 
matters that promote, advance, and make the nation a nation. To do this, we 
                                                                                                                                          
Articles on Atatürk and Atatürkism] (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1988), 59. 
Accent is added  
 
41 Ibid., 68-72. 
 
42 Atatürkçülük: Birinci Kitap [Atatürkism: Book One], 259. 
 
43 Atatürkçülük: Üçüncü Kitap, 109. 
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need science and technology together with patriotism, devotion, and 
goodwill.44 
 
 Although the concept of rationalism implies a kind of doctrine founded upon 
some definite, abstract, and rationalist speculations, in the military’s understanding it 
has a very empirical base because its content is tinted with modern science and 
technology. Thus, it is not just a kind of rationalism which operates against 
empiricism. It was clearly stated that “the essence of rationalism in Atatürkism is 
science and technology.”45 
 The interpreters who claim that Atatürkism is a systematic ideology 
developed by Atatürk himself are usually reluctant to quote and interpret the crucial 
statement of Atatürk in which he said that what he left as his spiritual heritage to the 
Turkish nation was only science. In explaining the importance of science and 
technology in the intellectual life of nation, a crucial statement of Atatürk further 
illuminates the military’s endeavor to base Atatürkism on science and reason. In this 
passage Atatürk said: 
I don’t leave any verse, any dogma, any frozen and fixed rule as my spiritual 
(manevi) heritage. My spiritual heritages are reason and science. It is evident 
what I am trying to do and to achieve for the Turkish nation. After me, those 
who want to adopt me can become my spiritual heirs if they accept science 
and reason as their guide in the above manner.46 
 
 The resort of the military to the original Atatürkism, namely the Atatürkism 
as a soft ideology, a weltanschauung emphasizing the use of science and reason in 
                                                 
 
44 Ibid., 112. 
 
45 Ibid., 111 
 
46 Ibid., 110. 
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reaching the ideas of “contemporary civilization”, gave the military rule an 
opportunity to change some fundamental policies implemented up to the 1980’s on 
behalf of Atatürk and Atatürkism. The most visible changes took place in the 
economy, religion and in the conceptualization of cultural modernity. In the 
economy solid interpretation of the principle of statism was replaced with a new 
moderate understanding (mutedil devletcilik) which approved of liberal and free 
market economic policies.47 To show how radical this change was, it is enough to 
remark that the precepts of the Constitution of 1961 prepared by the military rules 
gave important obligations to the state in providing social justice and welfare for the 
people.48 According to the military leaders of the time, this was an imperative of 
Atatürkism. Not surprisingly, one of the reasons for the 1971 Memorandum was that 
the reforms proposed by the Constitution of 1961 had not been done.49 In terms of 
secularism, a more moderate approach was developed without transgressing 
Atatürkism. On the basis of the “actual needs of society,” as they were perceived by 
                                                 
 
47 In the opening speech of “The Second Economic Congress of Turkey” held 
in 1981, President Kenan Evren said that “the ideas that we develop for the state and 
private sector to be benefited from the opportunities provided by the free market 
economy will have great contributions to the economy of Turkey.” Kenan Evren, 
“Devlet Başkanı Orgeneral Kenan Evren’in İkinci Türkiye İktisat Kongresini Açış 
Konuşması,” [The Opening Speech of General Kenan Evren, the President of 
Turkey, Given in the Second Economic Congress of Turkey], in Atatürkçülük: İkinci 
Kitap, Atatürk ve Atatürkçülüğe İlişkin Makaleler [Atatürkism: Book Two, Articles 
on Atatürk and Atatürkism] (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1988), 250. For the 
concept of moderate statism [mutedil devletçilik], see, Atatürkçülük: Birinci Kitap 
[Atatürkism: Book One], 109.   
 
48 Suna Kili, Kemalism (Istanbul: School of Business Administration and 
Economics, Robert College, 1969), 184. 
 
49 Cüneyt Arcayürek, Demirel Dönemi, 12 Mart Darbesi: 1965-1971 [The 
Demirel Period and 12 March Intervention: 1965-1971] (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 
1992), 25; Batur, Anılar [Memoirs], 300-301.  
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the military leaders, secularism was softened, which increased the legitimacy of 
religiosity. In a similar vein, the radical understanding of modernity was softened, 
and native historical and cultural moral values were more emphasized. Since modern 
science was made the ultimate guide in life and an indispensable component of 
Atatürkism, a more manipulative attitude towards social problems was developed 
which in turn, infiltrated novel ideas and policies contrary to the previous official 
interpretation of Atatürkism and its prescriptive principles.50 
 
4.5 Islam and Secularism in Post-1980 Atatürkism 
One of the most important changes accompanying with the changes in understanding 
of Atatürkism took place in the state-Islam relationship, hence in the military’s view 
of secularism. The origins of the maximal secularism and its official 
institutionalization in Turkey have already been discussed in the Third Chapter. The 
maximal secularism and anti-clerical and anti-religious policies were justified on the 
bases of Atatürkism. In the hard ideological interpretations of Atatürkism, the 
reforms of Atatürk were defined as a revolutionary movement saving society from 
the obscurantism of the Middle Ages,51 and a movement launching a fatal attack on 
Islam, and any compromise (read liberalization) on secularism meant a return to this 
backward position. Due to the reasons explained before, in the post-1980 
                                                 
 
50 There are lots of works criticizing the military rule of 12 September, and 
accusing the military leaders of deviating from Atatürkism. For instance, see, Emre 
Kongar, 12 Eylül Kültürü [The Culture of 12 September, 2nd ed. (Istanbul: Remiss 
Kitabevi, 1993); Bozkurt Güvenç, Gencay Şaylan, İlhan Tekeli, and Şerafettin 
Turan, Türk-İslam Sentezi [Turkish-Islamic Synthesis] (Istanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 
1994). 
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Atatürkism, religion was incorporated into the state, and was given an important role 
in society as an indispensable and necessary component of culture, and one of the 
moral sources of the Turkish nation. 
 One chapter in Atatürkism: Book Three examines the Atatürkist view of 
religion, and the place of religion in society from the perspective of the military. 
There are two fundamental changes regarding both religion and secularism in the 
official interpretation of post-1980 Atatürkism. On religion the key sentence is that 
“religion is a reality and a necessary institution.”52 In terms of secularism the change 
was about the content of secularism. Although the separation of the state and 
religion, or religion and politics, was maintained and no change was offered, a 
pragmatic definition of secularism was proposed as follows: 
In the Turkish Republic the aim of the principle of secularism is to guarantee 
freedom of conscience and worship, confine religious activities to creed and 
worship, and base worldly affairs and worldly institutions on the principles of 
modern science and advanced technology. The principle also gives the rights 
of the state to the state, and that of religion to religion, and separates state and 
religion.53 
  
 The “necessity of religion” for society in the post-1980 Atatürkism has an 
ontological justification delineating the limits of reason and science in the 
philosophical quest of man, and in its ultimate applicability to the design of the state 
and society. In other words, although science and reason would be taken as mere 
                                                                                                                                          
51 Güvenç, Şaylan, Tekeli and Turan, Türk-İslam Sentezi [Turkish Islamic 
Synthesis], 170. 
 
52 Atatürkçülük: Üçüncü Kitap [Atatürkism: Book Three],  225. The “necessity 
of religion” was taken from a statement of Atatürk. The statement is as such: 
“Religion is a necessary institution. It is not possible for nations to survive without 
religion. But, the point is that, it is an attachment between man and God.” Idem, 225. 
 
53 Ibid. 48. 
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guides in life, it was also accepted that they could not be enough to satisfy all needs 
of man, since there is a distinct realm in which reason and science have nothing to 
say. One of the indicators of the change in the military’s interpretation of Atatürkism 
in the 1980’s is that the military elites discerned one important point which was 
absent in the previous interpretation; Atatürkism as an ideology could not be a 
suitable substitute for Islam. Hence, they took religion as an autonomous component. 
This fact has vital importance to understand the whole efforts of the military rule in 
finding appropriate instruments in order to set up the state and design society after 
the 1980 Intervention. The relationship between science and religion was posed by 
the military elites as follows: “An essential point should be indicated that although 
great improvements are taking place in science and technology today, the need that 
religion fulfills does not disappear. This is a reality too.”54 
 The demarcation line between science and religion was drawn from a 
statement of Atatürk in which he tried to explain the relationship between reason and 
God. Atatürk said, “the concept of God is a metaphysical issue which is difficult to 
be comprehended by human mind.”55 The military’s interpretation of this statement 
justified the existence of an independent sphere peculiar to religion, and its necessity 
for society. It also questions the universality of reason and science, and limits their 
claims to worldly affairs. The military’s interpretation of the above statement is as 
follows: 
Atatürk’s attempt to present the concept of God as a metaphysical issue 
beyond the comprehension of human mind explains that man’s rational 
reasoning has some limits. The reason of man is unable to answer all questions 
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which are and have to be asked by man. The answers of some questions exceed 
the boundaries of reason. They are transrational. 
In this respect, the rationalists’ denial of and criticism against the religious 
answers explaining the ties between man and God produce harmful results for 
society. Indeed, this is not possible. Neither belief and negation can go 
together, nor it has, up to now, been possible for negation to dissolve the 
belief. As it was explained by Atatürk, religion is a necessary institution, and 
it is not possible for a nation to survive without religion.56 
 
 It was expected that religion should accept the scientific and rational ordering 
of worldly affairs, namely, the economic, juridical, and historical matters. For the 
military, this view is not contrary to Islam, because after the Prophet the Islamic 
scholars accepted to solve the problems whose solutions had not been found in the 
Holy Quran by means of reason. “Atatürkism understands and implements the 
essential elements of religion in accordance with the spirit of the way defined by the 
Quran and followed by the Prophet.”57 One of the important results of the defining 
the domains of religion and reason in the above manner is that the military elites 
maintained the sharp separation of the state and religion and avoided any political 
implications. In other words, the military’s view on the political expression of Islam 
was maintained in its old fashion. The state was given the responsibility to prevent 
religion from political exploitation which was considered against Atatürkism.  
 A further notable change in terms of the military elites’ approach to religion 
and secularism in Atatürkism was related to the rhetoric and style by which 
Atatürkism and Islam were rearticulated. The changes comprised, first of all, the 
personality of Atatürk who was presented as a person having respect for religion. In 
1981, Evren said to the students of Theology Faculty in Konya: 
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There may be some people with an intention to introduce Atatürk to you in a 
wrong way. Investigate him well. Atatürk was not an enemy of religion. He 
had great respect for religion. But some people presented him as if he was an 
enemy of religion. Our nation suffered from schisms in history. Atatürk made 
reforms to save religion from the hands of ignorants and fanatics. Otherwise, 
he was very close to the enlightened men of religion, and he always supported 
them.58 
 
 It is a well known fact that in the radical secularist circles Atatürk has been 
presented as a person whose main mission was secularizing the Turkish society in a 
radical way which was considered as an indispensable requirement for 
modernization.59 The mild point made on the relationship between Atatürk and Islam 
was just to point out that Atatürk was not an enemy of Islam. He was respectful of 
the “true” Islam. Within the same circles, the statements of Atatürk tackling Islam in 
an affirmative manner which were stated especially in the years between 1920-1924 
have been considered as tactics to manipulate the Muslim public for the political 
purposes, particularly to defeat the Greeks, and to prepare a secure ground for the 
                                                                                                                                          
57Ibid., 234. 
 
58 Evren, Söylev ve Demeçler: 1980-1981 [Speech and Statements], 146. It is 
interesting, for instance, to compare Evren’s perception of Atatürk with that of Özer 
Özankaya who claims that Atatürk believed in a cosmic natural religion which  sees 
nature as the only source of  all powers and happenings, and adopts an evolutionary 
perspective towards religion. Özer Özankaya, Atatürk ve Laiklik: Türk Demokrasi 
Devriminin Temeli [Atatürk and Secularism: The Basis of the Turkish Democratic 
Revolution] (Istanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1983), 172-189. 
 
59 For instance, on the relationship between the reforms of Atatürk and 
“reaction,” and how they marked the Republican history, Cahit Tanyol writes: “The 
struggle between revolution and “reaction” has became coat of arms of Atatürk’s 
revolutions and the Turkish Republic. The revolution was put under the command of 
political authorities. When the state was strong enough, the institutions, the 
organizations, and ideas which were previously eliminated by the revolution 
disappeared from the scene. The state attacked all religious institutions... Atatürk 
intimidated the exploiters of religion, and aimed at leaving the religion as a pure 
belief in the conscience of the people and as a private tie between God and man.” 
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future secularizing reforms. Later, when Atatürk consolidated his power, his real 
attitude towards religion became manifest which was revolutionary aiming at 
eliminating religious phenomenon from society. Indeed, it is true that during the 
period of the War of Independence, Atatürk used religion as a social force to 
mobilize the masses against the Greeks,60 and after the victory, his attitude towards 
religion changed, and it was followed by his well-known secularizing reforms. 
Another true point in this regard is that most of the affirmative statements given by 
Atatürk were pronounced in this early period of republic. But what is important for 
our perspective is not whether Atatürk was acting in a manipulative manner or not. 
Nor it is that all affirmative statements of Atatürk given in the early years were 
pronounced tactically. The important point, here, is that the military elites 
extensively used and accepted Atatürk’s early statements in the rearticulation of 
Islam and Atatürk and Atatürkism in the 1980’s. The most notable text is Atatürk’s 
khutbah61 (hutbe) delivered at Paşa Mosque in Balıkesir in which he pointed out that 
Islam was a rational and logical religion, and in which he explained the significance 
of mosques in the daily life of the people. He also emphasized in the same khutbah 
that the subjects of khutbahs should be taken from the actual life and problems of the 
                                                                                                                                          
Cahit Tanyol, Laiklik ve İrtica [Secularism and Reaction], 2nd ed. (Istanbul: Altın 
Kitaplar, 1994), 160. 
 
60 On Mustafa Kemal’s use of religion in the War of Independence, see, for 
instance, Paul Dumont, “Hojas for the Revolution: The Religious Strategy of 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk,” Journal of the American Institute for the Study of Middle 
Eastern Civilization 1 (Autumn-Winter, 1980-81): 17-32, and Dankwart A. Rustow, 
“Mehmed Akif’s “Independence March”: Religion and Nationalism in Atatürk’s 
Movement of Liberation,” Journal of the American Institute for the Study of Middle 
Eastern Civilization 1 (Autumn-Winter, 1980-81): 112-117. 
 
61 The speech delivered at Friday moon prayer. 
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people.62 The text of this khutbah was completely reproduced in Atatürkçülük: 
Birinci Kitap [Atatürkism: Book One]. Most of the other passages found in the 
military’s books of Atatürkism were chosen again from the affirmative statements of 
Atatürk.63 The contrary views of Atatürk were limited only to the reaction. A careful 
look at the elaboration of the views of Atatürk in the book reveals that Atatürk was 
presented a person who was primarily interested in explaining the true Islam, not in 
fighting against the reactionary. Thus, positive elements of Atatürk’s statements on 
religion were given a constituting role in the formulation of the place of religion in 
Atatürkism, and anti-reactionism was considered as a supplementary to it.64 
 The approval of religion as one of the basic institutions of society, and 
accepting a distinct ontological sphere confined to religion were radical shifts in this 
new articulation of Atatürkism because in its extremist interpretations neither 
religion had been recognized as a social institution, nor religion and science had 
been considered as two independent phenomenon concerning different spheres. On 
the contrary, they were considered as rival entities claiming monopoly on the 
problem of “truth.” Not surprisingly, the extreme positivist outlook adopted by the 
pre-1980 state elites prevented them from recognizing the role played by religion in 
society as an “independent” phenomenon. Thus, on the part of the state elites it was 
                                                 
 
62 Atatürkçülük: Birinci Kitap [Atatürkism: Book One], 465-467. 
 
63 Şaylan mentions the tactics of the authorities in extracting the statements of 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. For instance, from a passage which included both positive 
and negative statements of Atatürk on religion, the authorities had chosen the 
positive statements neglecting the negative ones. See, Şaylan, Türkiye’de İslamcı 
Siyaset [Islamist Politics in Turkey], 107-108. 
 
64 This observation is true for the chapters of “Religion” of Atatürkçülük: 
Birinci Kitap [Book One] and Üçüncü Kitap [Book Three]. 
 220 
expected that as modernity develops, religion is doomed to disappear.65 The religious 
policies implemented in the one-party period were formulated on the basis of this 
presumption, which resulted in a maximal secularizing program containing strong 
atheist tenets.66 The principal result was “the impoverishment of Turkish culture,” as 
pointed out by Mardin,67 which undermined the sources of cultural identity. It seems 
that the changes in official interpretation of Atatürkism in the post-1980 period were 
closely associated with the military’s recognition of the fact that the ongoing model 
of secularism had important drawbacks in terms of social morality and cultural 
identity. Thus, the changes in the theoretical formulation of Atatürkism were 
followed by changes in the cultural policies of the state. In the new formulation of 
the national culture, Islam was not only identified as an important cultural source, 
but also the new cultural policy of the military rule took important measures in order 
to encourage religion as the legitimate source of the national culture of Turkish 
society. At the educational level, religious courses were made compulsory, and in the 
                                                 
 
65 For instance, Cahit Tanyol asks; “why is religion still so influential in our 
social and political life despite the fact that it has lost its popularity in civilized 
societies?” This question reflects the implicit, sometimes explicit, assumption of the 
radical secularists’ belief that the development of science and modernity operates 
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67 Şerif Mardin, “Religion in Modern Turkey,” International Social Science 
Journal 29 (1977): 279. 
 221 
planning of the national cultural policy the potential contributions of religion were 
elaborated in detail. 
 
4.6 Religion and the National Culture: Toward a Rearticulation of Modernity 
The principal consequences of the radical secularizing policies of the republican 
elites were elaborated in the Third Chapter. If we summarize the problem here, it can 
be said that the replacement of religion with science did not operate well in the 
domain of morality, and in solving the problem of cultural identity. The problem of 
secular morality was universal unleashed by modernity which dominated to a certain 
extent the social thought of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Max Weber 
was aware of the same problem when he claimed that “at the public level, 
secularization leaves a moral vacuum which can not be filled by scientific 
advance.”68 In Europe, it was not science that totally dominated the spectrum of 
individual choice, but various philosophical doctrines have developed with 
alternative frameworks of morality. Moreover, as argued by Mohammed Arkoun, 
unlike the Turkish case where the positivistic postulates became dogmas themselves, 
“the Western societies had an advantage of maintaining a tradition of free, strong, 
and continuous criticism of science.”69 In Turkey, where radical positivistic outlook 
marked the Ottoman and the republican reforms; however, “scientific moralism” was 
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69 Mohammed Arkoun, “İslami Bir Bakış Açısı İçinde Positivizm ve Gelenek: 
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considered sufficient to solve the social, political, cultural, and moral problems. The 
problem faced by the republican Jacobeans was posed by Mardin as follows: 
The greatest problem of the republic was not the sovereignty of the people, it 
was easily captured. The fundamental problem was at the deep level of society 
and in its ethical foundation. In other words, it was a problem of the “leading 
principle” which defines what were the ethical principles that citizens would 
follow, and on what bases the familial and daily relations would be re-
constructed. What would be the required transcendental principle from which 
legitimacy could be derived?.... Republican jacobeanism addressed only the 
citizens, but its principles pertaining to the constitution of society and the daily 
life of individuals were rather weak. The Turkish jacobeans who were 
positivist and republican had to remember the following sentence of Auguste 
Comte: “The religion of humanity replaces God, but, it never forgets the 
functions previously fulfilled by God.” This means that there is a great void in 
the republican ideology, and it is the void of ethical principles which are 
becoming more important in the modern world.70 
 
 The total rejection of the past had not been succeeded by a new ethical 
underpinning. The past was not only rejected as the political, cultural, ideological 
and societal model, but a complete divorce from the old cultural identity was 
supposed as a requirement for the republican citizens to became “civilized” and 
“modern.” The articulation of the local and universal values, namely, the 
conglomeration of the indigenous values and the “universal” values of the 
Enlightenment, were rejected due to the belief in a maxim that “there was only one 
civilization and it was the Western civilization.” The situation was aptly described 
by Kevin Robins. He argued:  
For the Kemalist elite, it seemed as if the principles of modernity could be 
accommodated only on the basis of the massive prohibition and interdiction 
of the historical and traditional culture. To make way for the new, rational 
                                                 
 
70 Şerif Mardin, “Kollektif Bellek ve Meşruiyetlerin Çatışması,” [The 
Collective Memory and the Conflict of Legitimacies] in Avrupa’da Etik Din ve 
Laiklik [Ethics, Religion, and Secularism in Europe], ed. Oliver Abel, Mohammed 
Arkoun, and Şerif Mardin, trans. Sosi Dolanoğlu and Serra Yılmaz (Istanbul: Metis 
Yayınları, 1995), 10-11. 
 223 
world view the culture had to be purged of its theocratic, mystified and 
superstitious ways of life. To become “civilized” it must purify itself of all 
that was particular, and by that token pre-modern, in the local culture. What 
this resulted in was not only disavowal and suppression of historical memory 
in the collectivity, but also, and even more problematically, denial and 
repression of actuality of Turkish culture and society. As much as it has been 
shaped by the assimilation of western culture, modern Turkish identity is also 
a product of various negations: Turkish society became practiced in the art of 
repression.71  
 
 For the first time in the republican history the state elites, particularly the 
military elites, nullified these negations, and recognized the shortcomings of the 
above cultural outlook which had been at work for decades. They also took 
important decisive steps to remove the cultural impoverishment by injecting into the 
national culture what was historically negated; “the historical” and “cultural moral 
values” which included both Turkish and Islamic components. Filled with these 
concepts, the “national culture” became the defining concept of the cultural policy of 
the military rule in the 1980’s. Needless to say, it was developed along a 
conservative line. 
 The encouragement of the national cultural values necessitated the 
determination of components of national culture. For this purpose two important 
attempts of the military rule are worth noting. First, the State Planning Organization 
(SPO) prepared a report for the Fifth Development Plan under the title of “Milli 
Kültür: Özel İhtisas Komisyonu Raporu” [The Specialists Committee’s Special 
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Report on the National Culture]72 in which the sources and components of the 
national culture were elaborated in detail, and the required policies for flourishing 
the national culture were planned. Second, the Turkish History Society [Türk Tarih 
Kurumu], which was established by Atatürk to make research on Turkish history, 
was reorganized under the name of Atatürk Higher Institution for Culture, Language, 
and History [Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu]; it was given the 
responsibility to determine the components of the national culture. In the Law 
numbered 2876, one of the tasks of the Institution was defined as “to determine the 
components of national culture as the guiding cores in determination, formation, and 
implementation of the national culture, and in the election of national targets, 
according to the aims and principles stated in this law.”73 Like the SPO, the Higher 
Institution also prepared a similar report on the components of national culture 
which will be examined below. In these reports one can see a different understanding 
of modernity and interpretation of Atatürkism.  
 It has been pointed out several times in this study that the Turkish state elite’s 
conception of modernity was extensively “Western” comprising only weak local 
tenets since they were firm believers in the universality of the Enlightenment. For 
instance, if we look at the understanding of the Kemalist nationalism among the 
radical Atatürkist circles we see that the indigenous elements play either marginal or 
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no role at all. The central notion in defining the Kemalist nationalism is 
“independence” in political, economic, and in all other fields. For example, Doğan 
Avcıoğlu, who was one of the leading figures of the Kemalist leftist journal, Yön, 
and a member of both the Constitutive Assembly established after the Coup of 1960 
and the Commission of Constitution which drafted the Constitution of 1961, sees the 
Atatürkist movement as follows: “In Atatürk’s movement there were two main ideas: 
nationalism and contemporary civilization. Nationalism meant independence in 
political, economical, and all other fields. The Contemporary civilization would be 
reached through the independence.”74 Hikmet Özdemir argues that this kind of 
understanding of the Kemalist nationalism was common within the Yön circle. 
Özdemir says that “according to Yön writers the first and indispensable condition of 
nationalism is total independence.”75 A similar argument is made by Ahmet Taner 
Kışlalı who sees independence and modernization as the defining concepts of the 
Kemalist nationalism.76 For him, “nationalism is an ideology which fulfills the needs 
of protection from the external forces, and solidarity of those people who share the 
same territory and conditions.”77 As can be seen local and indigenous attributes and 
values were not included in these interpretations of the Kemalist nationalism. It will 
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be meaningful if we compare the above interpretation of Turkish nationalism with 
that of Atatürk. Atatürk says: 
Turkish nationalism is to march in the track of progress and development, and 
in the arena of international relations as equal and harmonious partner of the 
civilized nations. Yet, at the same time it is to preserve the particular 
characteristics (hususi seciyelerini) of Turkish society and its distinct 
identity.78 
 
 The conception of the national culture of the military elites in the 1980’s 
represents a substantive departure from this old tradition, and places special 
emphasis upon the second part of Atatürk’s above definition of Turkish nationalism. 
The national and local elements were rejected by the radical secularists because they 
were considered as opposite qualities to the cosmopolitan values of modernity, and 
they implied the ideology of conservatives and ultra-nationalists.79 It was claimed 
that there was nothing which could be supposed as an unchanged essence defining 
the peculiarity of the Turks, but only some metaphysical presumptions. Thus, the 
preservation of the “national culture” was a wrong target choice of the post-1980 
governments.80 However, the military elites were decisive in resorting to indigenous 
culture and national history in installing the new national and cultural identity. 
Therefore, in the period of the military government the cultural policy formation and 
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implementation completely differed from the previous periods. The national 
character of the Turkish culture was strongly emphasized. Evren’s recommendations 
to the students of the War College in 1985 portray the military’s outlook of 
modernity and Westernization in the 1980’s. Evren said:  
Do not be imitators. Atatürk said that “the nations could not progress by 
imitating each other.” Imitation leads to slackness and eradicates the ability. 
The greatest danger is that it erases the culture and tradition. You will profit 
from the science and experiences of the West, but without taking them totally. 
You will do what the traditions and the character of our nation oblige.81 
 
 The fact that the new set up of state and society has dwelled upon the national 
culture has important implications in terms of secularism and the state-Islam 
relationship in Turkey. In the new formulation of cultural policy religion was 
incorporated as one of the important sources of the national culture. As a result of 
this policy, the old conception of maximal secularism was relatively softened, since 
the new policy included not only the recognition of religion as a social matter, but 
also, the encouragement of religiosity in society through family, school and mass 
media. The following section analysis the conception of religion in the report. It can 
also be meaningful to mention here the way in which the national culture was 
elaborated, and how Islam and national culture were articulated. 
 The program of national culture, like other policies, found its justification by 
addressing Atatürk’s cultural aims. The report of National Culture conceives the 
main characteristics of Atatürk’s cultural policy as “national” [milli] one. The report 
says:  
The essence of this policy is to preserve our self-identity without denying the 
fact that in the process of improving its own essence, the culture is open to the 
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elements of foreign cultures if they are appropriate to our social body. Yet, it is 
far from imitation. Atatürk aimed at a culture which was appropriate to our 
history and our national character. The basis of culture is the character of the 
nation.82  
 
 The state was given the dominant role in the cultural domain as an agent 
defending a particular national culture. A pure liberal and democratic outlook in the 
cultural domain was not supposed as an ideal goal because it was assumed that in 
societies where the state is not given the role of guide in cultural planning, it is likely 
that the culture is exposed to invasion of foreign influences. The role of the state is to 
provide a kind of development which seeks the balance between the material welfare 
and moral heritage. It also aims at transforming the developments in science and 
progress into the inner wealth and ensuring the continuity between the past and the 
present.83 
 The Commission discussed principal cultural items such as language, 
literature, music, architecture, fine arts, history and religion, and prepared detailed 
proposals to inject a nationalist tone into them. The underlying concepts throughout 
the report are the historical, cultural, moral and national values. Western and secular 
concepts are either absent or less emphasized.  
 Religion is one of the most important components of the national culture 
discussed in the Report. Religion was defined within the context of theology. It was 
defined as “a divine origin institution delineating the relationship among people and 
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between men and God.”84 The sociological justification of religion in the Report is a 
radical break from the previous conception since like the views of the military on 
religion developed in the three books of Atatürkçülük, the conception of religion has 
changed from being a  “private” matter to a “social” one. The following passages do 
not only represent how the state described the place of religion in society but also 
show how a radical change took place in the state’s approach to religion. In the 
Report, the old conception of religion as an extremely private phenomenon was 
abandoned, and a “social” conception has been accepted. It is argued: 
First of all, it is not a proper idea to say that religion is only a matter of 
conscience, and since its scope is limited to the conscience it has no influences 
upon the individual behavior and social life. On the contrary, religion guides 
the life of individuals and regulates the social life of societies ranging from the 
most primitive to the most developed ones. The fact that the religious rules 
and orders have vivid life in society shows that religion could not be separated 
from society.85 
  
The importance of religion in “nationality” stems from the history of the 
Turks in such a way that the Turks accepted Islam as their religion because there 
were great similarities between pre-Islamic beliefs of the Turks and Islam. Islam 
played a vital role for the Turks in maintaining their nationality and unity. It is not 
possible to think of the Turkish architecture, literature, music, social rules and 
norms, and manners without Islam. The Turks who accepted Christianity as their 
religion lost their nationality. This shows how Islam is vital for the maintenance of 
the national unity and integrity.86  
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 In the Report, religion as a policy issue was studied in relation to the 
following headings: social integration and development, the role of religion in family 
and child development, religious education in schools and through the means of the 
mass media, and the education of religion and ethics in the educational institutions. It 
was planned that religion would be encouraged in these areas. The developments in 
the 1970’s were considered as a product of alienation stemming from the rapid social 
change, and the encouragement of religion was offered as an antidote for these 
problems. It was declared: 
The unifying and integrating features of Islam, which is the most appropriate 
religion to the Turkish character, has deeply penetrated into our people with 
its power of strengthening the ties between the individual and society. 
Religion had shown its power in the history of the Turks in hard times when 
there appeared the possibility of dissolution, and saved the Turkish nation 
from such an undesirable end.87 
 
 The suggestions on the religious education in family life and schools include 
radical criticism of the republican educational policies. The report blames the 
republican educational system for being materialistic, and sees the chaotic 
developments in the 1970s as a direct product of this educational philosophy. 
Therefore, according to the report, the education of the republican period was 
unsuccessful. A new alternative educational program had to be formulated on the 
basis of a spiritualist philosophy. Thus, the definition of secularism had to be 
changed in such a way that it would not pave the way to an irreligious interpretation 
of secularism and the belief that religion could be ignored in social life. For this 
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purpose, among other policies, religious courses would be introduced in the 
schools.88  
  Another issue which was elaborated in relation to religion was the problem 
of development. It has been previously pointed out that the radical Westernists 
understood development heavily within the context of a normative frame. The 
central concept to which all other ideas were addressed was modernization 
(çağdaşlaşma) which included cognitive changes. Subjective secularization, i.e. the 
secularization at the level of consciousness, was more emphasized in the 
conceptualization of modernity rather than in material development. The traditional 
Islam was seen as an obstacle to this purpose; hence, the elimination of traditional 
Islam was conceived as a requirement for modernity.89 However, as it was argued by 
Arkoun, neither was modernity developed independent of a specific historical and 
cultural tradition, nor was it possible that without substantial interaction with the 
tradition modernity would be reached.90 An interaction is needed between the 
dynamics of tradition and modernity. The Report recognizes such a need in a radical 
way. For the Committee “the development should be spiritual and ethical.”91 This 
does not mean that the material side of development could be ignored. The 
relationship between spiritual and material development was established as outlined 
below: 
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The essential and rooted development is one which takes place on the spiritual 
base and under the guidance of the spiritual development. None of them are 
ignorable. A fair and harmonious balance must be established between spirit 
and matter, religion and science, and moral and material development. Posing 
the problem as such, the answer to the question of what kind of development is 
required can be given as following: The socio-cultural prerequisites of 
development are education based on healthy principles, strong ethics and 
religion, and national and religious consciousness.92 
 
 The emphasis on the Turkish and Islamic notions in drawing the sources of 
national culture and in formulating a new social ethics implies parallelism with the 
ideas developed by a conservative circle, Aydınlar Ocağı (the Hearth of 
Intellectuals) which has been one of the influential conservative organizations whose 
ideas were partly shared by the ultranationalists (e.g. The Nationalist Action Party). 
In fact, as will be further elaborated in the following chapter, there was a close 
relationship between the rule of 12 September and the Hearth, which led some left-
oriented Atatürkist intellectuals to the claim that the ideology of the military 
government was the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, and the military authorities were the 
collaborators of the Turkish-Islamic synthesizers who were best represented by 
Aydınlar Ocağı and the Nationalist Action Party. For instance, Emre Kongar claims 
that “the military government was not only a continuation of the idealists93 
[ülkücüler] because it was totalitarian, but also because the government implemented 
the principles of Turkish-Islamic synthesis.”94 Similar arguments were raised by 
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Şaylan who claimed that the Turkish-Islamic synthesis became the official ideology 
of the state in the hands of the military leaders in the 1980s.95 Yet, it is hard to claim 
that there was a total fit between the ideas of the Hearth and the military leaders. For 
instance, unlike the preferences of the Hearth, the use of head scarf in schools was 
banned by the military leaders.96 Moreover, what is important here is not the sources 
from which the military leaders were inspired in formulation and implementation of 
policies, but the nature of the policies concerning secularism and Islam which has 
important implications in terms of moderating the maximal secularism in Turkey. As 
it was pointed out before, their understanding of secularism referred to Islam in an 
affirmative way, which decreased the gap between two polar opposite forces of the 
Turkish polity, i.e. Islam and the state. Although the military never saw the 
politicization of Islam as legitimate, at least they recognized that modernity did not 
necessarily mean the eradication of the religious phenomenon from social life. 
 To see how close were the views of the Committee to those of the military 
government, it is enough to look at the practices of the military government. The 
military introduced religious courses in primary and secondary schools and created 
the Atatürk Higher Institution for Culture, Language, and History [Atatürk Kültür, 
Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu), which was given the responsibility of research to 
determine the constitutive elements of national culture. The religious education will 
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be discussed below, but it would be meaningful first to look at the endeavors of the 
Atatürk Higher Institution. 
 It has been previously pointed out that the most important task of the Higher 
Institution was to find out the sources and elements of national culture in order to 
formulate cultural policies.  For this purpose, the Institution prepared and accepted a 
report97 whose content was very similar to that of the SPO’s Milli Kültür [National 
Culture]. The Report of the Institution determined the cultural sources of the Turks 
and the character of the national culture by resorting to Turkish and Islamic origins. 
In the report it was claimed that: 
The Turkish and Islamic cultures which are the sources of our national culture 
had reached a perfect synthesis in the period of Seljukids and especially in the 
Ottoman period; however, none of these two cultures was dissolved into the 
other. By taking the complementary features one from the other, a fair 
synthesis was realized. It was this synthesis that gave shape, spirit and power 
to the Ottoman Empire which was one of the largest and most enduring 
Empires of the world.98 
 
 After the reforms of Atatürk, the Turkish nation faced a new cultural 
heritage, i.e. the West, which was a preferred strategy of the republican elites to 
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bring the Turkish culture to the level of contemporary civilization. Today, the 
cultural problem that Turkey faces is the problem of the harmonization of these three 
cultural traditions in a fair way. Useful and acceptable parts of each culture needed 
to be taken and integrated into the unity of the Turkish culture. This task requires an 
investigation of the cultural sources of our nation.99 
 The items which were proposed as the sources of the Turkish culture were 
similar to those of the SPO’s report.100 Religion, as one of the sources of the national 
culture, was elaborated in relation to its historical importance for the Turks and to its 
possible contributions to the national culture. Although the language employed in 
articulating religion and national culture was not as radical as that in the SPO’s 
Report, it was chosen carefully, and the ultimate implications were the same: 
religion is an indispensable part of the Turkish national culture, and we should 
benefit from it. Unlike the radical secularist’s understanding, the report regards 
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religion as one of the defining components of the Turkish nationalism. The report 
stipulates:  
Without being removed from social life, religion should maintain its feature of 
being a source of the national culture feeding the ethical, moral, and cultural 
norms and values of Turkish society. No one can deny the role of religion in 
formation of nations. If the demarcation line between ümmet (the religious 
community) and the nation is clearly drawn, it becomes clear that religion 
supports the national culture. It is possible to add religion, as a cultural element 
to the moral side of the Turkish nationalism within legitimate boundaries. 
Religion, as one of the unifying and integrating components of the nation, has 
shaped the world view of our nation throughout the centuries. Since culture is 
also a way of life, we shall incorporate religion into this cultural system 
without breaking the main tenets of secularism.101  
 
 The aim of a cultural policy is to preserve the basic proponents of a cultural 
identity and the substance of the national culture. In the report the development of 
culture involved taking elements from foreign cultures which were suitable for the 
national culture. It is in this sense that the report is far from imitation.102 
 All of these endeavors clearly indicate that the military leaders’ 
understanding of religion, modernity and Atatürkism was radically different in 
comparison to the previous periods. The state elites began to approach religion in a 
more affirmative manner, which partly legitimized the societal role of religion. The 
specific and most concrete result of these changes in the state’s approach to Islam 
emerged in the field of the religious education. The new educational policy 
introduced compulsory religious courses at the secondary school level, which is still 
a hotly debated issue with some important implications for secularism. The religious 
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education has also been the most important and concrete move taken by the military 
throughout the republican history in the understanding of secularism. 
 
4.7 Religious Educational Policies under the Military Rule 
Religious education in the Republican period has been a crucial area upon which the 
secularists and Islamists have fought with each other to impose their preferences. 
The strategic position of the educational institution within the state-society 
framework put further impetus on the intensity of this combat. The extreme 
secularists’ view of the religious education can be summarized in such a way that no 
religious education is compatible with the spirit of a secular state.103 On the other 
hand, both the religious and conservative right groups in Turkey have supported 
religious education by means of the state’s hand, and they have seen no opposition 
between religious education and secularism, hence Atatürkism.104 To what extent the 
compulsory religious education is compatible with the secular state is open to debate, 
all the more so if no private religious education is allowed by any means. The state’s 
intention to hold Islam under the state’s control throughout the republican history led 
the state elites to put the religious education under the strict control of the state. In 
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some periods, especially from the mid-1930s to the end of the 1940s, no religious 
education was offered by the state educational institutions; it totally disappeared.  
 The most important step in this direction was taken by the educational 
reforms of the republic, particularly by the promulgation of Tevhidi Tedrisat Kanunu 
[The Law of the Unification of Education] which aimed at transferring all 
educational institutions to the Ministry of Education on March 3, 1924 together with 
the abolishment of the Caliphate. Atatürk’s aim at subjective secularization by 
means of the state apparatus gave rise to secularizing the institution of education. 
Also his intention to spread an “enlightened religion” and enlightened men of 
religion presupposed the establishment of modern religious institutions. For this 
purpose, the Theology Faculty within the Darülfünün (Istanbul University) and some 
new schools of imam-hatip to educate religious personnel were established. But by 
1933 all of these institutions had disappeared due to the lack of the students, which 
was also a result of the existing social and political environment. Between 1935-
1948 no religious course was offered in the public schools.105 The government 
during the period in question had been in the hands of the extremists of the RPP led 
by Recep Peker; therefore, the policies reflected a radical character. The moderate 
group within the party always kept an intention to institute religious education in the 
schools, however, they could not realize their intention until the end of the 1940s.106 
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The liberalization of extremely radical secularism and initiating religious courses in 
the public schools began after the World War II when İsmet İnönü, the President of 
the Republic, decided to open politics to competitive elections. The softening of the 
state’s attitude towards religion was partly due to the competition between the 
Democrat Party and the RPP. The Democrat Party had a strong appeal among the 
masses, not the least for their support of religious education. The RPP felt the need 
to have educated personnel to regulate religious affairs. The new policies of the RPP 
included initiating elective religious courses in the schools based on the parents’ 
will, and opening of some new imam-hatip schools to educate religious personnel 
and the establishment of the Theology Faculty at Ankara University.107 
 After the transition to democracy, the DP government opened a new chapter 
in the field of the religious education. Religious courses became regular in the 
schools unless the parents declared otherwise. The government opened new religious 
schools. In due course, the number of religious schools increased, and in the 1970s 
the imam-hatip schools were transformed into lise by the right wing governments, 
but no change was done related to the status of the religious courses in the schools. 
 The military government planned to revise the ongoing policy of religious 
education in Turkey. The changes in the state-Islam relationship in the same period 
were previously explained with their principal reasons. In a similar vein, through 
religious education, the military had expected to realize what were proposed by the 
changes, i. e. to solve the moral, ethical, and identity crisis of the Turkish youth 
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especially to prevent them from inclining to extreme left and right ideologies. 
Another notable reason was to put an end to the private, sometimes illegal, religious 
courses given by different religious groups, a strategy which also reflects the 
intention of the state to maintain its control over religion. Evren criticized the old 
policies of religious education in Turkey because these policies failed to teach the 
youth the religion of their parents: 
So far, it has not been possible for the Turkish children to learn the religion of 
the Turkish nation which is also the religion of their parents. It is impossible 
for every family to teach religion at home. It is also risky because they may 
instruct wrong things... For this reason, we put compulsory religious courses 
into the Constitution. By this way, our children will learn their religion, as 
proposed by Atatürk, in schools of the state and by the hand of the state.108 
 
 In the early days of the Intervention a commission made up of some ministers 
and the head of the Directorate of Religious Affairs prepared a report entitled 
“Türkiye’de Din Eğitimi-Din İstismarı” [Religious Education and Religious Abuse in 
Turkey] and sent it to the related people and institutions as a secret document. 
Describing the existing state of affairs, the document made it clear that after the 
republic the attempts at keeping religion out of politics had reached an important 
stage, which was then followed by reverse movements resulting in the exploitation 
of religion by some politicians. The document proposed the following: “The 
termination of these negative developments is only possible if the state recognizes 
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religion as a social reality, provides religious services and perfect religious education 
by its hands, and leaves no space for the exploitation of religion.”109 
 The report mentioned about the significance of the imam-hatip schools, and 
offered to introduce compulsory religious courses in all the primary and secondary 
schools.110 Further important attempts in this regard were the organization of a 
seminar by the Ankara Theology Faculty in which religious education was discussed 
in detail, and a minor but notable event the publication of a book by the Directorate 
of the Religious Affairs entitled Atatürk ve Din Eğitimi [Atatürk and the Religious 
Education].111  Hüseyin Atay, the then dean of the Theology Faculty and the head of 
the Organization Committee, argued that “the Law of the Unification of Education 
was instituted not to eradicate religious education, but to integrate religious 
education into the broad educational system and to evaluate it within this broad 
frame.”112 A speech delivered on behalf of the Minister of National Education shows 
that the seminar was planned together with the Ministry.113  
                                                 
 
109 Nokta [Turkish Weekly], 26 March 1989. The report was introduced by 
Nokta with large quotations from the original report. The members of the 
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Organizations, Vecdi Özgül (Minister of the Youth and Sports) and Tayyar Altıkulaç 
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110 Ibid., 19. 
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 The underlying point in these endeavors was one and the same: since religion 
is a social phenomenon and an indispensable part of the Turkish national culture, the 
religious education should be given by the state itself, and it should be compulsory. 
It is not contrary to secularism and Atatürkism.114 This was also stressed by Evren 
personally as follows:  
By doing this [initiating religious courses in schools] are we acting against 
secularism, as sometimes said by the opponents of religion, or do we serve 
secularism? Of course, we serve secularism, because secularism is not to leave 
the Turkish youth and citizens in the hands of exploiters of religion by 
depriving them of religious knowledge... 
The religious education in the schools is not against the principles of Atatürk. 
Look what Atatürk said on this issue: Friends. Religion is an essential 
institution. It is not possible for a nation to survive without religion. But the 
point is that religion is a relationship between man and God... There is no 
clergy in our religion. We all are equal, and have to learn the religious rules at 
equal levels. Every individual needs a place to learn the religious rules, 
religious sentiments and creeds. This place is the school. Look, this is what 
Atatürk said to us.115 
 
 As has already been shown in this chapter, the approach of the military 
leaders to religion was radically different from the preceding era. The old conception 
of religion which was based on the “secularization thesis” assuming that with the 
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development of modernity religion becomes a matter of private due to the process of 
privatization and its social significance decreases, or even disappears, was replaced 
with a new understanding which emphasized its social significance. A new cultural 
philosophy was formulated which incorporated the indigenous cultural and historical 
and moral values. In accordance with this new approach, Atatürkism was 
reinterpreted, which enable to give up its strict statist and secularist stand, and to 
adopt a critical standpoint in evaluating modernity. Furthermore, the softening of the 
maximal secularism by the military government created a basis on which the 
succeeding Motherland Party governments under the leadership of Turgut Özal 
further liberalized existing secularism, which has been vital in transferring of the 
Islamist to the public sphere, hence, in their integration to the system. Yet, the 
contention between Özal and the military leaders on secularism and the role of 
religion in society reveals the limits of this new move, which will be examined in the 
following chapter.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
THE MILITARY AND RELIGION AFTER THE TRANSITION TO  
DEMOCRACY 
 
 
 
This chapter aims at analyzing the developments in state-religion relationship after 
the transition to democracy with a particular focus questioning whether any change 
took place in the attitude of the military leadership of the 1980 Intervention towards 
religion. In other words, to what extent the military leaders of the Intervention 
maintained their previous affirmative standpoint towards religion after the transition 
to democracy is the main question that the present chapter seeks to answer. In this 
chapter, the above problem will be examined in relation to the attitudes of the 
military leaders towards two main developments after the transition to democracy in 
Turkey. The first important development was the coming to power of the Motherland 
Party (MP) whose policies were different from, and to a certain extent, opposing 
those of the military government. What was the attitude of the military leadership 
towards “the pro-religious” policies of the MP? This chapter also includes the 
elaboration of the thesis of Turkish-Islamic synthesis which underpinned the 
conservatism of both the military government and the MP. The second important 
development was the rise of the “religious revival” or the public visibility of Islam 
along with the rise of civil society which gained wider autonomy in comparison to 
the pre-1983 period and to a great extent provided a suitable ground for the religious 
movements to be flourished in the public sphere. In fact, the post-1983 period 
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brought about new concepts and styles of conducting politics at the level of civil 
society, if not at the level of party politics, which generated far-reaching 
consequences for the relationship between the state and society or politics and 
society. For the first time in the Ottoman-Turkish political history, civil society 
began to take shape and gained notable autonomy. This chapter also seeks to 
delineate whether the military leaders changed their affirmative attitude towards 
religion in the face of the “religious revival” which dominated the scene in the 
1980s. Because of the subject matter of this study, this chapter only covers the 
period of Evren’s presidency.  
5.1 The Legal-Institutional Setup of the System and the Coming of the MP to 
Power 
Although the legal framework in the new set up of the state, namely in the 1982 
Constitution, was designed by the military leaders in such a way that it set some 
limits to the freedoms provided by the legal-constitutional framework of the 
Constitution of 19611 and gave priority to the “highest interests of the state,”2 the 
                                                 
1 Ergun Özbudun, Türk Anayasa Hukuku [The Turkish Constitutional Law] 
(Ankara: Yetkin Yayınları, 1986), 48-49. 
 
2 Bülent Tanör, “Siyasal Tarih: 1980-1995” [Political History: 1980-1995], in 
Türkiye Tarihi V: Bugünkü Türkiye (1980-1995) [Turkish History V: Turkey Today 
(1980-1995)], ed. Sina Akşin (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1997), 46-47. The new 
constitutional framework also vested in the president considerable power vis-à-vis  
other parts of the executive, i.e. the prime minister and cabinet, and the legislature, 
which also means that it strengthened the state vis-à-vis  the civilians in comparison 
to the 1961 Constitution. See, for instance, Ergun Özbudun, “The Status of the 
President of the Republic Under the Turkish Constitution of 1982: Presidentialism or 
Parliamentarism?” in State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s, ed. 
Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1989, 37-45; Özbudun, 
Türk Anayasa Hukuku [The Turkish Constitutional Law], 49; For an evaluation of 
the executive in Turkey after 1982 see, Metin Heper, “The Executive in the Third 
Turkish Republic: 1982-1989,” Governance 3 (1990): 229-319; See also, Ömer  
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impacts of the changes unleashed by the economic liberalization policies, coupled 
with the liberalization discourse of the MP under the leadership of Turgut Özal, on 
political liberalization, were in sharp contrast to the intentions and expectations of 
the military leaders. “Institutional monism,”3 i.e. the monist structuration of the state 
by a coherent elite group around an official ideology, marked the character of the 
post-1983 Turkish polity, however, some radical changes took place at civil societal 
level strongly influencing the subsequent course of politics in Turkey. The concept 
of “change” and further democratization of the political system shaped the new 
content of social and political discourses. The concept of democracy became a 
shared concept of different political groups. Accordingly, the new political discourse 
was marked by liberal and compromising tenets.  
 Within the political domain, the notable change was the coming of the 
Motherland Party to power, which was not the preferred eventuality of the military, 
thus the situation in which the MP had come to power in particular, and the general 
conditions under which a new game of politics was allowed are important to 
understand the compromises and conflicts between the military and civilians. As has 
already been pointed out, the military leaders of 12 September intended to introduce 
democracy within narrow limits. They identified the party leaders and the political 
parties as the main responsible agents behind the erosion of public authority, 
prevalent terror and chaos, thus, in the new set up of the political system the military 
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leadership paid special attention to the party system.4 The first attempt of the 
military leaders in this regard was the closing down of all political parties that were 
active in political arena prior to 1980. The leaders and the upper level administrators 
of former parties, which included deputy leaders, secretaries general and the central 
executive members, were banned from forming a political party and from becoming 
members of any of the political party for a period of ten years. Moreover, the new 
constitution extensively restricted the political activities of the trade unions and 
associations, and no political links were allowed between such organizations and the 
political parties. The political parties were also banned from establishing branches of 
youth and women.5 The new constitution not only prohibited the political activities 
of the trade unions, but also it excluded students and civil servants from party 
membership.6 By prohibition of the political parties and the active political 
participation of different organizations to politics, the military aimed to prevent the 
fragmentation and polarization of the political system that were considered to be the 
main causes of the chaotic developments in the 1970s which led the country to the 
crises.7 
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  As İlter Turan notes, the aim of the new legal framework was to achieve 
three goals: “preventing excessive politicization of citizens and groups, keeping 
political parties internally more democratic, and rendering both political parties and 
the party system more stable.”8 Thus, although fifteen parties were established 
before the elections of November 6, 1993, the National Security Council allowed 
only three parties to join the elections. They vetoed other parties and some 
candidates of the approved parties, whom were found undesirable by the military in 
the new design of the political system. The approved parties were Milliyetçi 
Demokrasi Partisi [the Nationalist Democratic Party], Anavatan Partisi [the 
Motherland Party] and Halkçı Parti [the People’s Party]. The Nationalist Democratic 
Party was established by Turgut Sunalp, a retired general, and the party had the 
military’s support. The People’s Party was led by Necdet Calp who was a former 
bureaucrat in the military government. The position of the PP was at the left of the 
political spectrum, and hoped to get the votes of the electorates of the former RPP. 
The Motherland Party was established by Turgut Özal, the deputy prime minister in 
the military government and the architect of the 24 January 1980 economic decisions 
which was a radical economic program aiming at transformation of Turkish 
economy from the imports substitution industrialization to the export-led one. 
 As has already been noted, the military leaders supported the Nationalist 
Democracy Party of Sunalp since they considered that the NDP, led by a former 
general, would maintain the reforms and the main policies of the military. Thus, on 
the eve of the elections, held on the November 6, 1983, Evren made a speech on 
                                                                                                                                          
Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey, ed. Ergun Özbudun  (Ankara: Turkish 
Political Science Association, 1988), 115-145.  
 
 
 
249 
television in which he declared an overt support for Sunalp. He said to people that, “I 
hope that you will choose the party which will maintain the policies of the National 
Security Council, and will not bring the country to terror and chaotic situation.”9 
But, the striking point in this speech was his criticism directed to Özal. Although he 
directly indicated no name, his implications openly addressed Özal. Evren stated that 
he wished to realize the promises of those who announced that they had the key to 
everything. He went on to say that it was unpleasant to take possession of all the 
good things accomplished by the military government by those who held the post in 
that government. It seemed to Evren that they [Özal] disregarded the efforts of the 
National Security Council, the Economic Council and the Council of the Ministries 
who were the true agents behind the economic success.10 To be sure, the intention 
was not to criticize Özal, but to influence the electorate in favor of Sunalp. But the 
election results surprised the military because, unlike their expectation that the 
electorate would choose the NDP, the winner of the elections was the MP whose 
political program had little affinity with the military’s political concerns.11 Generally 
speaking, the results of the elections had two significant implications: although the 
people gave the support to the military in installing the regime, they did not want to 
go on with the military after a successful set up of the regime, and two relatively 
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uncompromising groups were brought to the top of the state, i.e. the presidential 
council made up of the former coup leaders and the government which claimed that 
they reconciled four main trends of the political spectrum under the banner of the 
MP-nationalist, conservative, liberal and social democrat. Indeed, relatively weak, 
yet tolerable, conflicts between Kenan Evren, the president, and Turgut Özal 
occupying the post of the prime minister characterized the post-1983 period. 
Needless to say, the prominent issues of conflict between them were religion and 
secularism.   
 In fact, Özal’s claim that the MP was representing four main political fronts 
of Turkish politics was true at least when the MP’s conservatism, nationalism and 
liberalism were concerned. The MP was liberal in its economic program, 
conservative in cultural outlook, along with a strong emphasis on basic individual 
rights of man which also implies liberalism. In its political program, the MP 
emphasized the basic rights and freedoms of man, and the minimal state both in 
economy and politics. Thus, the space occupied by the state in society needed to be 
redefined. The conservatism of the MP bore the basic tenets of the currents of the 
conservative right in Turkey such as the preservation of national, religious and 
historical values with a strong emphasis on a mighty Turkey. But, Evren warned 
Özal not to accept the candidates of the former Nationalist Action Party, an ultra-
nationalist party involved in outlawed activities in the 1970s, and the religious 
National Salvation Party. When Özal visited Evren to inform about his intention to 
establish a political party, Evren told Özal: 
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I see no objection in your intention to form a political party. In fact, you 
served in the Ulusu government. If we found an objection, we would not give 
you the seat of state minister and deputy prime minister. But in the past you 
had some relations with the National Salvation Party. You were a candidate of 
the NSP from İzmir. You have affinity with the members of the NSP and the 
National Action Party. If you accept their adherents to your party, we do not 
permit you. When we asked him to promise this point, he replied that, “be 
pleased, I never permit.” On this agreement we approved him to establish the 
party.12 
 
 Yet, despite the early reservations about the extreme representatives of the 
conservative right, there were significant similarities between the views of Evren and 
Özal stemming from the fact that, as far as culture and the cultural role of religion 
were concerned, they both had a conservative outlook which made compromise 
between them possible, and kept the conflicts within the sustainable boundaries. In 
order to understand this affinity and the ideological origins of the cultural policies of 
the military government,  it is necessary to portray the conservative current of 
thought from which the military government was inspired. As will be elaborated 
below, the main common point between Özal and Evren, or the military leadership 
of the 1980 Intervention and the MP governments in general, was their affinity to the 
Turkish-Islamic synthesis which was one of the prevalent currents of the 
conservative right in Turkey.  
 
5.2 The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis 
In order to capture a more definite picture of the relationship between Evren and 
Özal in terms of religion and secularism, particularly how they tolerated each other 
despite the fact that they had different views on these matters, it is necessary to 
elaborate the similarities of their views as much as the differences are needed to 
                                                 
 
 
 
252 
understand the contention persisted between them during the period of Evren’s 
presidency. Although there were significant differences between Özal and Evren in 
terms of religion and secularism, they shared one fundamental point which was also 
the guiding principle of the cultural policies of the military government in relation to 
religion in the 1980s: “religion is the cement of Turkish society.” The conception of 
religion as a social “cement,” or a binding instrument of social life, has been the 
prominent idea of the Turkish nationalist-conservative right; thus, it also reveals the 
intellectual tradition from which the military leadership was inspired in the 
formulation and implementation of cultural policies. In fact, there were notable 
similarities between the approach of the military leadership of the 1980 Intervention 
to religion and that of some rightist groups, particularly those of the advocates of the 
Turkish-Islamist synthesis.13 The role of religion in the development of the 
nationalist ideology in general and the articulation of these concepts in Turkey in 
particular is beyond the scope of this study, but a particular approach will be 
discussed below, which sees a historical synthesis between the Turkish culture and 
Islam, and offers a nationalist ideology for society, i.e. the nationalist right that has 
been represented by the Nationalist Action Party [Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi]. The 
NAP made its appearance in political arena by the mid-1960s under the leadership of 
Alparslan Türkeş, a retired colonel and an influential figure of the 1960 coup, and 
enlarged its organizational networks to combat particularly with communism in 
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Turkey.14  They were involved in armed struggle with the leftist groups in the 1970s 
and, after the coup of 1980, the military government arrested their activists and 
closed down their organizations.  
 The underlying idea in the nationalist-conservative thought is the unity of the 
2500 year old Turkish tradition and Islam, which was seen as the most appropriate 
religion for the Turks in terms of beliefs, manners and way of life. İbrahim 
Kafesoğlu, one of the leading ideologues of this circle, argues that throughout 
history the Turks have accepted different religions, but they have only been content 
with Islam. When they accepted religions other than Islam, they either lost their 
nationality or felt the need to change religion again. 15 “Why has the religious history 
of the Turks taken place in this way?” he asks: 
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It has a simple answer: There are astonishing similarities between the Islamic 
beliefs and those of the ancient Turks. It seems that other religions were 
unable to satisfy the Turks because Judaism was only for the Jews; 
Christianity was based on Trinity; and Buddhism lacked the belief in God. On 
the contrary, the Islamic conception of unique God comprised the beliefs 
system of ancient Turks. In a sense, by accepting Islam the Turks thought that 
they did not embrace a new religion, but the one which was stronger and 
convincing, and had a book.16 
 
 According to the advocates of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, the similarities 
between Islam and the beliefs of the ancient Turks, such as belief in a unique and 
heavenly God, and the immortality of souls, were so close that the Turks, in a sense, 
were ready to accept Islam. It was, as Süleyman Yalçın argues, a dress as if it was 
sewn for the Turks, thus, the Turks accepted Islam easily by their free wills and 
neither psychological nor socio-cultural incompatibility took place between Islam 
and the Turks.17 It was this harmony which mutually fostered both Islam and the 
Turks in history. Neither the historical and traditional ingredients nor Islam can be 
separated from the national culture and daily life of the people.  
 The Turkish-Islamic synthesis turns into a radical conservative cultural 
program when western culture is concerned. Since the Turkish-Islamic synthesis is 
the final cultural state, nothing can be taken from the west except for the 
technological and scientific products. Moreover, they argue that Turkish culture has 
been under the attack of the West since the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, and 
except for the period of Atatürk, the Turkish state has followed a “wrong” 
westernization program which destroyed the  “essence” of national culture. This was 
                                                 
 
16 Ibid., 144.  
 
17 Süleyman Yalçın, one of the leaders of the Hearth, expressed this view in 
“Introduction” written for the book of Kafesoğlu. See, Süleyman Yalçın, “Takdim,” 
[Foreword] in Kafesoğlu, Ibid., 8-9.  
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the main reason behind the erosion of social norms and values, and social crises that 
Turkey experienced before 1980. In order to overcome these crises, the state should 
formulate and implement a program of “national culture” which is an indispensable 
task for our national state and well-being of Turkish society.18   
 A well-elaborated program based on the Turkish-Islamic synthesis was 
offered by the Hearth of the Intellectuals [Aydınlar Ocağı], an organization formed 
by a group of rightist intellectuals in 1970. The initial aim of the Hearth was to unite 
the divided nationalist-conservative right to use it as a defensive block against 
communism. In due course they widened their networks especially among the 
educated strata, and thus, became influential in state bureaucracy and universities 
which enabled them to influence the government policies during the periods of the 
right wing Nationalist Front governments in the 1970s. Although they had no direct 
connections to the Nationalist Action Party, or the Ülkücü Movement in general, 
because of the nationalist-Turkist tenets contained in the ideology of these both 
groups, the Hearth was closer to the NAP than any other right wing parties. 
Moreover, there were close relations between the Hearth and the leadership of the 
NAP especially in the 1970s.19  
                                                 
 
18 İlhan Tekeli, “Türk-İslam Sentezi Üzerine” [On the Turkish-Islamic 
Synthesis] Bilim ve Sanat [Science and Art] 77 (1987): 5-8.  
 
19 Bora and Can, Devlet, Ocak, Dergah [The State, The Hearth and the Dervish 
Lodge], 152-154. Although the Hearth and the NAP were close associates and had 
similar views, it is hard to say that the Hearth was a sub-division of  the NAP. As 
Bora and Can note, if the relationship between the Hearth and NAP in comparison to 
other right wing conservative parties is concerned, it can be said that it was a primus 
inter pares kind of relationship. Ibid., 150. In the 1980s the contention between the 
Hearth and NAP became more visible, partly due to the Hearth’s support of the 12 
September, and the proponents of the NAP began openly to criticize the Hearth. See, 
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 The chief target in the philosophy and political program of the Hearth 
appears to be the preservation and improvement of the “national culture” which was 
articulated through the precepts of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, thus, not 
surprisingly, peculiar characteristics are accentuated in the definition of culture. For 
instance, Muharrem Ergin, the leading ideologue of the Hearth, defines culture as 
“the totality of all aspects of life which makes a group and people a nation, and gives 
a peculiar character to it.”20 These aspects of life constitute the essence or the unique 
values of a nation, and the “essence” of a culture can not be transformed into other 
cultures.21 In their understanding, a change in a culture ineluctably leads to the loss 
of nationality, thus, the issue of preservation of the national culture becomes the 
survival problem of Turkey and the Turks. As he says, “culture is, before anything 
else, a problem of national security.”22 Since the survival of Turkey is closely related 
to the preservation of national culture, the state is obliged to adopt a policy of 
national culture.23 Like other adherents of the circle, he also criticizes the cultural 
                                                                                                                                          
for instance, Mustafa Güngör,  “Türk-İslam Sentezi Mümkün Mü?” [Is the Turkish-
Islamic Synthesis Possible], Yeni Düşünce [New Thought], 1 May 1987.  
 
20 Muharrem Ergin, Türkiye’nin Bugünkü Meseleleri: İlaveli Dördüncü Baskı 
[Turkey’s Problems: 4th enlarged ed.] (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü 
Yayınları, 1998), 6. The first edition of Ergin‘s book was published by the Hearth of 
Intellectuals in 1973 with no name and it was presented as the official view of the 
Hearth. The subsequent editions appeared under the name of Ergin. The last edition 
(1998) includes an appraisal on the 1980 Military Intervention.  
 
21 Ibid., 22. 
 
22 Ibid., 33. 
 
23 The following passage demonstrates how vital is the problem of national 
culture for the survival of Turkey in the conception of the Hearth. “Today Turkey 
has to decide, first of all, whether she will live in these lands as a national society or 
as a cosmopolitan international mass made up of the world citizens. In fact, no new 
decision is needed for this matter, because long before Atatürk decided that Turkey 
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policies that were put at work after the death of Atatürk as being humanistic, which 
idealized western values instead of the Turkish national ones, and hence, undermined 
the essence of the national culture. Ergin says:   
Humanism means the rejection of national culture and substituting it with the 
cultural values of the West. So, it transforms a national society into a 
cosmopolitan mass. This is exactly what happened in Turkey. The national 
culture of Atatürk’s period was rejected and the non-national values were 
propagated.24  
 
 Orhan Türkdoğan visualizes the attempt of the idealization of the Greco-
Latin culture between 1940-1950 as a backward move from the spirit of the National 
Forces of the Independence War and departing from the way of Atatürk, and claims 
that it was a mortal blow on the process of the nation-building in Turkey.25 It created 
generations who were filled with international cosmopolitan values, which made 
them admirers of Greco-Latin culture rather than the native Turkish one. As a 
consequence of such understanding, a program of a national policy comes out as the 
chief target of the state which is vital for the survival of Turkey.26  
 The hallmarks of their outlook were declared under the title of “Milli 
Mutabakatlar” [the National Consensus] in a seminar organized by the Hearth in 
September 1984- “The Reasons which Brought our Country to the 12 September and 
the Conspiracies on Turkey” [Ülkemizi 12 Eylül’e Getiren Sebepler ve Türkiye 
                                                                                                                                          
would live as a national society forever. It is impossible for other kind of society to 
survive in these lands. If it were possible, the Ottoman society would endure.” Ibid., 
180.   
 
24 Ibid.,  
 
25 Orhan Türkdoğan, Değişme, Kültür ve Sosyal Çözülme [Change, Culture and 
Social Disintegration] (Istanbul: Birleşik Yayıncılık, 1996), 178.  
 
26 Ergin, Türkiye’nin Bugünkü Meseleleri [Turkey’s Problems], 381.  
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Üzerindeki Oyunlar].27  The proposal, which summarizes the fundamental tenets of 
the views of the Hearth in forty points, proposes various policies grounded on 
national culture with a perspective presented above.28 The novel element in Milli 
Mutabakatlar in comparison to their previous standpoint and to other rightist circles 
was the western dimension which was highly instrumental, as will be elaborated 
below, in the articulation of this view to the philosophy of the 1980 Intervention. 
According to the proposal:  
The Turkish culture is a triple synthesis based on Turkish, Islamic and 
Western combination. The first pillar of this trivet is Turkishness, the second 
pillar is Islam and the third one is the West.... The Turkish-Islamic synthesis is 
the invariable essence of this culture, whereas, the West is the changing and 
developing component.”29  
 
 The Hearth and their views became significant for Turkish political life 
because the military leadership, in search of a new source of social “cement,” 
resorted to the Hearth and their views for the formation and implementation of 
cultural policies. In a sense, there was a mutual recognition between the military 
leadership of 12 September and the Hearth, albeit unofficial. The military leadership 
benefited from the views and the cadres of the Hearth during their rule, and, in return 
for this, the Hearth gave a sincere support to the Intervention. For instance, Ergin 
sees the Intervention as “a blessed and comprehensive movement for the fate of 
                                                 
 
27 Bora and Can, Devlet, Ocak, Dergah [The State, The Hearth and the Dervish 
Lodge], 162.  
 
28 This text was published in Türk Kültürü [The Turkish Culture] 279 (1986) 
with the signs of Muharrem Ergin, A. Aydın Bolak and Süleyman Yalçın, and was 
reprinted in Ergin’s book. See, Türkiye’nin Bugünkü Meseleleri [Turkey’s 
Problems], 380-399.  
 
29 Ergin, Türkiye’nin Bugünkü Meseleleri [Turkey’s Problems], 385.  
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Turkey....,” and says that, “the first great event of the last 60 years of the Turkish 
history was the movement of Atatürk and the second one was the 12 September 
Military Intervention.”30  
 There were some fundamental concerns shared both by the military and the 
Hearth which made this tacit alliance or coalition possible. First of all, a strong anti-
communist rhetoric was a common point in the approaches of both the military and 
the Hearth. The Hearth’s conception of the strong state, which would be capable of 
restoring law and order in Turkey, was another merging point.31 Moreover, the 
Hearth had an affirmative approach to Atatürk and Atatürkism which made it easy to 
articulate their views to the weltanschauung of the 12 September Intervention. As 
Bora and Can note; “This positive attitude towards Atatürkism can not simply be 
explained, as the left-Kemalist circles usually do, by the Hearth’s worry to use 
Atatürkism as a folding screen.”32 Their Atatürkism stems from their ascertainment 
that in the period of Atatürk, who was the greatest Turkish nationalist, the “national 
culture” colored the essence of the state.33 In accordance with the Westernization 
aims of Atatürkism, which were indispensable elements of Turkey’s quest of 
modernity, the Hearth modified the synthesis by adding the western dimension. As 
has already been noted, Turkish culture was illustrated as a synthesis made up of the 
Turkish, Islamic and western elements, though the last ingredient was a changing 
                                                 
 
30 Ibid., 237-239.  
 
31 Bora and Can, Devlet, Ocak, Dergah [The State, The Hearth and the Dervish 
Lodge],149-151. 
 
32 Ibid., 155. 
 
33 Ibid., 155-256.   
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and developing one. The accentuation on Atatürkism and their approval of the West 
also differentiate the Hearth from other rightist-conservative and religious circles in 
Turkey.34 Furthermore, as far as the relationship between the state and religion was 
concerned, they had a secular outlook in such a way that the withdrawal of religion 
from its traditional position due to the formation of the national state or the rise of 
modernity, was taken as a natural and necessary development. Religion in the 
modern world, which was seen only as a component of culture, could not dominate 
all realms of culture, but only its own sphere. The affairs of the state and religion 
should be separated. Ergin says that, “Turkey will never be religious but will always 
remain pious.”35 Yet, they conclude that religion is an important and necessary 
cultural component which sustains society.36  
 Not surprisingly, the most important state agencies which were influential in 
the ideological and cultural spheres, such as the universities, the Atatürk Higher 
Institution for Culture, Language and History [Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek 
Kurumu] and TRT [the Turkish Radio Television], were filled with either the 
                                                 
 
34 For instance, Ergin says: “We should never forget that Atatürk will always 
be influential in the fate of Turkey. Atatürk is the founder of this state, and no state 
can be far from embracing its founder and pursuing his road. Therefore, Turkey will 
never be without Atatürk.” Ergin, Türkiye’nin Bugünkü Meseleleri [Turkey’s 
Problems], 293. But, their conception of Atatürkism is highly nationalistic. Among 
the principles of Atatürk, they give priority to nationalism, and other principles are 
seen as complementary. See, Ibid., 303.  
 
35 Ibid., 203.  
 
36 Ibid. 306. Türkdoğan’s definition of the policy of national culture has 
significant implications for their understanding of secularism and religion. The 
policy of national culture means “all efforts to realize the requirements which are 
necessary to be transformed from ümmet [the religious community] to nation with an 
historical outlook.” Türkdoğan, Değişme, Kültür ve Sosyal Çözülme [Change, 
Culture and Social Disintegration], 39.  
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members or the sympathizers of the Hearth. The military government enacted a 
decree on July 20, 1982 which proposed to establish an institution in order to 
investigate the principles and the reforms of Atatürk, and to educate the staff which 
was required to teach these subjects in the universities. The Institute of the Turkish 
Revolution [Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü], which was already an academic unit 
under the Faculty of Language, History and Geography of Ankara University [Dil 
Tarih ve Coğrafya Fakültesi], was reorganized in accordance with this decree. The 
Institution was staffed with the members of the Hearth.37 Another notable attempt of 
the military government in this regard was related to the status of the Turkish 
History Society [Türk Tarih Kurumu]. As has been noted in the previous chapter, the 
Turkish History Society was reorganized under the name of Atatürk Higher Institute 
for Culture, Language and History, and was given responsibility to determine the 
components of national culture by law. As it was stated, these components would be 
the guiding cores in formation and implementation of the national culture and in 
determination of national targets.38 
 If the relationship between the Hearth and the attempts at reorganization of 
these institutions along with the efforts of the newly installed institutions are 
examined, it can be seen that the Hearth gained extensive influence and succeeded to 
articulate its views to the ideology of the 1980 Intervention. Consequently, the 
                                                 
 
37 Bora and Can give a detailed documentation of the places occupied by the 
adherents of the Hearth. See, Bora and Can, Devlet, Ocak, Dergah [The State, The 
Hearth and the Dervish Lodge], 185-189.  
 
38 Aydın Sayılı, “Önsöz,” [Preface], in Milli Kültür Unsurlarımız Üzerinde 
Genel Görüşler [General Views on the Components of Our National Culture] 
(Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu, Atatürk Kültür Merkezi 
Yayını, 1990), vii. 
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Hearth’s views from Türkiye’nin Bugünkü Meseleleri [Turkey’s Problems], firstly 
published in 1973, to Milli Mutabakatlar [the National Consensus] colored the 
content of the main state documents which were used to formulate and implement 
the cultural policies in Turkey. Indeed, the report of the SPO (State Planning 
Organization),39 and the other report which was accepted by the Atatürk Higher 
Institution for Culture, Language and History on June 20, 198640 repeated the above 
sources of the Hearth.41  
 The fact that the military leadership of the 12 September Intervention were 
inspired from the views of the Hearth of the Intellectuals in formation and, to a 
certain level, in the implementation of cultural policies gives us the principal reason 
behind the compromise between the Motherland Party government, or Özal, and the 
military leadership, now represented by President Evren and the Presidential Council 
made up of the former commanders of the Land, the Naval and the Air forces and the 
government. In a sense, the Hearth was a common ground of the two sides. Although 
the liberal rhetoric of Özal and the MP government had little or nothing in common 
with the military’s desire to have a strong state, in cultural terms there were striking 
affinities between the preferences of the military and Özal which stemmed 
                                                                                                                                          
 
39 Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı [The State Planning Organization], Milli Kültür: 
Özel İhtisas Komisyonu Raporu [The Specialists Committee’s Special Report on the 
National Culture] (Ankara: DPT, 1983). 
 
40 “Kültür Unsurlarının ve Kültür Politikalarının Tespitinde Uygulanacak 
Yöntem ve Sorumluluklar Hakkında Inceleme,” [An Inquiry into the Method and 
Responsibilities in Determination and Application of the Cultural Elements and 
Cultural Policies]. The report, which was also used in this thesis, was republished in 
Türk-İslam Sentezi [ The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis], ed. Bozkurt Güvenç, Gencay 
Saylan, İlhan Tekeli and Şerafettin Turan (Istanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1994), 60-94. 
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particularly from the conservatism of Özal and the MP. As is well-known, Özal 
always claimed that he combined the four trends of the Turkish politics in the 
philosophy of the Motherland Party. In his words; “Our government is nationalist, 
conservative and takes the principles of social justice and competitive free market 
economy as its essence.”42 His liberalism was especially related to his economic 
policy and the fundamental rights of man, whereas, his conservatism was more 
visible in his understanding of culture. In fact, Özal was a firm believer in 
conservative values, thus, like the military leadership, he put considerable emphasis 
on the preservation of traditional norms, values and manners in the cultural realm. 
Needless to say, religion has been the most important ingredient of the conceptual 
universe of Turkish conservative thought and political currents,43 which was also 
true for Özal. Therefore, despite the fact that there were differences, even dissention, 
between the views of Özal and Evren, as much as the similarities that will be 
elaborated below, Özal welcomed the cultural policies of the military government, in 
which religion played a considerable role. Moreover, Özal had close connections 
with the Hearth since the 1970s.44 For instance, Süleyman Yalçın, the then head of 
the Hearth, said that Özal developed the main frame of the 24 January Economic 
Decisions as part of the activities of the Hearth, and announced in an conference held 
                                                                                                                                          
41 The content of these documents has been examined in the previous chapter. 
See Chapter IV of the present study.  
 
42 Turgut Özal, Başbakan Turgut Özal’ın Konuşma, Mesaj, Beyanat ve 
Mülakatları: 13.12.1983-12.12.1984 [The Speeches, Messages, Statements and 
Interviews of Prime Minister Turgut Özal: 13.12.1983-12.12.1984] (Ankara: 
Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1984), 24.  
 
43 Bora, Türk Sağının Üç Hali: Milliyetçilik [The Three Cases of the Turkish 
Right], 77-78. 
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in Ankara in April 1979.45 Not surprisingly, there were significant number of 
deputies in the MP who were either direct members or the adherents of the Hearth.46 
Therefore, as far as the cultural dimension of religion was concerned, no serious 
conflict took place between the military leadership and the Motherland Party 
governments under Özal’s premiership. Yet their compromise on the cultural role of 
religion comprised no concessions on its political appearances on the part of the 
military, and conflicts arose between the parts in question which manifested 
themselves in various disputes between Özal and Evren. They stemmed especially 
from the fact that, unlike Evren who only approved the cultural aspect of religion, 
Özal was willing to further enlarge the space in social and political spheres occupied 
by religion. Thus, in order to comprehend the course of the state-religion relationship 
after the transition to democracy, the contentious side of the relationship between the 
civil and the military leadership concerning religion also needs to be elaborated.  
 
5.3 The State Conservatism versus Civil Conservatism: Evren and the Policies 
of the Motherland Party Governments led by Özal 
As has already been noted, the period of Evren’s presidency and Özal’s premiership 
was characterized by tolerable conflicts on secularism and the role of religion in 
                                                                                                                                          
44 Güvenç, et al., Türk Islam Sentezi [The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis], 157.  
 
45 Süleyman Yalçın, “Aydınlar Ocağı ve Türk-İslam Sentezi” [The Hearth of 
the Intellectuals and the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis], Tercüman [The Interpreter], 
(Turkish Daily), 1-6 February 1988.   
 
46 It is enough here to note just the charter members of the MP belonging to the 
Hearth. For instance, Veysel Atasoy, Kazim Oksay, Mustafa Taşar, Vehbi Dinçerler 
and Ercüment Konukman were the members of the Hearth. The number of the 
deputies with the origin of the Hearth and other nationalist circles was also high. 
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society, and it was stated that although they shared the view that religion was an 
important cultural component holding society in harmony, this did not lead them to 
reach an agreement on a political expression of religiosity. Therefore, after the 
transition to democracy, Turkey witnessed different confrontations between Özal 
and Evren arising from what Evren had been most afraid of, i.e. religion. This was 
due to the fact that what Özal understood about secularism and religion was quite 
different from Evren’s understanding. Evren’s views of religion and secularism were 
elaborated in detail in the previous chapter along with the policies of the military 
governments, hence, it would be a repetition here to give a comprehensive account 
of Evren’s conception of secularism and the role of religion. Briefly, Evren took 
religion as a component of national culture and as a source of social morality, which, 
he hoped, would be instrumental in promoting national harmony and moderating 
extreme political “ideologies.” Yet he was against the politicization of religion and 
its use by the politicians for the political purposes. As a natural consequence of such 
a view, Evren regarded neither religious communities nor political expressions of 
religiosity as legitimate, because they implied particularism that would be harmful to 
the unity of the nation. Thus, where the politicization of religion was concerned, his 
view of secularism did not differ substantially from the previous military-
bureaucratic elites. He saw secularism as a guarantee for Turkish cultural 
modernization and for the national unity and democracy. As such, his move from the 
mainstream understanding of secularism was only limited to cultural and moral 
aspects of religion in society, which was, to be sure, a radical break in itself. In short, 
without lifting their reserves on the politicization of religion, Evren and the military 
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elites of the 1980 Intervention treated Islam in a more positive manner in such a way 
that Islam was accepted and promoted as a marker of national cultural and social 
morality, an understanding which led to the incorporation of religion into the new set 
up of the state. 
 Özal’s view of religion, however, was shaped by his conservatism and 
liberalism.47 In a sense, the differences between the attitudes of Evren and Özal 
towards religion and secularism represent also two different brands of conservatism 
represented by the state elites and the political elites. Since Evren was a member of 
the bureaucratic strata, the priority in his conservative policies was given to the 
general interests of the state, i.e., its unity and integrity, whereas, Özal, as a 
representative of the people, pursued ways to enlarge the public domain in favor of 
particular values. As noted above, Özal’s political program included political and 
economic liberalism, and cultural conservatism.  As an advocate of liberalism, 
especially of its Anglo-American version, he was a firm believer in the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of man. For instance, in a speech delivered to the İzmir 
Economic Congress held on 4 June 1992, in which he gave the signs of what was 
later labeled as the “Second Change Program” aiming at transforming of the 
structure of the state on the basis of democratic principles, he said that the primary 
target was “to realize the freedoms of thought, religion, conscience and free-
enterprise in a perfect way.”48 Therefore, the Motherland Party governments led by 
                                                                                                                                          
Lodge], 202-210. 
 
47 For further elaboration of the differences between Evren’s and Özal’s 
understandings of secularism see, Burhanettin Duran, “Kenan Evren’s and Turgut 
Özal’s Conceptualizations of Secularism: A Comparative Perspective,” Unpublished 
Master Thesis (Ankara: Bilkent University, 1994).  
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him removed the articles of 141, 142 and 163 from the Criminal Code of the Turkish 
Constitution, prohibiting the communist and religious activities and propaganda, and 
as such were impediments to the freedom of thought. As a conservative politician 
and a believer, he pointed out that religion was the cement of society, an 
indispensable part of social morality and the most important component of cultural 
identity.49 Like other right wing governments formed hitherto, the MP governments 
under the leadership of Özal proposed that the “development” would be on the basis 
of national, moral and historical values of the Turks.50 In various occasions Özal 
pointed out the necessity of maintenance of historical values. The following passage 
portrays what Özal understood from conservatism and indigenous values:  
The reason behind our efforts to strengthen youth, sports, family, the middle 
class and the like is our desire to preserve the most valuable items of our 
customs and tradition. We are a conservative party in the Western sense of the 
word. It does not mean reaction.... For instance, there is a principle in our 
religion which was expressed in a hadith saying that “the man who sleeps full 
in his bed while his neighbor is hungry is not from us.” This is the most 
striking sing for the necessity of social assistance... I mean we should keep 
these values. I do not see the preservation of such good things that we have 
inherited from the past as reaction. On the contrary, it is an endeavor to keep 
what is good and worthy... This is what we understand from conservatism.51 
 
                                                                                                                                          
48 Yavuz Gökmen, Özal Yaşasaydı [If Özal Were Alive] (Ankara: Verso 
Yayınları, 1994), 51. 
 
49 “Turgut Özal’la Mülakat” [An Interview with Turgut Özal], Türkiye 
Günlüğü [Turkey’s Agenda] 19 (1992): 17. 
 
50 Nuran Dağlı and Belma Aktürk, Hükümetler ve Programları: 1980-1987 
[Governments and Their Programs: 1980-1987] (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 1988), 
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51 Turgut Özal, Başbakan Turgut Özal’ın Resmi Geziler, Tesis Açılışları ve 
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  Therefore, Özal found nothing wrong in the conservative cultural policies of 
the military government; hence, he did not hesitate to maintain them after he came to 
power. For instance, despite the fact that he pursued a minimal state in all areas of 
life and made an enormous effort to propagate it, he upheld the compulsory religious 
courses in primary and secondary schools, which were introduced by the military 
government.  He said, “we see it as an obligation of the state to take necessary 
measures to provide religious courses in primary and secondary schools. This is 
necessary to create moderate and highly decent generations.”52 This was due to the 
fact that, in Özal’s view, religion was an important component in the life of 
individuals and society because, for him, it educated people and kept society in unity 
and harmony.53 Yet, he also remarked that their conservatism did not hesitate to take 
from the West what was good and beneficial. According to Özal, today the crucial 
area of change was technology rather than ideology, thus technological innovations 
had to be taken from the West.54 In a sense, as far as his conservatism was 
concerned, Özal followed the path of mainstream Turkish conservative thought in 
relation to tradition and modernization, which argued that modernity could be 
attained by adopting the Western technology, so nothing was needed in the way of 
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culture and morality.55 Traditions, customs and manners were the cultural 
components which differentiated us from other nations, shaped our distinct character 
and kept us in unity.56 As Osman Ulagay, in a somewhat exaggerated fashion, 
observed, “in Özal’s agenda only one thing had a place as a collective ideology-i.e., 
the religion. Özal did not hesitate to say that it was the religious ties which held 
society together.”57  
 Yet in Özal’s view the role of religion in the life of individuals and society 
went beyond the mere considerations of national unity and social harmony, probably 
due to his religious-conservative background and his belief in the fundamental 
premises of liberalism. As has already been noted, Özal considered that there were 
three fundamental freedoms which were indispensable for Turkey to become a great 
nation, and he made them the fundamental tenets of his political mission. These were 
freedom of thought and speech, freedom of religion and freedom of free enterprise.58 
If these freedoms, which were given by God, were put under pressure, it would be 
impossible for man to develop its potential, thus no societal development could 
occur.59 For Özal, development was only possible in our society if these conditions 
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were provided for the people in a perfect way.60 Therefore, he related the activities 
and existence of religious communities to the fundamental rights of man and saw 
them as a natural consequence of democracy and an outcome of the piety of Turkish 
people. As will be discussed below, the positive attitude of Özal toward religious 
communities was the main controversial subject between Özal and Evren.61 
 Unsurprisingly, Özal’s interpretation of secularism also differed from that of 
Evren and the state elites. At the general level he repeated the classical maxim; 
“Secularism has a basic reason. This is the freedom of religion and conscience. The 
freedom of religion and conscience has a unique guarantee, it is secularism.”62 Yet 
he emphasized the unrestrictive rather than restrictive features of secularism. Özal 
said; 
Under the guarantee of the Constitution, everybody has the freedom of 
conscience, religious belief and worship. We believe that we have to realize 
the material and moral development together.... We do not see secularism as a 
restrictive instrument in the preservation of moral values, in practicing the 
freedom of religious worship and belief, and in the development of religious 
culture.63 
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 His ideal model of secularism was the one which was found in the developed 
Western countries and the United States, where both the religion and the state were 
independent from each other. Thus, Özal was questioning whether the existence of 
the Directorate of Religious Affairs [Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı]64 within the state 
machinery was compatible with state’s secular nature. Should it be left to the 
religious communities? How could this purpose be realized?65 He desired all these 
issues to be discussed in public. One may say that, as it was pointed out, Özal 
“aimed to make some changes in the existing status of secularism in accordance with 
the requirements of our age.”66 Similarly, Özal’s approach to Atatürkism and Atatürk 
was different from that of the state elites. For Özal, the rightist governments have 
always faced with an ardent opposition originating from the leftist intelligentsia with 
a claim of defending the principles of Atatürk and the republican reforms. The 
intelligentsia gained considerable success in this effort.67 According to Özal, 
republican secularism was a revolutionary secularism and, naturally, included some 
hard measures. Thus, the traces of operation of Atatürk reforms, which were 
instituted from top to down, were deep.68 In due course, this sort of secularism 
produced a situation in which the state gained some divine features, and secularism 
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was equated with atheism.69 But after a long period through which secularism was 
successfully consolidated, some corrections were needed to erase the traces of this 
operation. Without denying the role of Atatürk in the Turkish history and the 
republican reforms for Turkey, Özal criticized the attempts which presented Atatürk 
as a taboo, and as an infallible and indisputable person. He said: 
It is not possible for the Turkish nation to forget Atatürk. But what is 
important is how to remember him. On the basis of the present stage occupied 
by the Turkish nation which was taken with the help and inspirations of 
Atatürk’s, it is worth if Turkish nation remember him as a man purged from 
taboos. This did not decrease the greatness of Atatürk.70 
 
 All of these differences between Evren and Özal became manifest when the 
Motherland Party governments began to implement pro-religious and conservative 
policies. In terms of the economic policies there were no great differences between 
the military and Özal. The military and their spokesman Evren did not intend to 
intervene into the economic policies because they considered economy as a 
governmental and technical realm. However, in terms of the cultural, political, and 
ideological issues Evren kept its hold on government, and when he felt that the 
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government took unacceptable measures, he intervened. He led the first meeting of 
the cabinet to counsel the members on some sensitive issues. He remarked that 
reactionary activities were as dangerous as communism and it was Atatürkism which 
could unite the people; thus, he desired that concessions would not be given to the 
reactionary groups.71 Yet, this did not prevent the problems to emerge and in due 
course the contentions arose between the government and Evren. The most 
controversial issues between Özal and Evren during the term of Evren’s presidency 
were religious developments, which manifested itself as Evren’s criticism directed 
both towards the activities of the ministers with conservative backgrounds and 
towards Özal’s reluctance to take measures against the activities of religious groups.
 Interestingly enough, the first two demands of Özal were related to such 
sensitive issues. Özal requested from Evren to lift the ban on a leader of 
Nakşibendi72 order, Raşit Erol, who was sentenced to compulsory residence in 
Çanakkale and proposed to promote the position of the President of the Religious 
Affairs within the hierarchy of the state protocol. They were firmly rejected by 
Evren. This incident aroused in Evren’s mind some questions about Özal whether he 
ever understood secularism in a correct way.73 In this regard, the most controversial 
issue between Özal and Evren was the policies of Vehbi Dinçerler, the Minister of 
Education. Dinçerler, who was said to be having relations with some religious 
groups, attempted to change some ongoing educational policies according to his 
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conservative outlook. The most contested event was Dinçerler’s prohibition of the 
teaching of Darwin’s theory of evolution in primary and secondary schools. He also 
ordered to wear “long shorts” in ceremones held for the 19 May Youth and Sports 
Celebration Day. Moreover, a law was enacted to prohibit the opening of bars or 
shops selling alcohol within the 200 meters of the schools, dormitories and mosques. 
A further policy implemented by the encouragement of Dinçerler was the ban of beer 
advertisements on the television and the radio in April 1984.74 Evren strongly 
criticized these policies and evaluated them as concessions to the reactionary 
groups.75 In addition to these policies, he was bored by Dinçerler’s decision to 
introduce Arabic as an elective course in the schools which aroused Evren’s fear that 
the Arabic Alphabet would come back.76 He took the attention of Özal to these 
developments, but Özal seemed to be unwilling to take into account of his warnings. 
As Evren noted, Özal always easily found some explanations to manage the 
situation.77  
 Evren expressed his views on education in October 1984, in a speech by 
which he also implied that he was not satisfied with the policies of the Minister of 
                                                 
 
74 Toprak, “The State, Politics and Religion in Turkey,” in Politics in The 
Third Turkish Republic, ed. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1994),131-132. 
 
75 Evren did not say that it was a wrong policy, but he asked Özal that why 
Vehbi Dinçerler was interested in this matter. Evren was suspicious of the intention 
behind this policy because Vehbi Dinçerler was one of the most influential religious-
conservative members of the MP and Evren thought that this could initiate a process 
of giving concessions to religious circles. Evren, Anılar [Memoirs], vol. V, 80.   
 
76 Ibid., 80-103. 
 
77 İbid., 271-272.  
 
 
275 
Education. In his visit to Yüzüncü Yıl University in Van where Dinçerler was also 
present he said: 
The new generation will be defender of the republic, democracy and the 
principles of Atatürk. They will be educated with your intimate and devoted 
efforts. Educate them as not chauvinist, but as patriots and Atatürkian 
nationalist; not as atheist and irreligious, but as secular minded.78 
 
 Evren continued to warn Özal on the activities of Vehbi Dinçerler in different 
occasions, which culminated in the replacement of him by Metin Emiroğlu in 
September 1985, after an event that the Ministry of Education recommended a book 
on dining manners entitled “Yemek Adabı” written by a religious scholar and other 
books which were considered as religious by the press. After the change of the 
Ministry of Education, Evren wanted Emiroğlu, the new minister, to fix the number 
of İmam Hatip Schools, not to appoint the graduates of İmam Hatip Scools to the 
influential positions of the Ministry and to abandon Dinçerler’s project of offering 
Arabic as an elective course in the high schools.79  
 Another important subject of controversy between Özal and Evren in relation 
to the religious movements was the head scarf (türban) in the universities. As will be 
further examined below, the head scarf was banned first in the primary and 
secondary schools and later the ban was widened to the universities, which initiated 
a process of long lasting disputes and confrontations between the opponents and 
proponents of the head scarf and the its ban. Özal and the MP, particularly its 
conservative members, were in favor of lifting the ban on the head scarf in the 
universities because Özal evaluated the head scarf within his general view of 
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fundamental freedoms comprising the freedom of conscience, belief, thought and 
free-enterprise.80 Evren opposed to Özal because Evren saw the head scarf was not a 
religious matter, but a symbol of the desire of reactionary groups to revive the old 
regime and reaction.81 The problem of the head scarf needs to be evaluated with 
another issue of conflict between the parts, namely, the religious communities and 
the development of religious movements in Turkey which marked the second half of 
the 1980s, since they were closely related in such a way that the protest religious 
movements became apparent mostly in connection with the head scarf. Moreover, 
the rise of the public visibility of Islam also was closely connected with another 
process marking the post-1983 period, i.e. the gradual development of civil society, 
because it was not only a mere desire of Özal to be flourished in Turkey, but also it 
was firstly introduced by him as a concept after an event that a large amount of the 
military students, who were said to be having sectarian affiliations, were fired from 
the military school in 1987.82 The increase of public visibility of religious groups 
and their activities took the attention of the president and the military which forced 
the military to prepare a report in order to submit to the National Security Council. 
Although the government declared that they agreed with the National Security 
Council on a basic point that there was a potential danger of the fundamentalism, it 
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seemed that Özal did not share all views of the Council which claimed that there was 
an actual danger of fundamentalism. It was in this state of affairs that Özal 
introduced the concept of civil society in connection with “civilianization” and 
“civilization.” For him civilization and civilianization were close concepts in 
Western countries where the state was for the people. But in Turkey the situation 
was reverse, which had to be changed as the basis of civil society.83 
 In order to widen the political sphere and promote the development of civil 
society the Motherland Party’s governments under the leadership of Özal pursued a 
liberal outlook in economy and politics which meant further legitimation of the 
plurality in the public and political spheres. In fact, as Ergun Özbudun observed, the 
liberal discourse in Turkish political life appeared for the first time under the 
leadership of Özal.84 The orthodox liberal themes, such as the state was for the 
people but not reverse, and the freedom of belief, thought and free-enterprise are the 
indispensable perquisites of societal development, were strongly emphasized in this 
period under the leadership of Özal who was pursuing a kind of society in which the 
ideas were supplied, like goods, for the people in the free market. He said that: 
Like goods and services, the ideas should also have a free market based on 
competition, in which they are supplied for the people and subjected to a 
civilized exchange. The value of an idea should be determined by free-market 
mechanisms without intervention. In fact, the freedom of thought and free-
market mechanisms are closely related phenomena. It is not possible to 
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maintain, at the same time, a free-market and a closed social system which 
gives no freedom of thought and expression of ideas.85 
 
 It was in this political climate that the religious groups raised their voice both 
to express their demands and also to find the ways to articulate these demands to the 
dominant public discourse.86 The liberalization of the political atmosphere was one 
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of the encouraging reasons behind the rise of the public visibility of Islam because it 
provided a secure ground for the religious groups to widen their activities.  
 Although public expression of religiosity increased in the 1980s, the “Islamic 
revival” was not a new phenomenon. Rather it has been one of the permanent facts 
of Turkish social and political life. The long course of Turkish secularization process 
was analyzed in detail in the previous chapters. It was stated that, secularism in 
Turkey involved a sharp separation of the state and Islam, and Islam was pushed 
away from the public sphere. It was one of the ideological aims of the republic to 
design a sort of public sphere in which no religious representation was allowed. 
Consequently, the public visibility of Islam disappeared, but Islam remained as an 
important component of the culture, norms and identity among the masses. As it was 
pointed out by Binnaz Toprak, although the state was secularized and the subjective 
secularization turned out the primary objective of the state in Turkey, Islam has 
remained as an important force in the formation of group norms and in integration of 
the individual to the general social system.87 “Religious enthusiasm disappeared on 
the surface but merely went underground. It was probably strengthened in some 
respects.”88 After the political liberalization by the end of the 1940s, religious 
sentiments have become important factor influencing the preferences of the 
electorate. Needless to say, the strength of the Democrat Party was derived from its 
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more liberal approach to religion. The liberalization of the official attitude toward 
Islam led also to the reappearance of the religious orders at the surface, 89 which, 
since then, have become important agents in mobilizing the electorate. However, by 
the mid-1960, one can say that, religion lost its previous mobilizational capacity. For 
instance, the establishment of the National Order Party, and its successor the 
National Salvation Party, which had religious outlook, did not succeed grassroots 
mobilization. As noted by Toprak, “the results of the 1973 election90 have shown 
that religion is indeed a significant factor in the political behavior of the Turkish 
electorate although it is not the most crucial factor for electoral success.”91 There 
was not a great shift in this trend until the 1990s. The development of different 
religious groups in the 1970s was a result of the increase of the plurality of social 
forces. In Toprak’s words, “Islamic revival “should be understood within the Turkish 
context as the outcome of an increasingly pluralist society during the 1970s... Islamic 
movements were only one, among several, such forces. And they were not the most 
militant in demanding regime change.”92 Again they were far from totally capturing 
the political power on religious basis.  As Özbudun has shown, functional cleavages 
i.e. socio-economic rather than cultural ones denoting the center and periphery 
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cleavage increasingly became important in the behaviors of electorate.93 In short, “in 
Turkey, politics has became a functional alternative to religion.”94 
 In the 1980s there was a notable increase in the activities of the religious 
groups, such as the press, education, banking and different social welfare activities 
by means of various endowments.95 Özal’s liberal approach to the religious groups 
encouraged their activities. Moreover, Turkey also witnesses the protest movements 
of the religious groups especially against the ban of the head scarf. These 
developments brought Evren and Özal to conflict, because, unlike Özal, Evren 
considered these developments as an expression of reaction.  
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5.4 Evren and Özal on Religious Developments 
In the previous parts of this chapter the approaches of Evren and Özal to religion 
have been analyzed along with the criticism and actions of Evren against the 
conservative ministers of the MP governments and their policies. It has been noted 
that although both Evren and Özal shared the view that religion was an important 
component of national culture and social identity, they differed on the political and, 
to a certain extend, social dimensions of religion; thus, the religious developments in 
the 1980s remained as the most controversial issue between them. Evren saw the 
religious revival, which he called it as reactionism (gericilik) and fanaticism (yobaz), 
as a desire of the reactionary groups to bring the old backward sharia regime back to 
the country through the exploitation of religion96 and as harmful activities to the 
national unity because, for him, it would provoke religious sectarianism in Turkey. 
Therefore, he did not tolerate the religious orders and communities, whereas Özal 
considered the religious revival as a natural appearance of the piety of Turkish 
people and a normal outcome of the democratic developments in Turkey. He saw the 
religious freedom, which also comprised the recognition of the existence of religious 
orders and communities, as one of the fundamental freedoms and a component of 
civil society. As noted by Yavuz Gökmen, Özal was trying to legalize the sufi lodges 
as civil societal elements and as the traditional educational centers in Turkey.  For 
this purpose, he visited the dervish lodges (tekkes) when he went to the foreign 
countries, which was a way of legalizing the orders. His ultimate intention was to 
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give them legal status within the constitutional framework.97 Although Özal did not 
realize his intention in this regard, his advocacy to religion and the religious 
communities contributed to their legitimation in the face of the state.98 
   His approval of religious orders and communities was also closely 
related to what he understood from secularism and civil society. As has previously 
been noted, Özal had in his mind an Anglo-American model of secularism in which 
the religious communities have legal status and religion is organized within the 
domain of civil society.  For religion to be developed as an element of civil society, 
Özal thought that the state would be divorced from religion and religion would be 
transferred to society.99 It was in this context that he said he was trying to find a new 
formula for the reorganization of the Directorate of the Religious Affairs, because, 
for him, it contradicted with the notion of a secular state. He said:  
We say that we are secular, but we have a religious organization whose 
head is appointed by the state. Is this right? Should we leave it to the religious 
communities or not?  How can we do this? These issues should be discussed 
publicly from now on.100  
 
 Beside the liberalism and the advocacy of Özal in terms of religion, it seems 
that he was also aware of the imperatives of an autonomous public in the moderation 
of the extremities. It seems that Özal considered the integration of these religious 
groups to the system as the most effective way to moderate the extreme demands. 
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For instance, in an interview, Özal said that, “in Turkey freed from prohibitions, the 
communists and the religious groups which desired to establish a totalitarian mullah 
autocracy under the guise of religion similar to the model of Iran lost their appeal 
and influence.”101 Similarly, in December 1986, when hot debates were taking place 
on religious movements in the press, Özal stated that reaction arose not from wide-
range religious freedom, but the lack of it.102 He also said to Evren that by means of 
the religious policies of the MP governments they were fighting with the parties that 
were against the state such as the Welfare Party and the Nationalist Labor Party.103 
 Due to the differences in their conceptions, confrontations between Özal and 
Evren became inescapable on reaction, (through not bitter). We learn from the 
Memoirs of Evren that in various occasion he continuously warned Özal to take 
some measures to deal with the reaction, but Özal seemed reluctant, or in Evren’s 
words, optimistic on the matter. Evren thought that Özal gave concessions to the 
religious groups and was unwilling to take the required measures. According to 
Evren, although the problem did not yet reach the critical point, the reactionary 
groups would become dangerous in the near future. On the other hand, Özal tried to 
convince Evren that these were transitional events and the people in Turkey were 
looking forward. They also belonged to the tradition. For him, what were generally 
shown by the press as the reactionary activities were intimate activities of the 
devoted people; thus, they should be careful on the matter because there was a 
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problem of the identification of reaction and confusing of it with the normal religious 
practices of people.104 He stated: 
We are an open party. We are trying to establish relations with the West. We 
also belong to our tradition. Some circles misinterpret secularism. There are 
people who interpret laicism as irreligion (dinsizlik). Our view of secularism is 
that no body has the right to intervene into other. We don’t allow anyone to 
interfere into the affairs of state.105 
 
 The conflict became more apparent and intense in the last months of 1986 by 
the news of religious groups’ infiltration of some military colleges and by one of the 
students in a Koran school in Denizli, controlled by an Islamic group called 
Süleymancis, committed suicide as a result of heavy punishment.106 These events 
initiated a process of hot discussions in the press and public on whether there was the 
reaction in Turkey or not, which lasted at least four months. At the end, various 
measures were put at work including the ban of the head scarf in the universities. 
The issue of reaction was brought to the November meeting of the National Security 
Council (NSC) in 1986 in which Evren criticized the attitude of the government 
toward the reaction and demanded from the government to confiscate private 
dormitories controlled Süleymanci and Fethullahci groups, which were the places of 
the religious education in accordance with the understanding of these groups. Özal 
stated that it was not possible according to the Constitution and the law concerning 
the associations. When Evren suggested to change the Constitution, Özal remained 
silent.107  
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 Evren was decisive to pursue the matter, and he went to Denizli to investigate 
the incident of suicide in Koran school. In his Denizli speech he openly repeated his 
explanations which he had made in the meeting of the NSC that the dormitories built 
by the private foundations had to be turned to the Ministry of Education according to 
the Law of the Unification of Education. If a new law was required to transfer them, 
it should be enacted.108 As an initial response to Evren’s speech, Metin Emiroğlu, the 
then Minister of Education, declared that they regarded the message of the president 
as an order and began to investigate the issue seriously.109 However, Özal’s 
interpretation of Evren’s speech was quite different. He stated that Evren’s message 
was only a suggestion and could be considered. He also emphasized that, contrary to 
the news, these dormitories were not independent, there was the control of the state 
over them.110 At the end, it seems that the government succeeded to convince Evren 
on the status of the private dormitories because neither the administration of these 
dormitories was given to the state nor the issue came on the scene again as a source 
of conflict between the president and the government.  
 The debate between the government and the president on whether there was 
any reaction or not in Turkey in the last months of 1986 and early months of 1987 
also fueled another long lasting problem in Turkey, i.e. the problem of the head scarf 
in the universities. The first direct attempt to ban the head scarf in the universities 
was made in 1982 on the part of the Higher Education Council (Yüksek Öğretim 
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Kurumu] (hereafter YÖK), to be sure, by the suggestions of the NSC, but it was 
softened in May 1984 probably due to the endeavors of the government.111 Yet 
Evren was not contented with this move because, as he noted in December 1984, he 
did not welcome the veiled women who were becoming more widespread in the 
streets and universities.112 Evren sent the court order of the Council of State 
(Danıştay) to YÖK in December 1986 in order to apply the ban on head the scarf in 
the universities strictly. The Council of the State banned the head scarf on the ground 
that it was a symbol of a world view which was contrary to the basic principles of 
the republic and the rights of women.113 He also said to İhsan Doğramacı, the then 
head of YÖK, that there would be some pressures from the government to put off the 
ban, but he would support him against these pressures.114  
 In order to bring the issue of the head scarf to a conclusion, the university 
rectors were invited for a meeting in Adana on January 1987. They met with the 
participation of Evren and came up with a conclusion that only modern dress could 
be worn in the universities and those who did not wear the modern dress were 
subjected to punishment.115 Soon after this meeting, the universities prohibited 
wearing the head scarf, which initiated protest movements in various cities. Hovever, 
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Özal and the members of the MP did not appreciate the decisions because they were 
in favor of lifting the ban on the head scarf. For instance, upon the question of a 
journalist on the applications of the universities Özal said: 
If it is a religious duty to cover the head, the universities accept it as a modern 
dress, as a result, there remains no problem. As far as I know entering 
classrooms with the head scarf is no prohibited by any rule. If I order you to 
cover your head, would this be right? If you do not like to cover your head, 
you argue against it. The opposite of this is also possible. I can not insist that 
you should uncover your heads.116  
 
 Despite the fact that Özal criticized the applications of the universities, he 
also added that the disposal belonged to YÖK, and he could not intervene in its 
affairs. However, the conservative members of the MP were more decisive to find a 
way for the students wearing the head scarf. For instance, when the veiled students 
visited Mehmet Keçeciler, he said that they would solve this problem sooner or later. 
He added:  
We have to solve this problem. If we can not solve it through the decisions of 
YÖK, we have recourse to other means like law. Once we suffered from 
similar restrictions too.... You will struggle for your rights. May be after your 
struggle some solutions will be found.117 
 
 Keçeciler was supported by other conservative members such as Kazim 
Oksay and Şükrü Yörür but neither the government nor the Assembly made a move 
to cancel the ban on the head scarf probably due to the fact that the matter became 
highly politicized which increased tension in the public. It was almost  two years 
later that a law was passed in the Assembly in November 1988, which stated that any 
kind of dress was free in the universities. Again Evren criticized Özal’s way of 
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solution, because Evren preferred to solve it by regulation, not by law.118 Evren 
emphasized that his attitude towards the head scarf was not solid, but to arrange it by 
a law seemed in contradiction with the Constitution. Evren applied to the 
Constitutional Court, and it abolished the law in March 1989. At the same time, 
Evren preferred not to hinder the government to implement its policy; thus, he 
demanded from İhsan Doğramacı to change regulations in favor of the head scarf. 
Consequently, the change in regulation was carried out, and it was left to the 
discretion of the universities.119  
 Both Evren and Özal were careful not to rise the conflicts to a point of crisis. 
For instance, when the hot debates were taking place in the public, especially in the 
press, that whether there was reaction in Turkey or not, and the discussions were 
brought to the Assembly, Özal stated that he agreed with president Evren on the 
point that there was a potential danger of reaction in Turkey.120 Similarly when the 
mayor of the metropolitan municipality of Konya, who was a member of the 
religious Welfare Party, allocated separate school buses to convey the female 
students to the university, Özal stated that the mayor could not separate the buses of 
the state for that purpose.121 On the other hand, Evren’s attitude towards Özal and 
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the government remained moderate, despite the fact that he did not cease his 
criticism for the religious developments. For instance, as has already been pointed 
out, when the government desired to soften the ban on the head scarf in the 
universities, Evren said that he was not decisive on the matter, and it could be done 
by changing the regulations. Moreover, when the opposition parties demanded from 
the Assembly to investigate the reaction in Turkey, Evren told Erdal İnönü, the 
leader of the opposition Social Democrat People’s Party, not to exaggerate the 
matter.122  
 All in all, if the period of Evren’s presidency and Özal’s premiership are 
taken under consideration together with the compromises and contentions, it can be 
said that there were no differences in their approaches to moral and cultural 
significance of religion, however, conflicts usually arose when the political 
expression of religion was concerned. Yet, Evren’s critical attitude towards the 
religious communities or the public appearances of Islam does not mean that there 
was a backward move in military’s approach in comparison to the pre-1983 period 
because in no time the military leadership of the 1980 Intervention approved the 
politicization of religion which was seen as a threat to the national unity and social 
harmony. Evren continued to emphasize on the integrating and unifying aspects of 
religion as much as he made warnings about its politicization. For instance, in the 
last months of his presidency Evren advised Avni Akyol, the Minister of Education, 
to improve the curriculum of the religious courses in the primary and secondary 
schools so as to emphasize on the necessity and value of religion, and the superiority 
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of Islam.123 In other words, the military leadership of the 1980 Intervention 
represented by the president and the presidential council maintained their previous 
standpoint towards religion in such a way that they regarded it as an indispensable 
part of the national culture and social identity, but always remained suspicious of its 
politicization.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 The developments after the seventeenth century which led the West to 
modernity, namely the Enlightenment, produced far-reaching consequences beyond 
Europe. The expansion of modernity throughout the world, which went hand in hand 
with the colonization process, pushed the “others” out of history, a process that 
culminated in the transformation of the non-Western world into the mere subjects of 
“modern history.” Yet, the West’s formidable challenge to the East generated a 
strong stimulus within the non-Western world to come to terms with the West. The 
initial response in most cases was the activation of a program of modernization 
through Westernization based on the negation of native and particular cultures which 
were assumed as impediments to grasp the power and the “universality” of the West. 
There was little intellectual interests aroused in the said nations to find particular 
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paths to modernity equivalent to the German Sonderweg.1 Rather, what characterized 
these societies was a weak historicism,2 denoting that they did not generate 
modernity on the basis of their own internal dynamics, but  experienced it as an 
external process by adapting Western technology, science, manners, institutions, and 
the like. Islam, as the prominent marker of the particular culture, was the first target 
of those who wanted to modernize their societies through Westernization. In cases in 
which the main actor of modernity, i.e. bourgeoisie, was lacking, this target was 
realized by the military-bureaucratic elites. This was especially true for the Ottoman-
Turkish modernization process which has completely developed under the aegis of 
the military-bureaucratic elites. Indeed, what is called the “Turkish Modernization” 
was a response of these elites to the general process indicated above to come to 
terms with the “history.” Accordingly, the character of Turkish secularism was 
shaped by the elitist political tradition. Thus, there has been a close relationship 
between the military and secularism in Turkey. Neither the historical trajectory of 
the state-Islam relationship nor the present form of secularism is possible unless the 
role of the military in shaping the incidents is looked at.  
 As has already been noted, the formation of modernity in these societies was 
realized through a drastic process of secularization on the part of the state elites. As 
                                                 
1 Sonderweg, a concept and a subject of German intellectual history, refers to 
the view that Germany should find a particular path to modernity different from the 
French and English ones. It should generate modernity on the basis of its local 
dynamics. See, David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, The Peculiarities of German 
History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth Century Germany (Oxford, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1984). 
 
2 Nilüfer Göle, Modern Mahrem: Medeniyet ve Örtünme [Forbidden Modern: 
Civilization and Veil] (Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1991), 13; For the lack of 
historicist thought in the Muslim world, particularly in the Arab world, see, Abdullah 
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it was shown, it was due to the particular historical-cultural tradition that the 
formation of modernity was realized by the state elites; thus, the modernizing-
secularizing role of the military in the Ottoman-Turkish context can be explained by 
looking at this historical-cultural setting rather than addressing the existing literature 
on civil-military relations, which was mainly developed to explain the military 
interventions and the rise of authoritarianism in the so-called third world or 
developing countries. The existing orthodoxy on civil-military relations, in general, 
assumes that the political activism of the military in “developing” counties can be 
explained by looking at the following factors: the organizational peculiarities of the 
military, the class origins of the military staff, the crises generated by the import-
substitution industrialization and the weak institutionalization patterns. Unlike the 
militaries which established enduring authoritarian regimes in most of the 
developing countries, the Turkish military has always been committed to a certain 
conception of democracy which places a sole emphasis on the “common interest” 
which prevented the military from establishing long lasting authoritarian regimes. 
Furthermore, the military’s political strength in Turkey springs from what the 
developing countries mainly lack: excessive institutionalization patterns,3 which also 
make the Turkish case exceptional.  
 The strong institutionalization patterns have come into existence through a 
long historical process which paved the way to a state tradition in which the military 
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was a central institution. Two critical factors were emphasized in shaping the 
institutionalization patterns either in weak or strong direction: the antecedent polity 
tradition and the nature of the military modernization. In societies where the 
representative assemblies effectively functioned, particularly the societies with 
feudal past, and these assemblies were not destroyed by the military modernization, 
the formation of modernity (which was experienced as the formation of the center or 
the national states), did not generate strong and autonomous centers. But, the 
societies which either lacked these assemblies or were destroyed in the process of the 
military modernization have been characterized by the strong centers, i.e. states, 
political elitism and the long lasting tensions between the center and periphery. The 
center formation of these societies develops at the expense of the periphery, and the 
military and bureaucracy appear as the sole representatives of the will of the center 
vis-a-visthat of the periphery.  
 Then, it was argued that secularity traditions were closely related to the types 
of the political cultures, and the elitist political cultures tended to generate the 
“maximal secularity” tradition. Unlike the smooth reconciliation of the state and the 
church in stateless societies where “minimal secularity” was found, in state societies 
a sharp separation of the state and the church with bitter confrontations of “massive 
religion” and “massive secularism” took place, and secularism tended “to erode the 
institutional adherence and belief together.”4 Alternative secular ideologies with a 
new set of the symbols and vocabularies, and philosophical systems were substituted 
for religion.  
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 As to the Ottoman-Turkish tradition, it was shown that because of the lack of 
the feudal past, the representative assemblies remained alien to the Ottoman-Turkish 
polity tradition. In fact, the state was structured mainly by the military which shaped 
at the same time its political culture. The state concentrated the power at the center 
and had no affinity with the periphery. Therefore, neither a hereditary aristocracy nor 
a bourgeoisie developed which could challenge the power of the center. The 
dominant cleavage has been the center and periphery in the Ottoman-Turkish polity.5 
Moreover, the modernization efforts, which firstly started by the modernization of 
the military, destroyed the nascent peripheral forces in the nineteenth century. 
Consequently, in the absence of the principal social forces which shaped the course 
of the political reforms in Western Europe, all reforms in the Ottoman-Turkish 
context aiming at modernization of society through Westernization were initiated 
from top down by the central elites, which resulted in further penetration of the 
periphery by the center. The state was structured around certain norms and by the 
military-bureaucratic elites which have filtrated the norms and demands of the 
periphery.  
 Like in Western Europe, the process of modernization and centralization was 
also the process of secularization. In the process of modernization whose origins go 
back to the nineteenth century, Islam, one of the central components of the Ottoman 
state, was gradually removed from the state structure, which culminated in a total 
divorce of the state and Islam with the establishment of the Republic in 1923. Kemal 
Atatürk, the founder of the republic, opted for a kind of religion which was 
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extremely private and rational.6 Atatürk, as a firm believer in the ideas of the 
Enlightenment perceived on the basis of the French positivist-rationalist experience, 
imagined a collectivity which would be based on a secular-positivist nationalism; 
thus, he fought institutional Islam to free the individual from the hold of religion and 
to bring about the new collectivity, i.e. the nation. The desired individual for this 
new collectivity was “the rationalist, anti-traditionalist, anti-clerical person, 
approaching all matters intellectually and objectively.”7 Religion was not accepted as 
a component of the nation and as a source of social morality. As has already been 
noted, it was substituted by science and secular nationalism which contained strong 
imprints of positivism and rationalism. Another strategy concerning religion was to 
prevent its appearance in the public sphere.  
 The revolutionary legacy of Atatürk was generalized by the state elites after 
Atatürk, and his pragmatic outlook was replaced with a prescriptive interpretation 
which also paved the way for the maximal interpretation of the secularism in 
succeeding periods.8 It gained irreligious and anti-clerical characters in the hands of 
the state elites, which was reinforced by the ideas of the new intellectuals who were 
filled, as Kemal Karpat pointed out, with the idea that “every social evil came from 
Islam.”9 As a result, a reverse relationship was established between the declared aim 
of the Turkish modernization as Westernization and Islam, which was considered as 
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an impediment in attaining this goal, a view whose origins go back to the nineteenth 
century.   
 Consequently, the republican synthesis excluded religion from the ingredients 
of the national culture and social morality. It was supposed that the new collectivity 
would be constructed on the total negation of historical memory,10 the view that led 
the state elites to search new sources of morality and the cultural identity other than 
Islam. Positivist science and secular nationalism were offered as new sources in this 
regard. It was the main historical weakness of the project of the Turkish secularism, 
on the one hand, that although it excluded religion from the definition of new 
collectivity and cultural identity, it failed to provide appropriate instruments for the 
moral sphere and even for attaining its fundamental goals- the national unity and 
social harmony because science as such had no relevance to them.11 On the other 
hand, it had to cope with the main social component with which the Turkish people 
continued to identify themselves, i.e. Islam.12 Thus, the rivalry colored the nature of 
the relationship between secularism and religion in Turkey, and exclusionary, rather 
than incorporating strategies, were preferred by the state elites.  
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 However, it was noted that the attitudes of the military leaders of the 1980 
Intervention towards religion was a radical break from this tradition since their 
treatment of religion represents that the antagonistic and extremely private 
conception of religion was abandoned paving the way for the recognition of its social 
aspects and the approval of its positive role in attaining modernity. On the one hand, 
the attempt of the military leaders of the 1980 Intervention was another 
manifestation of the incessant endeavors of the state elites to find a satisfactory 
answer to the above problem, on the other, it brought about a new modus vivendi 
between the state and Islam. It seems that the military leaders in the 1980s discerned 
the most important weakness of the republican ideal: “the principles of modernity 
could be accommodated only on the basis of the massive prohibition and interdiction 
of the historical and traditional culture.”13 The military elites of the 1980s thought 
that the social and political upheavals that marked the 1970s stemmed from the lack 
of social morality which could be filled by religion. Therefore, they began to treat 
Islam in a more affirmative way. A new social ethics was offered which incorporated 
strong religious tenets. Religious courses were made compulsory at the primary and 
secondary school levels. The official recognition of Islam found its expression in 
daily political discourse which “articulated and tolerated Islamic elements in the 
political-public realm.”14 A new view of “national culture” was formulated by the 
military government in which religion was emphasized as an indispensable 
component of sources of this culture. Accordingly, the relationship between Islam 
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and Atatürkism was rearticulated which paved the way to the redefinition of the 
relationship between the modernization ideals of Atatürkism and Islam.15 With 
regards to the change in the ideological orientation of the military in the 1980s,  
Kemal Karpat aptly observed:  
The key ideological change has occurred in the meaning attached to 
“modernism.” Today, the cultural and political emulation of the West is no 
longer the axis of the modernism. It is, rather, economic development, 
technological advancement, and material progress in all its forms. The 
reconciliation with the Ottoman past and the reshaping of the national identity 
in the light of the Turk’s own national cultural and religious ethos have 
broadened the scope of modernization in such a way as to relegate the West, 
without abandoning it, to a secondary position, while giving priority to a new 
historically rooted socio-cultural Turkish identity. In large measure this has 
been achieved by reinterpreting “secularism” in such a way as to permit the 
reconciliation between the past and present without damaging the foundation 
of the Republic.16 
 
 All in all, the incorporation of indigenous ingredients including Islam into the 
formulation of a social morality and the definition of cultural identity was an 
important move from “maximal secularity” to “mere secularity” because an 
affirmative relationship was reestablished between the state and Islam, and the 
modernization ideals of Atatürkism and Islam at least in cultural terms. The cast–
iron theory of Islam, which bears strong imprints of the secularization thesis 
claiming that with the development of modernity the scope of religion declines, and 
                                                                                                                                          
 
15 The military leaders of the 1980 Intervention resorted to the pragmatic 
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even disappears,17 was abandoned, and Islam began to be seen not as a rival, but as a 
cultural ally in attaining the modernity. The developments after the 1980s proved in 
a sense this view because after transferring of the religious groups to the public 
sphere, it became apparent that the “religious sphere” has not remained immune to 
the views, values, manners and representations of the “outside,” and new forms of 
Islam have emerged infused with the “cosmopolitanism” of modernity.18  
Yet, the military’s move in this regard did not lift their reserve on the 
political expression of religiosity. They maintained the existing model of church-
state separation based on the idea that politics should be totally immune to the 
influences of religion. Apart from the military’s prevailing commitment to 
secularism, seen as an indispensable instrument in attaining modernity, their 
suspicious attitude towards the political expression of religiosity was also shaped by 
the fear that it would awaken particularism and sectarianism in society which would 
damage the national unity and social harmony. Moreover, this new modus vivendi 
between the state and Islam did not change the one-sided position of the state vis-a-
visIslam, and the state maintained its “singular position to influence and structure the 
political course and discourse of Islam,”19 as it became more apparent after the 
meeting of the National Security Council on February 28, 1997, which resulted in 
the resignation of the coalition government formed by the religious Welfare Party 
and the True Path Party. It needs an independent study that whether or not 28 
February represents a break from the legacy of 12 September.  
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